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INTRODUCTION
It is commonly understood that as a matter of federal law, states may
have divergent substantive policies with respect to those matters that are not
violative of the United States Constitution. Such diversity among polities is
one of the frequently heralded benefits of our federal system.1 As a
practical matter, however, what degree of political heterogeneity among
states is possible vis-à-vis substantive policies that are not unconstitutional?
In short, what is the degree of legal pluralism that our Constitution’s federal
regime permits?
The answer to the question turns in large part on whether states, if they
so choose, can regulate their cit izens even when they are out of their Home
States.2 If they cannot, citizens can bypass their Home States’ laws by
simply traveling to a more legally permissive state to do there what is
prohibited at home. Such “travel-evasion,” which in effect gives citizens
the power to choose which state’s laws are to govern them on an issue-byissue basis, can cripple the ability of states to ac complish constitutional
1

See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A
General Restatement, 148 U. P A . L. REV. 1503, 1558 (2000) (stating that a good associated
with federalism is the “diversity of choices [it] permits”).
2
The Article refers to the place where the traveler lives as the “Home State” and the
place to where she has traveled as the “Host State.”
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objectives. Consider, for example, how travel-evasion can frustrate
legislation banning assisted suicide: the state’s interests that drive such a
law are undermined if one of its sick citizens takes a bus to a jurisdiction
that allows her to end her life. As this Article explains, such travel-evasion
may have the systemic effect of creating a “race-to-the-bottom” to the
lowest common denominator of regulation, thereby undercutting the degree
of political heterogeneity possible among states in our federal system among
policies that are not foreclosed to states by the United States Constitution.
On the other hand, a Home State’s direction of its citizens’ out-of-state
activities can run up against the interests of the Host State, and, for many
other reasons, may threaten to undermine our federal system. How the
interests of the Host State, Home State, and the federal system are to be
accommodated is the subject of this Article.
There are many constitutionally legitimate state goals that can be
frustrated if citizens can free themselves of their Home State’s legal
requirements merely by crossing a border. For example, those states that
require motorcyclists to wear helmets typically do so to protect both their
citizens’ health and the state’s coffers (since badly injured people require
medical assistance, may become public charges, etc.). Of course, the state’s
interests are no less implicated if one of its bare-headed citizens is injured
while motorcycling in a sister jurisdiction without helmet laws. So can a
state require that its citizens wear helmets when riding motorcycles
wherever they might be? Consider as well:
• A state may ban gambling altogether for moral reasons, to prevent the
costs imposed on gamblers’ families, or to reduce the creation of public
charges.3 Since such policy goals are undermined regardless of where
the citizen’s gambling occurs, can a Home State ban its citizens from
gambling not only at home but also in all other states?4
• Many states have refused to accept the battered spouse defense for
wives that kill their battering husbands (and vice versa). Is a Home
3

See Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 185-87 (1999)
(noting that the federal government may assist states in their assertion of a “legitimate and
substantial interest” in alleviating the societal ills of “injury and loss to [compulsive] gamblers
as well as their families, commun ities, and government”).
4
This Article does not address the question of whether and to what extent states can
regulate their citizens’ behaviors in foreign countries. The time required by, and costs of,
international travel make interstate travel the major means by which citizens attempt to evade
their Home State’s laws. To be sure, extraterritorial interstate regulation might lead to
increased efforts of citizens to leave the country to escape the force of their Home State laws.
States’ powers are more limited internationally insofar as they may interfere with the federal
government’s powers over foreign affairs. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (preempting and declaring unconstitutional a state law that imposed
sanctions on Burma because the state law conflicted with federal sanctions and law).
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State that does not accept the defense without recourse if a battered
husband kills his wife while the couple is on vacation in a Host State
that accepts the defense?5
• A Home State may prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation to protect gay men and lesbians and to counteract
homophobia by requiring interaction between heterosexuals and
homosexuals. Can the Home State apply its regulations to a citizen
who runs a business in a state that does not have such an
antidiscrimination law?6
• It is constitutional for states to enact parental notification laws that
protect the interests of the pregnant minor’s parents by providing them
the “opportunity to consult with [their daughter] in private, and to
discuss the consequences of her decision in the context of the values
and moral or religious principles of their family.”7 What, if anything,
can the Home State do to keep its policy from being skirted by the
minor crossing the border?8
In fact, a broad array of state laws can be circumvented through
travel—laws running the gamut from citizen welfare and the integrity of
government to the conduct of business. This Article explores the
circumstances under which states can counter such “travel-evasion” to
ensure the efficacy of policies that they are constitutionally permitted to
pursue. It suggests that to a large degree they can. For instance, this Article
will show that states can regulate extraterritorially to counter all the abovementioned kinds of travel-evasion.9

5

This intriguing hypothetical was put forward in Seth F. Kreimer, The Law of Choice
and Choice of Law: Abortion, the Right to Travel, and Extraterritorial Regulation in
American Federalism , 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 451, 499 n.169 (1992) [hereinafter Kreimer, Law of
Choice]. I discuss it at length infra notes 423-26 and accompanying text.
6
This Article does not consider the converse case of whether a gay man from a Home
State with antidiscrimination laws can assert that law against a business located in a state
without such laws. That scenario implicates the question of whether and to what extent Home
States may regulate noncitizens, a complex query that is beyond the scope of this Article.
7
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899 -900 (1992). The Court in Casey
upheld a parental notification law. Id.
8
In fact, this frequently occurs. See, e.g., CRLP: Judicial Bypass Fails Young Women
Seeking Abortions, U.S. NEWSWIRE , July 15, 1999 (reporting that a Louisiana woman traveled
to Texas to obtain an abortion after her petition for a waiver of Louisiana’s parental
notification requirement was denied by a Louisiana state court judge), available at LEXIS.
See generally Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 455 n.14 (citing newspaper articles
enumerating studies that document the extent of travel-evasion to circumvent restrictive
abortion regulations).
9
This Article considers states’ powers to act unilaterally so as to regulate their cit izens’
out-of-state conduct. A work-in-progress explores two alternatives to unilateral efforts to
regulate extraterritorially: (1) congressional authorization to states to regulate citizens
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The question of extraterritorial regulation to counter travel-evasion is of
more than just theoretical interest. Pennsylvania recently prosecuted an
adult who helped a pregnant minor travel out of the state to avoid the
parental notification requirements of her Home State, 10 and a few years ago
the United States House of Representatives approved a bill that would have
made an adult’s assistance to such pregnant minors a federal crime.11
Consider as well Wisconsin’s recent efforts to put small Wisconsin dairy
farms on an even playing ground with large Wisconsin farms. Purchasers of
raw milk paid premiums to large Wisconsin dairy farms in excess of the
economic savings that attended the purchase of milk from large farms. To
deprive large Wisconsin farms of financial benefits that were not the result
of economic efficiencies and thereby engender fairer competition,
Wisconsin prohibited premiums to the extent they exceeded the real
economic savings of purchasing milk from large farms. The large
Wisconsin farms and milk purchasers then engaged in classic travelevasion: with the express purpose of avoiding the Wisconsin law, they
restructured the sales so they technically occurred in Illinois, which did not
have such a restriction on premiums. Wisconsin in turn sought to apply its
prohibition extraterritorially to such Illinois sales.12
These examples notwithstanding, few states have tried to frustrate
travel-evasion by regulating their citizens’ out-of-state activities. There is

extraterritorially and (2) interstate compacts. Mark D. Rosen, Concurrent Legislative
Jurisdiction 40-45 (Jan. 10, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). Both
alternatives to unilateral state action are difficult to accomplish polit ically, however, and
hence are unlikely on their own to adequately protect states’ interests. See id. at 40-44
(identifying political and potential constitutional problems with the two alternatives).
10
Commonwealth v. Hartford, No. 95-98 (Ct. Com. Pl. Sullivan County, Pa. Dec. 5,
1996). Professo r Kreimer helpfully points out that Ms. Hartford’s conviction was reversed
due to improper jury instructions in an unpublished, unreported decision. See Seth F.
Kreimer, Lines in the Sand: The Importance of Borders in American Federalism , 150 U. P A .
L. REV. 973, 975 n.8 (2001) [hereinafter Kreimer, Lines in the Sand]. Pennsylv ania was
interested in retrying the case, see Robert L. Sharpe, Supreme Court Drops Appeal over N.Y.
Abortion, 22 P A. L. WKLY. 1029, 1029 (1999) (“An upstate Pennsylvania prosecutor said he
would likely re-try the case.”), however the defendant and the Sullivan County district
attorney ultimately entered into an agreement under which Ms. Hartford was to perform the
same community service and undergo the same rehabilitative treatment that the court had
ordered following her conviction. Telephone Interview with Max P. Little, District Attorney,
Sullivan County, Pa. (Dec. 20, 2001).
11
See House Passes First Federal Criminal Anti-Abortion Measure, U.S. NEWSWIRE ,
June 30, 1999 (reporting that the House passed the Child Custody Protection Act, H.R. 1218,
106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999), which would have made it a federal offense to transport a minor
across state lines for the purpose of obtaining an abortion if the minor’s state of residence
required parental involvement in her decision to obtain an abortion), available at LEXIS.
12
For a discussion and analysis of this case, Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609
(7th Cir. 1999), see infra Part II.C.2.
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evidence that this paucity of examples is attributable to a perception among
the states that they are without power to regulate extraterritorially.13 Indeed,
the House Bill was condemned in the popular press on such a ground,14 and
Wisconsin’s effort was struck down under the Dormant Commerce Clause
by a federal court of appeals.15 This Article will suggest that such criticism
is misplaced,16 and that the court’s analysis was erroneous.17 I hope in this
Article to correct the misperception of state incapacity to regulate
extraterritorially, so as to allow states to consider this form of regulation on
its merits.18
Courts and commentators have asserted several doctrinal objections to
state efforts to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct. The first claim
is that states simply do not have the power to regulate conduct occurring
outside their borders. Language from the United States Supreme Court case
Bigelow v. Virginia19 has been said to support this view.20 The Court in
Bigelow stated that a “State does not acquire power or supervision over the
internal affairs of another State merely because the welfare and health of its
own citizens may be affected when they travel to that State.”21 Similarly,
the Arizona Court of Appeals recently held that “‘[l]aws have no force of
themselves beyond the jurisdiction of the state which enacts them, and can
have extraterritorial effect only by the comity of other states.’”22 Much
13

See infra note 32 (discussing cases and materials that support the proposition that
states do not have extraterritorial powers).
14
See, e.g., Katha Pollitt, Far from Chile?, NATION, July 27, 1998, at 9 (asking “[s]ince
when is one still subject to one’s home state’s laws in another state?” and arguing that such a
law accordingly would be unconstitutional); Editorial, Crossing the Line, P ORTLAND
OREGONIAN , July 28, 1998, at B8 (“Imagine traveling to Portland from another state, abiding
by every local law, then returning to face arrest for your completely legal conduct on Oregon
soil . . . . [F]ederal lawmakers are [not] justified in using a back- door ploy to interfere with
prerogatives of individual states to make laws affecting the people who live within their
borders.”).
15
See Dean Foods, 187 F.3d at 620 (“[T]he commerce at issue here occurred wholly
outside of Wisconsin, and thus any attempt by Wisconsin to enforce its volume premium rules
against it would violate the extraterritoriality principle.”).
16
Infra Part II.
17
Infra Part II.C.2.
18
Relevant to analyzing the merits of such extraterritorial regulation is the extent to
which a state could enforce such regulations. Concurrent Legislative Jurisdiction, a work-inprogress, analyzes enforcement issues and shows that states would have many efficacious
options to ensure compliance with laws that regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct.
Rosen, supra note 9, at 45-46.
19
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
20
Professor Kreimer has advanced this view. See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5,
at 460-62 (arguing that Bigelow has strong foundations in American federalism).
21
421 U.S. at 824.
22
Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm Workers of Am., 816 P.2d 919, 925 (Ariz. Ct.
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Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence seems to take a similar approach,
as such caselaw announces that states may not enact “extraterritorial
legislation” that “‘directly regulates transactions which take place across
state lines.’”23 This Article will show that these lines of caselaw do not
undermine the well-established and normatively sound jurisprudence that
states have inherent power to regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct.
A second possible objection to extraterritorial regulation is that even if
Home States have some extraterritorial powers with respect to their citizens,
they do not have the power to prohibit them from engaging in activities in
Host States that are permissible for the Host States’ citizens. Professor Seth
Kreimer has advanced this view, relying in part on the above-mentioned
case of Bigelow to argue that the “tradition of American federalism stands
squarely against efforts by states to punish their citizens for conduct that is
protected in the sister state where it occurs.”24 Professors Rollin Perkins
and Ronald Boyce have proffered comparable arguments.25 Professor Lea
Brilmayer has come to a similar conclusion, arguing that with regard to
issues about which there are sharp moral disagreements among states, such
as abortion and the right to die, “the structure of our federal system clearly
compels the priority of the territorial state, and . . . this priority typically
invalidates the residence state’s claim to regulate.”26
This Article argues against the positions advanced by Professors
Kreimer, Perkins, Boyce, and Brilmayer, as well as the other objections to
extraterritorial regulation that have been propounded.27 It shows that our
App. 1991) (quotin g Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 669 (1892)).
23
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 333 n.9 (1989) (quoting Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457
U.S. 624, 641 (1982) (plurality opinion)).
24
Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 462.
25
See ROLLIN M. P ERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE , CRIMINAL LAW 42 (3d ed. 1982)
(“[N]o state may punish its citizen for what he does in the exclusive territorial jurisdiction of
another state where what was done was lawful.”).
26
Lea Brilmayer, Interstate Preem ption: The Right to Travel, the Right to Life, and the
Right to Die, 91 MICH . L. REV. 873, 876 (1993).
27
To date, a few scholars have concluded that states have powers to regulate their
citizens’ out-of-state conduct under limited circumstances, but none has comprehensively
analyzed the issue of extraterritorial regulation. See C. Steven Bradford, What Happens If
Roe Is Overruled? Extraterritorial Regulation of Abortion by the States, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 87,
170 (1993) (concluding only that there is a “plausible” case on behalf of state extraterritorial
power in the discrete context of abortion); Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws,
73 I OWA L. REV. 893, 907 n.94 (1988) (stating in a footnote that “[s]tates may punish citizens
for criminal acts done outside the state”); Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial
State Legislation, 85 MICH . L. REV. 1865, 1906-08, 1912 -13 (1987) (providing incisive but
incomplete analysis of extraterritoriality in five pages); William Van Alstyne, Closing the
Circle of Constitutional Review from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of
a Decision Merely Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1684 (spending one page on the
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country’s federal union imposes far more modest limitations on states’
inherent powers to regulate the extraterritorial conduct of their citizens. The
Constitution creates a national union, to be sure, but it is a union of
meaningfully empowered states. Meaningful empowerment means that
states can take reasonable steps, including extraterritorial regulation, to
ensure the efficacy of heterogeneous policies that themselves are not
unconstitutional. The political heterogeneity that extraterritorial regulation
permits is an affirmative good in a country as large and diverse as ours.
(Professor Seth Kreimer provides a rejoinder to my analysis in a
commentary immediately following this Article, and the editors of the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review were kind enough to allow me an
extended footnote to respond.28 )
More generally, this Article stands firmly against the current tendency
among many important legal scholars to dismiss the significance of
subfederal polities. Professor Larry Kramer recently opin ed in the pages of
the Yale Law Journal that “few citizens today think of the United States as
anything other than a single political community” that “share[s] what is, for
practical purposes, a single culture.”29 Professors Edward L. Rubin and
Malcolm Feeley come to a similar conclusion 30 and argue that the only
valuable function of states is to “achieve the managerial benefits that flow
from decentralizing certain governmental functions.”31 This Article, by
contrast, elucidates the importance of allowing rich political heterogeneity
among states.
The Article is composed of four Parts. The first Part examines states’
presumptive powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct. These
baseline extraterritorial powers are confirmed by the Tenth Amendment and
are limited in the first instance by due process, which guarantees that such
regulations are fair vis-à-vis individual citizens. Such extraterritorial
powers are only presumptive, however, for there are additional federal
limitations, which are the subjects of Parts II and III. Part I reviews early
Supreme Court caselaw, recent scholarly restatements, and contemporary
due process jurisprudence concerning extraterritoriality. In so doing, Part I
develops several powerful normative arguments on behalf of the position
issue).
28

Infra note 455.
Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public
Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1989 (1997).
30
See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 945 (1994) (“[T]he United States has one political
community, and that political community is the United States.”).
31
Id. at 951. For an explanation of the managerial advantages of decentralization, see id.
at 910-13.
29
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that states have extraterritoriality regulatory powers over their citizens.
Part II reviews several constitutional provisions that tame states’
baseline extraterritorial powers in the service of creating a single, federal
union of states. These limitations on extraterritoriality emerge from the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the right to travel, and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, as well as nontextual structural limitations. Although
courts and commentators have correctly recognized that these constitutional
constraints limit the extent to which Home States can regulate their citizens’
out-of-state activities, their scope has been overstated. Careful analysis
shows that these constitutional doctrines place important, but only modest,
limitations on state power, and that they leave ample room for Home States
to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities.
As a result of the doctrines explored in Parts I and II, our federal system
is one in which both the Home and Host State presumptively have
concurrent jurisdiction over any given transaction or occurrence. Part III
explores the law that establishes and regulates this system of concurrent
jurisdiction. Part III also provides a preliminary explanation as to why this
system does not result in anarchy, but instead generally functions smoothly.
A short Conclusion follows.
I.

T HE PRESUMPTIVE POWER OF HOME STATES TO REGULATE T HEIR
CIT IZENS’ OUT-OF-STATE CONDUCT

As a matter of federal constitutional law, states have a presumptive
power to regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial conduct. This is something
that many state courts appear not to appreciate. 32 This extraterritorial power
32

See, e.g., Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm Workers of Am., 816 P.2d 919, 925-26
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (concluding that states are without extraterritorial power as a matter of
federal constitutional law); supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the issue
concluded in Bruce Church). For a review of cases showing state courts’ “attitude of
territoriality,” which had led the courts to refrain from applying state laws to extraterritorial
activities, see Daniel L. Rotenberg, Extraterritorial Legislative Jurisdiction and the State
Criminal Law, 38 T EX. L. REV. 763, 773 & n.59, 774-80 (1960). Similarly, many
jurisdictions that have abandoned strict territorialist conflict -of-laws rules and have applied
Home State laws concerning loss-allocation to out -of-state occurrences are nonetheless of the
view that the Home State could not regulate the conduct of its out -of-state citizens. See, e.g.,
Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E. 279, 284 (N.Y. 1963) (applying New York guest statute to
accident occurring out of state). For example, the court in Babcock stated that if the legal
issue had
related to the manner in which the defendant had been driving his car at the time of
the accident . . . it [would be] appropriate to look to the law of the place of the tort so
as to give effect to that jurisdiction’s interest in regulating conduct within its borders,
and it would be almost unthinkable to seek the applicable rule in the law of some
other place.
Id. The distinction between “conduct regulating” and “loss allocating” rules is widespread in
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is part of the inherent sovereign powers that have been retained by states
under the Tenth Amendment. While the scope of these presumptive powers
is limited by contemporary due process doctrine, states retain significant
extraterritorial powers vis-à-vis their citizens.
A. Early Caselaw
As a matter of federal law,33 states’ regulatory powers do not end at
their borders. Under appropriate circumstances, states have the power to
apply their laws to their citizens’ out-of-state activities. Though the
Article’s focus is on extraterritorial regulation of citizens, any study of state
extraterritoriality powers must start with an early case that upheld
Michigan’s criminal prosecution of a noncitizen who had never entered the
state. The defendant in the 1921 case of Strassheim v. Daily had engaged in
bribery and false pretenses in Illinois as part of a scheme to sell used
machinery to the state of Michigan that he falsely claimed was new.34
Writing for the United States Supreme Court, Justice Holmes famously
declared that “[a]cts done outside a jurisdiction, but intended to produce and
producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State in punishing the cause
of the harm as if he had been present at the effect.”35 Unfortunately,
Strassheim is not particularly helpful in explaining the source of the state’s
extraterritorial powers; it merely says that “the usage of the civ ilized world
would warrant Michigan in punishing him, although he never had set foot in
the State until after the fraud was complete.”36 As we soon will see,
subsequent cases have more fully developed the proposition that a state has
the power to protect itself from harm that is directed against it from outside
its borders.
The Supreme Court upheld another state’s exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in Skiriotes v. Florida.37 The Court approved the application of

conflict-of-law doctrine. See generally RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 434-35 (4th ed. 2001) (describing how choice-of-law issues are
determined in New York and Louisiana depending on this distinction). To the extent this
caselaw is premised on the view that federal constitutional law precludes conduct regulating
extraterritorial regulation, this Article suggests these criminal law and choice-of-law doctrines
could be different. Whether they should be different, of course, is ultimately a matter for
states to decide on the merits.
33
State extraterritorial powers under federal law are permissive rather than mandatory;
thus, a state court could legitimately conclude that state law precludes a state from regulating
extraterritorially.
34
221 U.S. 280, 281-82 (1911).
35
Id. at 285.
36
Id. at 284-85.
37
313 U.S. 69 (1941).
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a Florida statute prohibiting sponge fishing to a Florida citizen’s activities
that occurred wholly outside of that state’s territorial waters. In contrast to
Strassheim’s epigrammatic discussion, however, the bulk of the Skiriotes
opinion concerned the source of the state’s power to regulate outside its
borders and focused on a two-step explanation. The Court first observed
that the federal government has inherent extraterritorial power over
activities implicating “legitimate interests” when those interests can be
undermined by activities that occur outside of United States territory:
[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from
governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign
countries . . . . Thus, a criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly
injurious to the government, and are capable of perpetration without regard to
particular locality, is to be construed as applicable to citizens of the United
38
States upon the high seas or in a foreign country . . . .

Second, the Court analogized the states’ sovereign powers to those of
the federal government and concluded that the states likewise have
extraterritorial regulatory authority. The Court’s reasoning turned on the
Tenth Amendment in concept, though not in name: the Court states that
“[s]ave for the powers committed by the Constitution to the Union, the State
of Florida has retained the status of a sovereign,”39 and the “‘residuum of
sovereignty’” (the power to regulate its citizens’ extraterritorial conduct)
was “‘not delegated to the United States by the Constitution itself.’”40
Accordingly,
[i]f the United States may control the conduct of its citizens upon the high
seas, we see no reason why the State of Florida may not likewise govern the
conduct of its citizens upon the high seas with respect to matters in which the
State has a legitimate interest and where there is no conflict with acts of
41
Congress.

Four aspects of Skiriotes merit further exploration if we are fully to
understand the scope of the decision’s holding in respect of
extraterritoriality. First, the opinion turned on the fact that the person who
was subject to regulation was a citizen of the regulating polity. The

38

Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 77.
40
Id. (quoting Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911)). For an example of a case
where the Court explicitly tied this type of argument to the Tenth Amendment, see Heath v.
Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), where the Court argued that states’ “powers to un dertake
criminal prosecutions derive from separate and independent sources of power and authority
originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to them by the
Tenth Amendment.” Id. at 89.
41
Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77.
39
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Skiriotes opinion repeatedly stressed that the regulated party was a citizen,42
and the Court distinguished an earlier case on the basis that it concerned one
state’s effort to regulate the citizens of another state.43 This is not to suggest
that citizenship is a necessary condition for extraterritorial regulation;
consider Strassheim. 44 Nonetheless, Skiriotes shows that citizenship is a
significant factor in assessing the constitutionality of extraterritorial
regulation.
Second, one might ask whether the Skiriotes decision, which concerned
a criminal statute, has application to the civil context. The answer is in the
affirmative, but the line of reasoning is more complicated than might first
appear. Although one might be tempted to say that extraterritorial civil
authority follows a fortiori from such criminal authority insofar as
government typically is subjected to stricter requirements in the criminal
context, where a person’s liberty is at stake, there are two respects in which
criminal law might be thought to justify state extraterritorial power more
readily than civil law.
First, one could argue that criminal law by its nature is concerned with
vindicating the public interest, and accordingly falls within the sovereign’s
inherent powers, whereas civil law addresses merely private interests.45
This objection is far too broad, however, for the civil law also can be a
vehicle for vindicating public interests;46 consider, for example, marriage
and divorce law. It also ignores the fact that the legislature’s choice
between civil and criminal penalties cannot be so facilely explained in a
regulatory state, such as ours, that charges executive agencies with pursuing
noncriminal actions.
Second, and more plausibly, it could be said that extraterritorial

42

See, e.g., id. at 76 (rejecting the view that “the State could not prohibit its own citizens
from use of the described divers’ equipment at that place” and stating that “[t]he question is
solely between appellant and his own State”).
43
Id. at 76-77 (distinguishing the case of Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240,
242 (1891), because it involved Massachusetts’ effort to enforce regulations “as against
citizens of Rhode Island”).
44
See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 284-85 (opining that a state can be warranted
in punishing a defendant who defrauded it, “although he never had set foot in the State until
after the fraud was complete” and thus was not a citizen at the time of the crime).
45
See, e.g., Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 657 (1892) (stating that the criminal
law’s “purpose is to punish an offense against the public justice of the state” whereas civil law
“afford[s] a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act”); see also id. at 668
(stating that the criminal law concerns “wrong[s] to the public [rather than] to the
individual”).
46
Cf. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 362 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he
State also expresses its sovereign power when it speaks through its courts in a civil litigation
between private parties.”).

2002] EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY

867

application of civil law is problematically complicated insofar as it concerns
the citizen’s relationships with other private parties; criminal law is more
simple because it primarily concerns the regulated party’s relationship with
her home polity. This second critique is also too broad because many civil
regulations effectively concern only the regulated party’s relationship with
her home polity, and many criminal laws have direct effects on third parties.
It nonetheless highlights an important consideration:
the state’s
extraterritorial powers in respect of its citizens may well vary depending on
whether the polity seeks to regulate its citizen’s relationship with other
private entities (particularly noncitizens) 47 or whether the state is regulating
its bilateral relationship with its own citizens.
In the end, then, Skiorites’ holding cannot be said to be applicable only
to criminal laws. Many civil laws also advance the state’s legitimate
interests and primarily concern the bilateral relationship between polity and
regulated actor, and Skiriotes’ holding concerning extraterritorial regulation
is fully applicable to these types of noncriminal laws. Moreover, as I will
soon show, the Supreme Court has since upheld the extraterritorial
application of state law to noncitizens.48
To continue with our analysis of Skiriotes’ holding, the case concerned
regulation on the high seas, and some commentators have suggested that its
holding is limited to this context.49 The Court’s reasoning, however, is not
so confined. As discussed above, the holding turned on the sovereign’s
inherent powers to guard its “legitimate interest[s]”50 against injuries that
can be “perpetrat[ed] without regard to particular locality,” and this logic
extends beyond activities that are performed on the high seas.51 Indeed, the
opinion explicitly referred to the legitimacy of regulations being applicable
in “foreign countries.”52
Finally, the Court in Skiriotes made clear that the extraterritorial power
47

See infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text (discussing Home Insurance Co. v. Dick,
281 U.S. 397 (1930)).
48
See infra note 94 (mentioning Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 348
U.S. 66 (1955)). In the future, I hope to explore the extent of state extraterritorial regulatory
power over noncitizens. Such regulations implicate fundamentally different questions than
the question addressed here, i.e., Home State extraterritorial powers vis-à-vis its citizens.
49
See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 475 & n.79 (citing books and periodicals
that would limit the Skiriotes’ holding to maritime law); Seth F. Kreimer, “But Wh oever
Treasures Freedom . . .”: The Right to Travel and Extraterritorial Abortions, 91 MICH . L.
REV. 907, 925 (1993) [hereinafter Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom] (“ Skiriotes is
specifically limited to state prosecution of crimes ‘within no other territorial jurisdiction.’”
(quoting Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 78)).
50
Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 77.
51
Id. at 74.
52
Id. at 73.
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of the United States, and hence also of the states, is not without limits.53
Namely, the extraterritorial regulation by states cannot lead to problematic
conflicts with federal law;54 it is in this sense that the extraterritorial power
over citizens is only presumptive. The Court spoke of the United States’
undoubted extraterritorial powers “when the rights of other nations or their
nationals are not infringed.”55 Although the Court did not elaborate what
constituted problematic “infringe[ment],” the Court understood that the
application of U.S. law in foreign countries does not per se infringe foreign
rights, for Skiriotes contemplated that application of U.S. law in foreign
countries would be acceptable at least sometimes.56
The question then becomes what if any power states have to regulate
their citizens when they are in sister states. Skiriotes makes clear that
federal and state extraterritorial legislative powers are comparable, but the
question is whether the sister states are analogous to foreign countries for
these purposes. The likely answer is both yes and no. On the one hand, the
intrinsic need—and power—of the sovereign to guard its legitimate interests
by extraterritorially regulating its citizens in respect of activities whose
locus is irrelevant to the state interest is, by definition, unaffected by where
the activity occurs. For this reason, Skiriotes supports the conclusion that
states enjoy such a presumptive power of extraterritorial regulation over
their citizens.57 On the other hand, what constitutes a problematic
“infringe[ment]” certainly differs as between foreign countries and sister
states. Under Skiriotes’ approach, the way to identify the limitations on
states’ extraterritorial powers vis-à-vis sister states58 is to consider what
sovereign powers were delegated to the federal government in the
Constitution and accordingly not retained by the states under the Tenth
Amendment. These limitations—constitutional constraints imposed by due
process, full faith and credit, privileges and immunities, the right to travel,
the Dormant Commerce Clause, and any structural constitutional
53

Id. at 78-79.
Id.
55
Id. at 73 (emphasis added). The Court expressly extended the federal analogy to the
states, noting that there was “[n]o question as to the authority of the United States over these
waters” and that “[n]o right of a citizen of any other State is here asserted.” Id. at 76.
56
Id. at 73 (“[T]he United States is not debarred by any rule of international law from
governing the conduct of its own citizens upon the high seas or even in foreign countries
when the rights of other nations or their nationals are not infringed.” (emphasis added)).
57
See Mark P. Gergen, Equality and the Conflict of Laws, 73 I OWA L. REV. 893, 907
n.94 (1988) (coming to same conclusion).
58
Different principles are relevant to considering states’ powers over their citizens’
conduct in foreign countries. See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 263
(2000) (preempting a Massachusetts law concerning trade with Burma because of a conflict
with federal trade policy).
54
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limitations—are different from the limitations upon the federal government
in the international context and are explained in Parts II and III. It is critical
to recognize, however, the analytical distinction between presumptive
extraterritorial powers and federal limitations on such powers; the mere fact
that a state may be without the power to extraterritorially regulate its
citizens in one context does not mean that states are generally without such
powers.
B. Scholarly Restatements
Relying on Strassheim and Skiriotes, scholarly restatements of the law
reflect the understanding that states have a presumptive extraterritorial
power to criminally and civilly regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct
where the state’s legitimate interests are implicated by the extraterritorial
conduct. The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law provides that
states “may apply at least some laws to a person outside [state] territory on
the basis that he is a citizen, resident or domiciliary of the State.”59 The
Restatement asserts that this principle applies to both extraterritorial
criminal and civil legislative powers.60 Directed to the criminal context, the
Model Penal Code provides that State A may impose liability if “the offense
is based on a statute of this State that expressly prohibits conduct outside the
State.”61 State A has extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction even if the

59

RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 reporters’ notes at 5
(1986). The reporters’ notes make clear that the Restatement’s authors understood its
principles to apply to the extraterritorial powers enjoyed by states within the United States.
See id. (citing inter alia to Skiriotes and Strassheim , and stating that the “exercise of
jurisdiction to prescribe by States is governed by the same principles whether the exercise of
jurisdiction has international or inter-State implications”). The reporters’ notes state that such
extraterritorial legislative jurisdiction generally “involve[s] acts or omissions that also had
effect within the State.” Id. Professor Kreimer criticizes the Restatement on the ground that
states stand in a different relation vis-à-vis sister states than does the United States vis-à-vis
other countries. Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 488 n.122. I agree that the “same
principles” are not operative in the two very different contexts of domestic and international
extraterritoriality, but the Restatement recognizes that the precise scope of extraterritorial
powers may differ, as well. See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402
reporters’ notes at 5 (1986) (“In exercising jurisdiction to prescribe, a State must take account
also of constit utional and other limitations governing judicial enforcement of its laws,
particularly in criminal cases.”). Parts II and III of this Article examine the federalism -based
principles that limit the exercise of states’ extraterritorial powers domestically. The
Restatement’s point concerning state exterritorial regulatory power, accordingly, remains
valid.
60
The Restatement is explicit about this. See RESTATEMENT (T HIRD ) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 403 cmt. f (1986) (“The principles governing jurisdiction to prescribe set
forth in § 402 and in this section apply to criminal as well as to civil regulation.”).
61
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(f) (1985).
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activity it prohibits occurs in a state in which the activity is permissible.62
The major limitation identified by the Model Penal Code is that the
regulated conduct must “bear[] a reasonable relation to a legit imate interest
of [the regulating] State.”63 The comment states that the “reasonable
relation to legitimate interests” requirement “expresses the general principle
of the fourteenth amendment limitation on state legislative jurisdiction.”64
These Model Penal Code provisions have been in whole or in significant
part adopted by many states.65
C. Due Process
Skiriotes did not invoke the term “due process” but instead deployed a
freewheeling constitutional inquiry bereft of citation to the Constitution. As
suggested by the comment to the Model Penal Code, the extent of a state’s
presumptive legislative jurisdiction today is analyzed under the doctrinal
rubric of due process. Under the modern doctrine articulated in Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Due Process Clause “prohibit[s] the application
of law which [is] only casually or slightly related to the litigation.”66 More
specifically, Shutts requires “‘a significant contact . . . creating state
interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally
unfair.’”67 A careful examination of the caselaw, immediately following in
Subsections 1 and 2, reveals that citizenship on its own virtually suffices to
give the Home State sufficient interest to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state
activities. The caselaw also suggests that even when a citizen is not
involved, states frequently have the power to exercise legislative jurisdiction
over persons whose out-of-state activities undermine legitimate state
interests. Taken together, it follows that states have a sufficient interest for
due process purposes to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities that are
undertaken for the purpose of evading, or have the effect of undermining,
legitimate state policies.
This logic establishes, however, only a
presumptive, and not an absolute, power to extraterritorially regulate, for
there are constitutional limitations outside of due process reflecting the

62

Id. § 1.03(2). For a discussion of § 1.03, see infra text accompanying notes 398-405.
Id. § 1.03(1)(f).
64
Id. § 1.03 cmt. 6. The comment, however, neglects to consider other constitutional
limitations that bear on the constitutionality of a state’s extraterritorial regulation. See infra
Parts II and III (discussing constitutional limitations on a state’s extraterritorial legislative
powers).
65
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-108 (A)(5) (2001); 18 P A . CONS. STAT. ANN . § 102
(6)(a)-(b) (West 1998).
66
472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985).
67
Id. at 818 (quoting Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
63
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federal character of our nation that also constrain states’ extraterritorial
powers. These limitations will be explored in Parts II and III.
1. Citizenship
As both a commonsense and doctrinal matter, citizenship is a
significant factor for purposes of legitimating state regulation. Writing for a
plurality of the Court in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, for example,
Justice Brennan observed that “[n]umerous cases have applied the law of a
jurisdiction other than the situs of the injury where there existed some other
link between that jurisdiction and the occurrence.”68 Continued Justice
Brennan, “[t]he injury or death of a resident of State A in State B is a contact
of State A with the occurrence in State B.”69
This is not to suggest that citizenship on its own justifies regulation. In
fact, the Court in Hague construed the early case of Home Insurance Co. v.
Dick70 as standing for the proposition that “nominal residence—standing
alone—[is] inadequate.”71 Careful analysis of the caselaw, however,
suggests that although “nominal residence” might not suffice, little more
than bona fide citizenship is required to justify extraterritorial legislative
powers for states.
In Hague, for example, the Supreme Court held that Minnesota could
apply its insurance law even though the accident giving rise to the insurance
claim had occurred in Wisconsin, the decedent and his widow had lived in
Wisconsin at the time of the accident, all relevant vehicles had been
registered in Wisconsin, and the insurance policy had been issued in
Wisconsin.72 According to the Court, Minnesota had three contacts with the
parties and occurrence that justified that state’s legislative jurisdiction: the
widow had become a bona fide Minnesota resident prior to the start of the
litigation; the decedent had commuted to and worked in Minnesota; and,
Allstate Insurance Company did business in Minnesota. 73
Minnesota’s interest in the widow is clear:
obtaining “full
compensation” for the survivors of accidents so as to keep them “‘off
welfare rolls’” and to ensure they can “‘meet financial obligations.’”74 The
other contacts, however, are at best modest in relation to the issue of
68

449 U.S. 302, 314 n.19 (1981).
Id. at 315 n.20.
70
281 U.S. 397 (1930).
71
Hague, 449 U.S. at 311. For my alternative explanation of the Dick case, see infra
notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
72
449 U.S. at 305-06.
73
Id. at 313-19.
74
Id. at 319 (quoting Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978)).
69

872

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 150: 855

Minnesota’s power to regulate out-of-state occurrences concerning its
citizens.75 Allstate’s presence in Minnesota is relevant to the fairness of
regulating a noncitizen third party, but it is in no respect relevant to the
fairness of Minnesota regulating its citizens’ extraterritorial conduct. The
final contact cited by the Hague Court—that the decedent had worked in
Minnesota—is equally dubious with respect to Minnesota’s regulatory
interest in this context. The decedent had not been commuting to or from
work at the time of the accident.76 Nor does the Court’s explanation that
Minnesota had an interest in the safety and well-being of its work force,
including its nonresident employees,77 in any way explain the basis for
Minnesota to apply its insurance stacking laws in the case, for “permitting
stacking will not further this interest.”78
In the end, then, Minnesota’s interest in applying its law would appear
to be wholly derivative of its legitimate interest in its bona fide resident.
That this is true is suggested by considering whether Minnesota could have
persuasively claimed an interest in applying its insurance stacking laws had
the widow remained a resident of Wisconsin; it is hard to imagine that the
Court would have accepted such a claim.
In short, Hague suggests that bona fide residence on its own is virtually,
if not wholly, a sufficient basis for empowering a state to regulate that
person’s out-of-state activities. How does this square with Dick?79 One
response might be that Dick concerned only “nominal residence,” as Hague
said.80 This explanation turns out to be inadequate, however, because what
made Dick’s Texas residence only “nominal”? It was not that Texas was
75

See also W EINTRAUB, supra note 32, at 593 (noting that Mrs. Hague’s residence gave
Minnesota an interest but suggesting that “if it were not for the prior commuting and business
contacts [of her deceased husband], even the plurality in Hague probably would have thought
it so outrageous as to be unconstitutional for Minnesota to assert this late acquired interest in
compensation”); cf. Lea Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between
State and Federal Law, 79 MICH . L. REV. 1315, 1341 -47 (1981) (arguing that Minnesota had
no relevant interests in Hague); Gene R. Shreve, In Search of a Choice-of-Law Reviewing
Standard—Reflections on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN . L. REV. 327, 352-53
(1982) (same).
76
Hague, 449 U.S. at 314.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 339 (Powell, J., dissenting). More completely, Justice Powell stated:
The insured’s place of employment is not, however, significant in this case. Neither
the nature of the insurance policy, the events related to the accident, nor the
immediate question of stacking coverage is in any way affected or implicated by the
insured’s employment status. . . . Minnesota does not wish its workers to die in
automobile accidents, but permitting stacking will not further this interest.
Id.
79
281 U.S. 397 (1930).
80
Hague, 449 U.S. at 311.

2002] EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY

873

not his bona fide residence; the Court observed that Dick’s “permanent
residence was in Texas.”81 What made it nominal in the eyes of the Hague
Court, presumably, was that all things in regard to the formation of the
insurance contract and the underlying events giving rise to the claim
occurred outside of Texas and that “[a]t all times here material, he was
physically present and acting” outside of Texas.82 But what difference
should that make to Texas’s interest in the matter? After all, the substantive
issue was one in which Texas well could have had a strong interest. At
issue in Dick was whether a Texas law that prohibited stipulations in
insurance contracts limiting time for suits to periods shorter than two years
was to apply to an insurance contract negotiated out of state that contained a
one-year limitation. 83 Thus, at stake was whether Dick would be able to file
suit to recover insurance for his tug, which had been totally destroyed in a
fire. 84 The loss of property and means of livelihood could well have
jeopardized Dick’s ability to meet his financial obligations in Texas.
Consequently, just like the Home State in Hague, Texas had an interest in
applying its laws; namely, a desire to ensure that survivors of accidents who
are citizens of the Home State can “meet financial obligations.”85 In short,
Texas had as much interest in Dick as Minnesota had in the widow in
Hague.
Properly understood, the basis for the Dick decision was not that Texas
had no interest in Dick, but that Texas had no right to regulate noncitizens—
the insurance companies—that had absolutely no contacts with Texas. The
insurance contracts had been negotiated out of Texas, in jurisdictions where
one-year suit limitations were legal, and the tug fire occurred outside of
Texas as well. In short, Texas’s effort to legislate extraterritorially failed
not because of Dick’s “nominal residence,” but because of the regulation’s
third-party effects on noncitizens. Dick thus teaches nothing about a state’s
inherent powers to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities. In fact, the
Dick Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis, explicitly said as much:
“We need not consider how far the State may go in imposing restrictions on
the conduct of its own residents . . . . It may not abrogate the rights of
parties beyond its borders having no relation to anything done or to be done
within them.”86

81

Dick, 281 U.S. at 408.
Id.
83
Id. at 406-11.
84
Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 8 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), rev’d, 281 U.S. 397
(1930).
85
Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, 49 (Minn. 1978).
86
Dick, 281 U.S. at 410 (emphasis added). Professor James Martin has argued that Dick
82
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Since Dick was decided, citizenship has been weighted even more
heavily to justify what is best characterized as extraterritorial regulation. In
Clay v. Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.,87 for example, citizenship was a basis for
overriding the express expectations of the contracting parties. An Illinois
citizen had purchased from a non-Illinois company an insurance policy that
required that any lawsuits be initiated within twelve months after the
occurrence.88 The clause was valid under Illinois law. The insured
thereafter made a bona fide move to Florida, which had a statute that
nullified any insurance clauses requiring suit before five years.89 Loss
occurred in Florida, and the Supreme Court decided that the contract’s
twelve-month provision did not apply.90 Although the Court suggested that
holding otherwise would amount to giving Illinois law extraterritorial
application, 91 the more natural way to conceptualize the operation of the
Florida statute is that it operated extraterritorially by altering the contractual
rights that had been created by the parties when they formed their
contractual obligations in Illinois.92 So understood, Clay gave more weight
is best understood as a decision in which “[t]he deference is to the sovereignty of Mexico and
not to the personal rights of the parties,” and hence that the case is best understood not as a
due process “fairness” decision but as a full faith and credit type of decision. James A.
Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 192 (1976);
see also id. (emphasizing that due process protects individuals, whereas full faith and credit
protects states); id. at 199 (concluding that “Dick does not yield to a due process analysis”).
While the case plausibly could have been decided on the principle of deference to sovereigns,
Dick plainly was not decided on those grounds. More importantly, it is unclear why the
decision need be so reread, for it is sensible on the grounds on which it was decided: there is
a strong argument that the noncitizen defendants had no substantial connection to Texas, and
therefore that applying Texas law would have been unfair to them and accordingly violative of
due process. See W EINTRAUB, supra note 32, at 598 (“[T]he application of Texas law
violated due process because the contacts that Texas had with the parties and with the
transaction were not sufficient to make it reasonable for Texas to assert the interest that it did
have in applying Texas law.”). For a critique of Martin’s argument, see Frederic L. Kirgis,
Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 94, 108-09 (1976) (p roviding an alternative due process-based explanation of Dick).
Professor Martin has not responded to this argument posited by Professor Kirgis. See James
A. Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 151 (1976) (responding to many
of Professor Kirgis’s arguments, but not to this one).
87
377 U.S. 179 (1964).
88
Id. at 180.
89
Id.
90
Id. at 181-83.
91
See id. at 181 (“While there are Illinois cases indicating that parties may contract —as
here—for a short er period of limitations than is provided by the Illinois statute, we are
referred to no Illinois decision extending that rule into other States whenever claims on
Illinois contracts are sought to be enforced there.”).
92
At the time of the Clay decision, contracts typically were construed under the law of
the jurisdiction in which they were made because the contractual obligations were
conceptualized as having come into existence at the time of contract formation. See, e.g.,
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to citizenship than did Dick, for whereas Dick was concerned with not
“increas[ing the parties’] obligation and impos[ing] a burden not contracted
for,”93 Clay did that very thing. The key distinction between the cases
justifying the different outcomes is that Florida in Clay (unlike Texas in
Dick) had a right to regulate the noncitizen because it did business in the
state, and was licensed to do so.94
2. State Interest in Thwarting the Subversion of Legitimate State Policies
by Out-of-State Activities
It is well recognized that legitimate state policies frequently can be
confounded by out-of-state activities, and regulating such extraterritorial
activities has been upheld frequently, even when the regulated parties are
not citizens of the regulating polity. This body of caselaw, in conjunction
with the cases surveyed above that show the states’ significant interests in

John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178, 182 (1936) (holding that a New
York statute providing that a false statement in an insurance application regarding medical
treatment constitutes material misrepresentation voiding the policy is a “term of the contract,”
and must be applied by a Georgia court, even though under Georgia law what qualifies as a
material misrepresentation is a question for the jury, and stating that “such recognition does
not give to the New York statute extraterritorial effect”); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF
LAWS § 332 (1934) (“The law of the place of contracting determines the validity and effect of
a promise with respect to [eight specified issues].”). To be sure, the Clay Court tried to
sugge st that the insurance company’s expectations really had not been disappointed because
the “‘contract did not even attempt to provide that the law of Illinois would govern when suits
were filed anywhere else in the country,’” 377 U.S. at 182 (quoting Clay v. Sun Ins. Office,
Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 221 (1960) (Black, J., dissenting)), but such an argument reverses wit hout
justification the typical default rule of the time that contracts were to be construed under the
law of the jurisdiction of formation.
93
Dick, 281 U.S. at 409.
94
Clay, 377 U.S. at 182 (quoting from Justice Black’s dissent in Clay, 363 U.S. at 221,
in its holding). In an even more extreme example of citizenship as a basis for extraterritorial
regulation than Clay, the Supreme Court in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp.,
348 U.S. 66 (1954), upheld one state’s extraterritorial regulation of a contract between two
noncit izens because the contract had an impact on a citizen. The Court upheld a Louisiana
statute that allowed injured parties to institute a direct action against an insurer “‘whether the
policy of insurance sued upon was written or delivered in the State of Louisiana or not and
whether or not such policy contains a provision forbidding such direct action, provided the
accident or injury occurred within the State of Louisiana.’” Id. at 68 n.4 (quoting LA . REV.
STAT. ANN . § 22:655 (West 1950)). The insurance policy disallowing direct actions had been
negotiated and issued in Massachusetts and Illinois, where such policies were legal, and was
between a non-Louisiana insurer and a non-Louisiana insured person. Id. at 67 & n.2. What
was the source of Louisiana’s interest? The answer is that the injured party was a Louisiana
citizen, and Louisiana wanted to maximize its citizens’ prospects for recovery. Id. at 72. In
short, the Watson Court allowed Louisiana to conform to Louisiana’s statutory requirements a
contract negotiated out of its state by noncitizens, thereby altering the express terms of their
contract. This de facto extraterritorial regulation was permitted because the contract affected
the welfare of a Louisiana citizen.
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regulating their citizens, strongly suggests that preventing citizens from
evading legitimate state policies through travel constitutes a legit imate state
interest sufficient to support a presumptive power of extraterritorial
regulation for purposes of due process.
Activities can harm a polity’s interests even if undertaken outside of the
polity’s physical borders. This can most readily be understood by
considering the types of activities generally deemed to fall within the
purview of states’ regulatory powers. States may seek to protect
themselves, to control third-party effects, to guard paternalistically the
welfare of their citizens, and to try to manage norm-generation.95 Each of
these legitimate state interests can be undercut by out-of-state activities.
Consider first a state’s guarding of its own interests. Speaking in the
context of the extraterritorial effect of federal statutes, the United States
Supreme Court has recognized that there are “criminal statutes which are, as
a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to
defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if
committed by its own citizens, officers or agents.”96 With respect to such
crimes, said the Court, “to limit their locus to the strictly territorial
jurisdiction would be greatly to curtail the scope and usefulness of the
statute and leave open a large immunity for frauds as easily committed by
citizens” when they are outside the polity’s borders “as at home.”97 This
logic readily carries over to the domestic context and can explain the
Court’s holding in the aforementioned Strassheim case, which upheld
Michigan’s assertion of jurisdiction over a person who had not entered the
state but who engaged in bribery and false pretenses in Illinois as part of a
scheme to fraudulently sell used machinery to Michigan. 98 Similarly, it
would make sense that public corruption statutes should prevent a public
official from “evad[ing] guilt . . . by the simple expedient of stepping across
[the] State border for the sole purpose of accepting the money.”99
95

See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1209 (1998)
(arguing that jurisdiction and choice-of-law issues do not render the regulation of cyberspace
infeasible or illegitimate and noting that “every nation has mandatory laws that govern
particular transactions or relationships regardless of the wishes of the parties” and “[t]he
primary justifications for such laws are paternalism and protection of third parties”); Cass R.
Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 907, 910 (1996) (arguing
that the government and the law are rightfully involved in “norm management,” “expressing
social values,” and “shifting social norms”).
96
United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922).
97
Id. (emphasis added).
98
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 281 -85 (1911).
99
Commonwealth v. Welch, 187 N.E.2d 813, 816 (Mass. 1963). Though the court in
Welch justified the application of the Massachusetts statute on the basis that some acts relating
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The police powers—a state’s presumptive power to care for the health,
welfare, and morals of its citizens—provides another predicate for the
extraterritorial regulation of citizens. The Supreme Court has “recognized
that a State ha[s] a legitimate interest in protecting the welfare of its citizens
as they venture[] outside the State’s borders.”100 Consider in this regard the
case of In re Busalacchi,101 which concerned a father’s desire to move his
daughter, who was in a persistent vegetative state, from Missouri, under
whose laws he could not remove the feeding tube that sustained her life, to a
state under whose laws he could more readily withdraw the tube. Did
Missouri have a legitimate interest in guarding the daughter’s life by
blocking the father’s plans so he could not simply cross the border to do in
Illinois—remove his daughter’s feeding tube—what was prohibited at
home? A Missouri state appellate court ruled that Missouri, which
determined that the guardian, under parens patriae, had such an interest in
the daughter’s life, 102 and it is hard to say that the court was incorrect on this
point. The court accordingly sustained Missouri’s effort to control what the
father could legally do regarding his daughter outside of the state.

to the corruption had occurred in Massachusetts, id., the same outcome should have obtained
even if all illicit acts had occurred out of state.
With respect to guarding the state’s interests, consider as well the analogous context of
contempt of court for violation of court orders. As one court stated,
contempt is an offense against the dignity and authority of the particular court, to
which the affront is offered. . . . [T]he affront is none the less directly against the
dignity and authority of that court, no matter to what county or state the offender
may go to violate the order of the court. If that were not true, then injunction orders
in many instances would be a farce. It would be ridiculous, to say that an order
enjoining the sale of personal property, over which the court had jurisdiction, could
be violated with impunity, if the lit igant only took the pains to cross the state line
before disposing of it.
Farmers’ State Bank v. State, 164 P. 132, 132 (Okla. Crim. App. 1917).
Virtually the same refrain can be seen in t he context of the out-of-state attempted murder
of a key witness in a prosecution: “The administration of justice is equally obstructed
wherever the act is done . . . . The act in its nature is not one dependent upon location for its
greater or less influence on the administration of justice.” McCaully v. United States, 25 App.
D.C. 404, 413 (1905).
100
United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 437 (1993) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(describing an observation in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975)).
101
No. 59582, 1991 Mo. App. LEXIS 315 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 1991).
102
Id. at *7-17. It is another question as to whether the action of the court —enjoining a
father from taking his daughter out of state—should have been upheld. Indeed, it may have
run afoul of the right to travel. See infra Part II.B (exploring how the right to travel imposes a
limit on states’ powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities). An alternative
response that would have been justified more easily would have been a Missouri statute
criminalizing the act of taking Missouri citizens in persistent vegetative states out of the state
for purposes of taking advantage of other states’ more lenient laws in respect of removal of
feeding tubes.
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In a context analogous to extraterritorial state regulation, the Supreme
Court recently has held that states have a legitimate interest in their citizens’
out-of-state activities if such activities undermine legitimate state policy. In
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., the Court upheld a federal statute
that prohibited the radio broadcast of lottery advertising by radio licensees
located in nonlottery states.103 The broadcaster in Edge was located in
North Carolina, a nonlottery state, but wanted to broadcast Virginia lottery
advertisements.104 As part of its analysis, the Edge Court concluded that the
statute directly advanced the federal government’s interest in “support[ing]
the antigambling policy of a State like North Carolina by forbidding stations
in such a State to air lottery advertising.”105 The federal interest that served
to uphold the statute thus was wholly derivative of the state’s interest,
ineluctably leading to the conclusion that the state’s interest was legitimate.
The Court understood that North Carolina’s antigambling policy would
have been undermined had the broadcaster been permitted to broadcast
advertisements for an activity that was legal in another state but prohibited
in North Carolina. In other words, North Carolina’s antigambling policy
would have been undermined by North Carolina citizens’ out-of-state
conduct, even if the gambling occurred in a state in which the activity was
legal. 106 The Court’s rationale makes sense; an antilottery policy might be
based on a conclusion that “lotteries play on the hopes of those least able to
afford to purchase lottery tickets, and that its citizens would be better served
by spending their money on more promising investments.”107 Surely these

103

509 U.S. at 418.
Id. at 423-24.
105
Id. at 428.
106
One might object to this conclusion by suggesting that all the Court meant is that
North Carolina’s antigambling policy would have been undermined had advertisements for
the activity emanated from North Carolina and that the opinion did not suggest that North
Carolina was legitimately concerned with whether its citizens acted out of state on the
information conveyed by the advertisement. The reasoning in the Edge opinion defeats this
highly counterintuitive explanation of the state’s interest. When analyzing whether a
reasonable fit existed between the governmental interest and the restriction, the Court stated
that the broadcaster’s “signals with lottery ads would be heard in the nine counties in North
Carolina that its broadcasts reached, [and] this would be in derogation of the substantial
federal interest in supporting North Carolina’s laws making lotteries illegal.” Id. at 429; see
also id. at 432-33 (suggesting that many North Carolina residents would not receive
information relating to Vi rginia gambling if Edge were not allowed to broadcast such
advertisements). Furthermore, the dissenters in Edge understood the state interest recognized
by the majority opinion to be “discouraging its citizens from participating in state-run
lotteries,” not the elimination of lottery advertisements from broadcasters located on North
Carolina soil. Id. at 440 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
107
Id. at 440 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104
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objectives would be undermined regardless of where gambling occurs.108
But how broadly should a state’s interest in guarding the morals or
welfare of its citizens be construed for purposes of determining the state’s
“legitimate interests” and hence its presumptive extraterritorial powers visà-vis its citizens? Answering the question first requires a recognition that
one’s conception of what falls within the state’s purview concerning its
citizens’ morals or welfare turns on the deep political theory that one holds.
Under classic Aristotelian political philosophy, for example, the core
function of the polity is to habituate its citizens to act virtuously. 109
Aristotle, as well as many neo-Aristotelians who go by the name of
communitarians, believe that government plays an essential role in
habituating its citizens to virtue, and that without government’s assistance
people’s potential for excellence will go unrealized. 110 Such a notion that
the state is deeply connected to the moral development and character of its
citizens is reflected as well in certain strands of republicanism.111 In a
similar vein, communitarian writers posit that people are partly defined by
the communities of which they are a part, and they accordingly argue that
politics is naturally and properly concerned with shaping the community’s

108

Such a state policy is not inconsistent with the fact that the state was not capable of
effectuating an absolute ban on advertising insofar as broadcasters located outside of North
Carolina could play lottery advertisements even if their signal came into North Carolina. The
inability to realize fully a state’s policy due to legal obstacles beyond the state’s control does
not make the state’s attempts to advance that policy constitutionally illegitimate. See Greater
New Orleans Broad. Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 195-96 (1999) (holdin g that a
prohibition on broadcasting lottery information could not be applied to gambling
advertisements by radio and television stations located in states where such gambling was
legal). The Supreme Court’s holding in Edge fully supports this sensible point, see 509 U.S.
at 429-34 (holding that the state’s broadcasting restriction reasonably fit the government
interest of supporting North Carolina’s antigambling policy even though many North Carolina
residents could hear lottery advertisements broadcast by radio stations located outside of
North Carolina), as do cases in other contexts, see, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151
(1986) (holding in the Dormant Commerce Clause context that “[t]he impediments to
complete success . . . cannot be a ground for preventing a state from using its best efforts” to
limit an environmental risk).
109
See Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community Self-Governance in Residential
Associations, Municipalities, and Indian Country: A Liberal Theory, 84 VA . L. REV. 1053,
1066-68 (1999) [hereinafter Rosen, Outer Limits] (explaining the Aristotelian theory of
government).
110
See A.C. Bradley, Aristotle’s Conception of the State, in A COMPANION TO
ARISTOTLE’ S POLITICS 13, 28 (David Keyt & Fred D. Miller, Jr. eds., 1991) (describing
Aristotle’s theory of the prominent role of the state in the attainment of virtue). For an
example of a prominent self-identifying neo-Aristotelian who also is viewed by many as a
communitarian theorist, see ALASDAIR MACI NTYRE , AFTER VIRTUE (2d ed. 1984).
111
See Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 109, at 1067 & n.53 (noting that early in
American history, public figures expressed the view that republican government required
virtue in its citizens).
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character.112 Aristotelian, republican, and communitarian views naturally
give rise to broad state interests that justify extensive regulation to shape
citizens’ norms and values. Furthermore, these political philosophies tend
to mandate a state regulatory interest in its citizens’ activities and behaviors
irrespective of where they occur since they inherently reflect an individual’s
character and hence fall within the state’s purview.113 By contrast, under
popular understandings of liberalism, the state is largely to leave people
alone to shape themselves as they deem proper.114
Which deep political theory ought to prevail for purposes of identifying
legitimate state interests in a due process analysis? The best answer is that
our federal system does not mandate a single answer,115 but that states can
adhere to any of the above political theories and are limited in enacting laws
only by discrete federal (and state) substantive constitutional doctrines.
This conclusion is consistent with the lessons of Lochner v. New York 116
concerning the dangers of judicial second-guessing of legislative value
judgments through the wholly open-ended vehicle of substantive due
process. This conclusion also is essential to preserving one of federalism’s
great merits: the space it provides for rich political heterogeneity at the
subfederal levels of government. The freedom of states to adopt different
deep political theories also is confirmed by the Tenth Amendment, which
reserves to the states the power to pursue their particular visions of the
good.117 In short, lim itations on such state powers properly come from
112

See id. at 1066-67 & n.52 (describing the communitarian view of “Interconnected
Welfare”).
113
See Lea Brilmayer, Liberalism, Community, and State Borders, 41 DUKE L.J. 1, 9-26
(1991) (arguing that communitarianism and liberalism support different conceptions of state
jurisdiction).
114
See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, P OLITICAL LIBERALISM 307-08 (1993) (singling out
necessary “social conditions and all-purpose means to enable persons to pursue their
determinate conceptions of the good”); Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 109, at 1091-92
(discussing Rawls on this point). In tension with this, of course, is the acknowledgment by
many that the liberal state deeply shapes citizens’ norms. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 95, at
907 (suggesting that government inevitably plays a large role in shaping human behavior and
“norm management”).
115
Cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 92 (1987) (“The Constitution
does not require the States to subscribe to any particular economic theory.”).
116
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
117
Cf. Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (holding that states’ “powers to
undertake criminal prosecutions derive from separate and independent sources of power and
authority originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to them
by the Tenth Amendment”); id. at 93 (“The Constitution leaves in the possession of each State
‘certain exclusive and very important portions of sovereign power.’ Foremost among the
prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal code.” (quoting T HE
FEDERALIST NO . 9, at 55 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke ed., 1961))); Heath, 474 U.S. at
93 (recognizing that “‘States . . . as political communities, [are] distinct and sovereign, and
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established constitutional provisions and doctrines, such as equal protection
and privacy, rather than through appeals to the amorphous Due Process
Clause. The “legitimate state interests” test under due process accordingly
should not act as a bar to a state’s adoption of a political theory under which
the state seeks to regulate the morals and character of its citizenry. As long
as the regulation does not run afoul of established constitutional doctrines,
ensuring that it not be evaded through travel should qualify as a legitimate
state interest.
To quickly conclude, many of the policies whose in-state validity is
constitutionally unquestioned can be easily thwarted if citizens can free
themselves of their Home States’ laws by merely exiting their state of
residence. Accordingly, states have legitimate interests for purposes of due
process in seeking to circumvent such travel-evasion by giving their laws
extraterritorial effect over their peripatetic citizens.
3. Considerations of Fairness: The Normative Case for Extraterritoriality
The final guarantee of the Due Process Clause is that the choice-of-law
decision cannot be fundamentally unfair.118 Application of the Home State
law to its out-of-state citizen does not per se run afoul of this final
protection of due process for two principal reasons. First, it is not unfair for
states to ensure the efficacy of constitutionally permissible policies by
withdrawing from their citizens the effective power to choose which state’s
legal regime they are to be governed by on an issue-by-issue basis. States
can insist instead that their citizens be subject to their Home State’s law for
so long as they elect to remain citizens of the state.
Second,
extraterritoriality has a rational fundamental basis in that it advances the
cause of political heterogeneity among states. As we will see, these
normative considerations are relevant not only to due process, but to many
other constitutional doctrines as well. Therefore, the normative arguments
developed below will be drawn upon at many other points in this Article.
a.

Ensuring the efficacy of legitimate state laws

First, extraterritoriality is fair because, as discussed above, it is
necessary to ensure the efficacy of many constitutional state policies.119 For
example, without such power, state laws outlawing gambling or requiring

consequently foreign to each other’” (quoting Bank of United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12
Pet.) 32, 54 (1838))).
118
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981) (noting that in choice-oflaw questions, fundamental fairness considerations must be satisfied).
119
Supra Part I.C.2.
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parental consent prior to abortions could be readily skirted. Since consent
to abide by laws that are lawfully enacted, and to incur the consequences if
one does not, is a cornerstone of citizenship, it is fair for a state to expect
that its citizens will obey legitimately enacted state laws and regulations,
even those laws an individual might not like. 120 Given this, it is perfectly
sensible and fair for a polity to prevent citizens from evading such laws by
seeking to avail themselves of different laws through travel. To the extent
that the control of third-party effects, the pursuit of paternalism, and the
management of the generation of norms are legitimate predicates for
lawmaking, it is fair that states are empowered to work against the
circumvention of these legitimate objectives by denying their citizens (for
so long as they remain citizens) the power to choose by the expedient of
travel to be governed by a different State’s legal regime.
In fact, there are several contexts in which the law limits individuals’
powers to elect to be governed by the law of their choice. This is strong
evidence that limiting citizens’ powers to avail themselves of different
states’ laws by curbing travel-evasion is not fundamentally unfair for
purposes of due process.
Particularly instructive is that the very
jurisprudence of due process is one place where these rules are found. For
example, in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, the Supreme Court considered
whether Kansas had sufficient contacts to justify applying its law consistent
with the demands of due process.121 Among the factors the Court rejected
as irrelevant was the plaintiffs’ desire to be governed by Kansas law: “Even
if a plaintiff evidences his desire for forum law by moving to the forum, we
have generally accorded such a move little or no significance . . . . Thus the
plaintiffs’ desire for Kansas law . . . bears little relevance.”122
In two other contexts, protecting the state’s ability to advance its
policies has explicitly justified limiting citizens’ powers to choose the law
by which they are to be governed. Consider first the law concerning
contractual choice-of-law provisions. Contracts, of course, is a field where
the law primarily lays down default rules that the contracting parties are free
to reject; “our society confers upon contracting parties wide power to shape

120

In fact, the Western political tradition long has grounded the duty to obey laws on
citizens’ implied consent to abide by laws by virtue of their being members of a polity. Mark
D. Rosen, Defrocking the Courts: Resolving ‘Cases or Controversies,’ Not Announcing
Transcendental Truths, 17 HARV. J.L. & P UB. P OL ’ Y 715, 725-26 (1994); LEA BRILMAYER,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 241 & n.49 (2d ed. 1995) (citing A. SIMMONS, MORAL P RINCIPLES AND
P OLITICAL OBLIGATIONS (1979)). This is a position that might justify extraterritorial
regulation even where a citizen’s out -of-state activities do not threaten state policy.
121
472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985).
122
Id. at 820.
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their relationships.”123 Nonetheless, “[t]he case law generally favors for the
enforcement of choice-of-law clauses that the chosen law bear a relationship
of some significance to the transaction.”124 The principal justification for
this is that without such a requirement “the parties could evade the
otherwise applicable local law and thereby render state laws regarding
contract validity meaningless.”125 Some state courts have gone even further
and overridden parties’ express choice of law where “the state whose law
would control in the absence of a choice has a materially greater interest in
the subject matter” than the state whose law the parties selected.126 These
lines of caselaw are consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of
Laws.127
A similar concern for not permitting parties to effectively opt-out of
laws so as to protect the state’s ability to further legitimate policies can be
found in the Supreme Court’s Contracts Clause jurisprudence. The clause’s

123
124

E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH , CONTRACTS 426 (3d ed. 1999).
EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 871 & n.1 (3d ed. 2000) (citing

cases).
125

Id.; see also 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A T REATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332.2, at
1079-80 (1935) (explaining that permitting parties to choose the law that is to govern their
contracts would be objectionable private legislation). Professor Kramer recently has argued
that “[i]n contract cases, true conflicts should be resolved by applying the law chosen by the
parties.” Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 329 (1990).
However, he appears to conclude that the parties’ choice should be disregarded “if party
autonomy threatens completely to undermine domestic policy.” Id. at 333. Similarly,
although Professors Erin O’Hara and Larry Ribstein recently have put forth a vigorous
argument for the expansion of party choice in contractual choice of law provisions, see Erin
Ann O’Hara, Opting Out of Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis of Contractual Choice of
Law, 53 VAND . L. REV. 1551 (2000) (providing an analysis of when contractual choice-oflaw provisions are beneficial); Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, From Politics to
Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1164-65 (2000) [hereinafter O’Hara &
Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency] (“To maximize efficiency, choice-of-law rules should,
in general, facilitate individual choice.”), they too recognize that there may be “lost benefits
resulting from evasion of laws through party choice of law,” and conclude that choice-of-law
rules should not be given effect when state legislators prohibit enforcement, O’Hara &
Ribstein, From Politics to Efficiency, supra, at 1153, 1164.
126
See Rosenmiller v. Bordes, 607 A.2d 465, 468 (Del. Ch. 1991) (relying on
RESTATEMENT ( SECOND ) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS and disregarding the choice of law
provision in a shareholders agreement); id. at 469 (concluding that “Delaware therefore has a
greater interest than does New Jersey in regulating stockholder voting rights in Delaware
corporations,” notwithstanding the “parties’ express choice of New Jersey law” as the
governing law).
127
See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND ) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(a)-(b) (1971)
(providing that the parties’ choice of go verning law will be overridden if “the chosen state has
no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no other reasonable
basis for the parties’ choice,” or if “application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the
chosen state in the determination of the particular issue”).
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prohibition against the enactment of laws by states that “impair[] the
Obligation of Contracts”128 could have had the effect of allowing a citizen to
immunize herself from the law by contracting in advance of legislation. A
party may claim such legislation could not be applied to her because it
would impair the obligation of her contract. Such arguments in fact were
made before the Supreme Court, but it was early established that the
Contracts Clause
does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are vested in it for
the promotion of the common weal, or are necessary for the general good of
the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
thereby be affected. . . . Familiar instances of this are, where parties enter into
contracts, perfectly lawful at the time, to sell liquor, operate a brewery or
distillery, or carry on a lottery, all of which are subject to impairment by a
change of policy on the part of the State, prohibiting the establishment or
129
continuance of such traffic . . . .

The Court’s reasoning makes sense since “the police power . . . is an
exercise of the sovereign right of the Government to protect the lives,
health, morals, comfort and general welfare of the people, and is paramount
to any rights under contracts between individuals.”130 Thus, this doctrine
prevents citizens from effectively opting out of their state’s regulations
through the expedient of contract.
Finally, state power to ensure the efficacy of permissible policies is
consistent with the Court’s “new federalism” jurisprudence of the last
decade. To be sure, the cases to date have involved questions of the federalstate relationship. But the core concern of respecting the states’ inherent
sovereignty that has animated many of these decisions 131 provides equal
theoretical support for the extraterritorial power to curb travel-evasion.
After all, if citizens are allowed to circumvent their Home State laws by
merely traveling across state lines, the state’s capacity to advance what it
deems to be the common interest within the scope of substantive policies
that are not precluded by the Federal Constitution—one of the essential
aspects of state sovereignty—is importantly undermined.
b. Political heterogeneity
A second reason that extraterritorial powers to curb travel-evasion are
128

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
130
Id.
131
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (reasoning that
states require Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit to maintain their inherent
sovereignty).
129
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not unfair, but are in fact normatively attractive, is that political
heterogeneity among states requires it. A federal system that did not permit
extraterritorial regulation to counter travel-evasion would systematically
disadvantage states that decide to regulate when others elect not to, perhaps
even leading to a “race-to-the-bottom” to the lowest common denominator
of regulation. Legal constraints imposed for reasons of paternalism or
norm-generation may be rendered ineffective if citizens could simply cross
a border to avail themselves of a different legal regime. This is self-evident
with respect to paternalistic policies that are intended to protect citizens
from themselves; such policies cannot succeed if the citizens can cross the
border to undertake the activity in a lenient jurisdiction.
Consider as well the effect of ignoring the Home State’s interests in
norm-generation. Under many theories, people’s moral sensibilities are
significantly shaped by the behaviors of people they know and with whom
they regularly interact.132 A state, accordingly, may be unable to impress a
norm on its citizens if large numbers of them are engaging in the locally
proscribed activity in a place where it is permitted. Importantly, this may
even be irreversible in the short run; once people start engaging in the
behavior, the possibility of inculcating a contrary norm might be lost. In
short, travel-evasion may reduce political heterogeneity across states with
respect to policies that are not foreclosed by the United States Constitution
by rendering less permissive state laws ineffective. Additionally, this would
have the corollary consequence of hindering the extent to which different
states could experiment with different legal regimes, a related benefit of
federalism.133
More basically, allowing extraterritorial regulation of citizens to curb
travel-evasion expands political heterogeneity by extending the range of
permissible options available to states. It allows there to be states that fully
permit a given activity, states that bar the activity only from occurring
within their borders, and states that flatly prohibit their citizens from
engaging in the activity. A regime in which all cit izens could free
themselves of their Home State’s policies by traveling disallows the third
option by definition. The absence of such an option is not merely of
132

See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA . L.
REV. 349, 356-61 (1997) (examining the role of social influence on individuals’ criminal
decision making).
133
See, e.g., AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 418 (19 99) (“[Local
ratesetting differences] can amount to the kind of ‘experimentation’ long thought a strength of
our federal system.”); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous
State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
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theoretical significance. Adherents of certain political theories—for
example, neo-Aristotelians, republicans, and communitarians—typically are
concerned with their fellow citizens’ character development and accordingly
are interested in regulating conduct irrespective of where it occurs.134 Only
the third option permits adherents of such perspectives the possibility of
advancing their political goals. Without the third option, neo-Aristotelians,
republicans, and communitarians would be hamstrung.135 On its face, this
might be problematic to those who believe one of federalism’s strengths is
the diversity it allows.136
This point can be more formally developed by drawing upon John
Rawls’ influential works on liberalism. From a Rawlsian perspective, a
federal system in which states may extraterritorially regulate their traveling
citizens is the fair and just political structure.137 Rawls seeks to construct a
just society by imagining the political institutions that people in an “original
position” would choose.138 In the original position, people are under a “veil
of ignorance,” meaning that they do not know the religious, philosophical,
or moral convictions of the people they represent.139 People in the original
position accordingly would choose a basic political structure that
accommodates a broad range of lifestyle choices because they would refuse
to create a polity that would not accommodate the needs of the person they
ended up representing. In the words of Rawls:
[T]he parties do not know whether the beliefs espoused by the persons they
represent [are] a majority or a minority view. They cannot take chances by
permitting a lesser liberty of conscience to minority religions, say, on the
possibility that those they represent espouse a majority or dominant religion
and will therefore have an even greater liberty. For it may also happen that
these persons belong to a minority faith and may suffer accordingly. If the

134

See supra text accompanying notes 109-14 (explicating the philosophical foundation
for the Aristotelian, communitarian, and republican position that state regulatory interests are
not contingent upon location).
135
Professor Kreimer argues to the contrary that permitting extraterritorial regulation
mutes diversity. See Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 915-16
(arguing that if the only way dissenters can “escape the force of a state law is to move to
another state,” the result would be “increas[ed] moral homogeneity”). I disagree, and I
explain why infra notes 256-62 and accompanying text.
136
See, e.g., Martha Minow, Putting Up and Putting Down: Tolerance Reconsidered, in
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM 77, 78 (Mark Tushnet ed., 1990) (discussing
the connection between federalism and diversity).
137
For an explanation as to why Rawls’s views are relevant to this type of inquiry, see
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 109, at 1061-63.
138
See RAWLS, supra note 114, at 26 (“The idea is to use the original position to model
both freedom and equality and restrictions on reasons in such a way that it becomes perfectly
evident which agreement would be made by the parties as citizens’ representatives.”).
139
Id. at 24 n.27.
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parties were to gamble in this way, they would show that they did not take the
religious, philosophical, or moral convictions of persons seriously, and, in
effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or moral conviction
140
was.

The original position is a heuristic tool for enabling a person to imagine
the political structure that is fairest from the perspective of all of society’s
citizens. Stated differently, the veil of ignorance and the original position
transform personal self-interest into society-wide interest: People in the
original position presumably will choose to accommodate everybody in a
fair way because they do not know whom they actually represent and
accordingly would not want to create a political structure that did not
accommodate whoever it is they happened to be.141
Rawls argues that the original position leads to two principles of justice
that, in turn, inform the basic political structure of the just polity.142 The
first principle of justice contemplates certain “basic liberties”—such as
“freedom of thought and liberty of conscience”—that the polity would be
required to respect.143 Rawlsians typically understand the first principle of
justice as creating substantive limits to the government’s regulatory powers
that roughly correspond to the substantive limits of the Bill of Rights.144
But what about those activities that are not so protected but that polities
are free to flatly proscribe, such as gambling? Analyzed from the
perspective of the original position, the just and fair basic political structure
would be a federal system in which each state would have the option of
extraterritorially regulating its traveling citizens. Not permitting such
extraterritorial regulation would limit the powers of subfederal polities such
that they would be unable to do what many—such as Aristotelians,
republicans, and communitarians, among others—think is absolutely
necessary for a polity to do. People in the original position, not knowing
whom they represent, would be unwilling to create such a political system
where, if they happened to be an Aristotelian (for example) they would be

140

Id. at 311 (emphasis added).
Mark D. Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures, Liberalism, and American
Constitutionalism, 12 J. CONTEMP . LEGAL I SSUES (forthcoming Winter 2002) (manuscript at
9, on file with author) [hereinafter Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal Cultures].
142
RAWLS, supra note 114, at 291-99.
143
Id. at 281. The second principle of justice, which will not receive any attention here,
concerns economic rights. Id.
144
I have argued that the first principle of justice also can be understood as requiring
certain governmental regulations in select subfederal polities on behalf of certain “political
perfectionists,” that is, those who believe that people’s moral powers can only be shaped
appropriately with the polity’s active intervention. Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 109, at
1092.
141
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deeply dissatisfied.145 More precisely, because Aristotelians believe that
polities play a necessary role in the habituation of people to act
virtuously,146 they may well believe that the wrongly structured political
system would be an obstacle to their fully realizing themselves as human
beings. Given a choice between a political structure that would not
accommodate them if they happened to be Aristotelians (or republicans or
communitarians) and a political structure that could accommodate them
regardless of whether they were traditional liberals or adherents of any of
these other political philosophies,147 people in the original position would
opt for a political structure that was more broadly accommodating, provided
that people had a right to exit whichever polity they lived in and move
elsewhere. Without an exit option, people who are liberals but who
happened
to
be
in
a
communitarian
148
state would be trapped in a polity not suited to them.
Failing to provide
the option of extraterritorial regulation to curtail travel-evasion, however,
“would show that [persons in the original position] did not take the
religious, philosophical, or moral convictions of persons seriously, and, in
effect, did not know what a religious, philosophical, or moral conviction
was,”149 for it would generate a political system that could not accommodate
Aristotelians, republicans, and communitarians.
To conclude, because Aristotelians (as well as republicans and
communitarians) require a political structure that allows extraterritorial
regulation of citizens, people in the original position, not knowing whether
they represented a neo-Aristotelian or a liberal, would opt for a political
structure that permitted the extraterritorial regulation of citizens. That
accordingly is the just and fair system. Should the person behind the veil of
ignorance be a traditional liberal, she could live in a subfederal polity that
did not extraterritorially regulate. Should she be a neo-Aristotelian, she

145

For an explanation as to why Rawls’s threshold definition of the “political conception
of the person” should not exclude Aristotelians, communitarians, or republicans, see id. at
1120-22.
146
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1098a15, 1103b1 -1103b5 (Terence Irwin trans.,
1985).
147
This is not to suggest that they would elect to create a political structure that
accommodated all possible political theories. For a discussion of those which would not be
accommodated, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra 109, at 1068-71.
148
For more on exit, see id. at 1097-106. The constraint of “well-orderedness”
presumably would not be implicated insofar as state policies still would be limited by
constitutional limitations. See id. at 1093-97 (arguing that the “well-ordered society”
requirement entails substantive limitations on subfederal sovereigns, which deny such specific
powers as making treaties with foreign nat ions and constrain other activities that have
significant effects outside of the community).
149
RAWLS, supra note 114, at 311.
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could live in a polity that did so regulate. For these reasons, permitting a
state to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities is not fundamentally
unfair for purposes of due process.150 To the contrary, permitting such
extraterritorial regulation is normatively desirable from a Rawlsian
perspective, and a political structure that flatly proscribed states from
extraterritorially regulating to curb travel-evasion would be unjust.
D. Bigelow v. Virginia and Extraterritoriality
In the 1975 case of Bigelow v. Virginia,151 the Supreme Court made
some observations that Professor Seth Kreimer has construed as disallowing
states from criminalizing their citizens’ out-of-state conduct.152 Professor
Donald Regan has come to a different conclusion, arguing that the
principles of extraterritoriality enunciated in cases such as Skiriotes and
Strassheim remain good law and that any anti-extraterritoriality statements
in Bigelow are mere obiter dicta. Professors Kreimer and Regan have
closely analyzed one section of the Bigelow opinion that touched on
extraterritoriality, and a careful review strongly supports Professor Regan’s
conclusion that it is dictum.153 There is a second point in Bigelow, not
discussed by the two scholars, in which the Court asserts an even more
forceful anti-extraterritoriality statement. This too is best understood as
dictum. Furthermore, subsequent caselaw has narrowed Bigelow such that
what remains of any extraterritoriality principle it may have articulated
would have no bearing on the types of extraterritoriality that are the subject
of this Article.
The Virginia statute at issue in Bigelow prohibited the sale or

150

Professor Kreimer surveys a number of potential justifications for a state’s
extraterritorial regulation of its citizens and finds them all to be lacking. See Kreimer,
Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 924-38 (exploring possible justifications for a
citizen’s obligation to obey extraterritorial state laws, i.e., consent, fairness, and the necessity
of order). He does not consider the arguments made above, however, and common sense
suggests that even one legitimate justification would suffice to take extraterritoriality out of
the cat egory of fundamentally unfair.
151
421 U.S. 809 (1975).
152
See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 462 (arguing that Bigelow establishes
the principle that states cannot “punish their citizens for conduct that is protect ed in the sister
state where it occurs”). Professor Lea Brilmayer at one point suggested that Bigelow “casts
some doubt on a state’s authority to regulate the activities of residents while in other states,”
LEA BRILMAYER ET AL., AN I NTRODUCTION TO JURISDICTION IN THE AMERICAN FEDERAL
SYSTEM 327 (1986), but she appears to have backed off from this view in a more recent work,
see Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due
Process, 105 HARV. L. RE V. 1217, 1241 (1992) (“It is also fairly well established that a state
may regulate its residents, even when they are acting outside the state.”).
153
See Appendix: Analysis of the Kreimer/Regan Debate Concerning Bigelow.
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circulation of any publication that encouraged or prompted the procuring of
an abortion. The editor of a Virginia newspaper was convicted for violating
the statute because the paper had printed an advertisement for low-cost
abortion services in New York that had been placed by a for-profit abortion
referral service. The Court ruled that such an application of the statute
violated the First Amendment.
The relevant passage from the opinion that Professors Kreimer and
Regan have considered states that Virginia could not “prevent its residents
from traveling to New York to obtain those services or, as the State
conceded, prosecute them for going there. Virginia possessed no authority
to regulate the services provided in New York . . . .”154 The section of the
opinion in which this assertion appears concerned the question of whether
commercial advertisements should receive First Amendment protection.
The quoted language constitutes dictum for the reasons explained in this
Article’s Appendix.
Consider next the extraterritoriality discussion in Bigelow that was not
discussed by Professors Kreimer and Regan. After establishing that the
advertising received First Amendment protection, the Court applied the
then-applicable constitutional test 155 —a balancing of interests—and
concluded that the Virginia statute infringed upon the editor’s First
Amendment rights. At this point in the decision, in relation to assessing the
quantum of Virginia’s governmental interest, the Court once again
discussed extraterritoriality. The Court stated:
To be sure, the agency-advertiser’s practices, although not then illegal, may
later have proved to be at least “inimical to the public interest” in New York.
But [a] this development would not justify a Virginia statute that forbids
Virginians from using in New York the then legal services of a local New
York agency. Here, Virginia is really asserting an interest in regulating what
Virginians may hear or read about the New York services. It is, in effect,
advancing an interest in shielding its citizens from information about [b]
activities outside Virginia’s border, activities that Virginia’s police powers do
not reach. This asserted interest, even if understandable, was entitled to little,
156
if any, weight under the circumstances.

This discussion, which assesses the extent of the government’s interest,
is essential to the Court’s ultimate holding that the Virginia statute violated
the editor’s rights under a balancing of interests. What, if any, of it
154

Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 824 (citations omitted).
The Court has since adopted a four -part test that governs First Amendment
challenges to commercial speech. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (applying the four -step analysis to a ban on promotional
advertising).
156
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 827 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
155
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constitutes a holding, however, is difficult to say. Dicta, of course, typically
refers to statements in opinions that are not necessary to support the Court’s
outcome.157 Neither statement [a] nor statement [b] were necessary to the
Court’s ultimate conclusion that the government’s interest is outweighed by
the individual’s interest in having access to information concerning services
available out of state. This can be seen by noting that the principle that a
state may regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities is not incompatible
with the principle that a state may not control its citizens’ knowledge of
what activities are permissible in other states. The latter principle may well
interfere with the preconditions to a meaningful exercise of the citizens’
right to travel (the decision to remain where she lives or instead to relocate
to a new jurisdiction), whereas extraterritorial regulation does not.158 The
Bigelow Court consequently did not have to decide any larger
extraterritoriality principles in coming to its conclusion that Virginia’s
statute violated the First Amendment, rendering the Court’s
extraterritoriality observations mere dicta.
Furthermore, understanding statements [a] and [b] as dicta is consistent
with the canonical distinction between dicta and holding. As explained by
Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens v. Virginia,159 dicta is afforded less weight
than holdings because only “[t]he question actually before the court is
investigated with care, and considered in its full extent. Other principles
which may serve to illustrate it, are considered in their relation to the case
decided, but their possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely
investigated.”160
Consistent with this understanding of dicta, the Bigelow Court did not
give careful consideration to the extent of a state’s extraterritorial powers.
Nowhere in the opinion did the Bigelow Court discuss the caselaw (such as
Strassheim and Skiriotes) with which its anti-extraterritorial position was
inconsistent. Further, although the Court did cite three cases to support the
anti-extraterritorial proposition (cases that were the subject of Professor
Kreimer and Professor Regan’s dispute), Professor Regan’s conclusion that
“none of the three cases is apposite” is unimpeachable:
United States v. Guest stands for the proposition that there is a right of
interstate movement which is constitutionally protected against private

157

Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. P A . L. REV. 1997, 2000 (1994). Dorf
ultimately criticizes this generally accepted understanding of dicta and offers an alternative.
See id. at 2040-42 (illustrating the difficulty of ascertaining the scope of judicial decisions).
158
See infra Part II.B (describing the modest limitations that the right to travel imposes
on Home States’ powers to regulate).
159
19 U.S. 120, 6 Wheat. 264 (1821).
160
Id. at 399-400.
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interference. Shapiro v. Thompson is about a right of interstate migration,
which involves precisely changing one’s state citizenship. Doe v. Bolton
involves the article IV privileges and immunities clause, and establishes that
New York (Georgia, in the original) cannot deny nonresidents access to
abortion referral services (abortion services, in the original) operating in New
York. This is obviously a quite different issue from whether Virginia can deny
161
its own citizens access to services in New York.

All that needs to be added is that Professor Regan’s analysis is
undisturbed by the Court’s most recent pronouncement concerning the right
to travel in Saenz v. Roe,162 which explained the cases analyzed by Professor
Regan in terms virtually identical to his own.163 In short, Bigelow’s
observations concerning extraterritoriality are comfortably characterized as
dicta because they were not necessary to the Court’s holding, they were
unsupported by the cases to which they made an oblique reference, and they
did not take account of the caselaw with which they were at odds.
In any event, Bigelow has been significantly modified by subsequent
cases. The Supreme Court held in United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co.164 that nonlottery states have a legitimate interest in shielding their
citizens from advertisements for lotteries in states in which lotteries are
legal. 165 The Court understood that North Carolina’s antigambling policy
would have been undermined had a North Carolina broadcaster been
permitted to broadcast advertisements for an activity that was legal in
another state but prohibited in North Carolina. The parallels between the
statutes at issue in Edge and Bigelow were thus quite striking: in both cases,
the statutes prevented in-state informational media from broadcasting outof-state advertisements of activities legal out of state, but not at home.
Unlike Bigelow, however, the Edge Court upheld the statute at issue against
a First Amendment challenge. 166 To be sure, Edge does not flatly overrule
Bigelow, since the statute upheld in Edge was federal rather than state.

161

Regan, supra note 27, at 1907 (citations omitted).
526 U.S. 489, 500-02 (1999). The Saenz decision did not deal with limitations on a
state’s power to regulate its citizens’ out -of-state activities, but concerned limits on a state’s
powers to discriminate between old-time residents and newcomers.
163
See id. at 498, 500 -02 (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966), for the
proposition that the constitutional right to travel from one state to another, though not in the
text of the Constitution, is firmly embedded in the Court’s jurisprudence; emphasizing that the
holding in Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U.S. 618 (1969), focused on the right to interstate
migration; and explaining that Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), concerns nonresidents who
enter a state for the procur ement of medical services).
164
509 U.S. 418 (1993).
165
See supra notes 103-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Court’s analysis in
Edge).
166
509 U.S. at 426-36.
162
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Nonetheless the Edge case undercuts Bigelow’s flat assertion that one state’s
police powers do not extend into another state; if states have a legitimate
interest in their citizens’ out-of-state conduct, as Edge holds, then why do
their police powers categorically end at their borders? Edge’s holding
surely is more consonant with cases such as Strassheim and Skiriotes, which
upheld the out-of-state exercise of police power because a state’s legitimate
interests can be implicated by out-of-state activities.167
Furthermore, the holding in Bigelow was expressly limited in Posadas
de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.168 The Court in
Posadas held that Puerto Rico could prohibit Puerto Rican gambling
establishments, which had been established to cater to travelers, from
advertising to Puerto Rican residents.169 In so holding, the Court had to
explain its holding in Bigelow. The Posadas Court could have distinguished
Bigelow on the ground that Bigelow concerned extraterritoriality, but the
Posadas Court did not do so. Instead, the Posadas Court explained that the
advertising restrictions in Bigelow were problematic only because the
“underlying conduct that was the subject of the advertising restrictions
[abortion] was constitutionally protected and could not have been prohibited
by the State. Here, on the other hand, the Puerto Rico Legislature surely
could have prohibited casino gambling by the residents of Puerto Rico
altogether.”170 Thus, even if (contrary to the conclusion above) Bigelow’s
anti-extraterritorial discussions constituted a holding, Posadas would appear
to provide an important caveat: Bigelow’s assertion that Virginia’s interest
was entitled to little, if any, weight because its “police powers do not reach”
activities outside of Virginia’s borders171 must be understood after Posadas
to mean that the Home State’s police powers do not extend to the
extraterritorial regulation of matters that the Constitution prohibits Home
States from banning.172 Any such limitation on extraterritoriality is
167

See supra Part I.A (reviewing early Supreme Court caselaw to confirm the
proposition that Home States have the power to regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial
conduct).
168
478 U.S. 328 (1986).
169
Id. at 340-44.
170
Id. at 345-46.
171
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 828 (1975).
172
Rather than limiting Bigelow, it could be argued that Posadas merely explained
limiting language that already appeared in Bigelow itself. The Bigelow opinion stated that
Virginia “is, in effect, advancing an interest in shielding its citizens from information about
activities outside Virginia’s borders, activities that Virginia’s police powers do not reach.
This asserted interest, even if understandable, was entitled to little, if any, weight under the
circumstances.” Id. (emphasis added). In other words, “the circumstances” under which
Virginia had no interest in regulating the extraterritorial conduct of its citizens were when the
underlying conduct was constitutionally protected. In any event, it makes no difference to the
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immaterial to the regulations that are the subject of this Article, namely,
laws that regulate activities that are not constitutionally protected, such as
gambling, riding a motorcycle without a helmet, and the like. 173
To quickly summarize, consistent with the teachings of the Model Penal
Code and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, Home States indeed
have a presumptive power to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities to
avoid travel-evasion. Such extraterritorial powers are wholly consistent
with contemporary due process doctrine; states have special interests both in
the welfare of their citizens and in ensuring that legitimate state policies not
be thwarted through the expedient of travel. Such powers are consonant
with longstanding Supreme Court caselaw, and they have not been
undermined by the case of Bigelow v. Virginia or any Supreme Court
decision since.
II. FEDERALISM ’ S PUTATIVE BROAD-BASED LIMITS ON HOME STATES
As several commentators have correctly noted, the Constitution
imposes, aside from due process-related concerns, limits on Home States’
ability to regulate the out-of-state conduct of their citizens. The scope of
these limitations, however, has been overstated in the literature. Examined
in this Part are the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the right
to travel, the Dormant Commerce Clause, and various “structural”
constitutional considerations. Properly understood, these constitutional
limits on Home States’ extraterritorial powers are only modest; they leave
ample room for a Home State to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state
activities.174
A. Privileges and Immunities Clause
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV provides that “[t]he
citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.”175 Professor Kreimer has suggested that this

types of extraterritoriality discussed in this Article whether Posadas is understood as limiting
or merely clarifying Bigelow.
173
This is true even with respect to parental notification laws, for states are free to
condition a minor’s abortion on parental notification and consent. See Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 899-900 (1992) (holding that the parental consent requirement of the
Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1992 did not violate the Co nstitution). The underlying
activity in Bigelow, by contrast, was an adult’s obtaining of an abortion, for which there is a
clear constitutional right under Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
174
Part III will explain more fully why states’ extraterritorial powers over their citizens
does not lead to anarchy that would undermine our nation’s federal system.
175
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
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clause flatly precludes the Home State from regulating its citizens’ conduct
in sister states.176 According to Professor Kreimer:
[H]ome States cannot waive the Article IV rights of their citizens when the
states regard those rights as unnecessary to guard against interstate friction;
rather, the citizens as individuals are “entitled” to local privileges and
immunities when they visit neighboring states. As citizens from different states
travel and interact on a basis of equality, they develop and maintain
177
consciousness of themselves as equals and members of a single polity.

This argument falls short on several grounds. To begin, no claim based
on the Privileges and Immunities Clause can serve as a general argument
against Home State regulation of its citizens’ out-of-state conduct because
the clause properly applies to only a limited category of regulations, as
demonstrated below in Subsection 1. Furthermore, the argument put
forward by Professor Kreimer is inconsistent with longstanding privileges
and immunities caselaw. As discussed below in Subsection 2, wellestablished caselaw provides that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does
not apply to a State’s regulation of its own citizens, but rather applies to the
regulation of states’ relationships with visitors who are citizens of other
states; in the lingo of this Article, the clause addresses Host States, not
Home States. Even so, the clause could indirectly interfere with the Home
State’s effort to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state conduct if it were
construed as compelling the Host State to apply its laws to the visitor
irrespective of the Home State’s policy. Subsection 3 shows that the
Privileges and Immunities Clause compels no such result. The clause does
not bar a Host State from applying the Home State’s laws to visitors if there
are good reasons to do so and applying another state’s laws to traveling
citizens of that state for the purpose of maintaining the legitimate policies of
the Home State should satisfy this standard. Finally, Subsection 4 will

176

Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 917-21.
Id. at 918-19 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). That Professor Kreimer interprets
the clause’s entitlement as extending broadly to cover virtually all laws is strongly suggested
by the sentences that follow those quoted above in the text:
By contrast, a system in which my opportunities upon entering California remain
subject to the moral demands of Pennsylvania undercuts this sense of national unity.
Such a system would deny to me, because of my status as Pennsylvanian, the
privileges that the Californians I pass on the street share as their birthright. This
situation hardly advances the goal of establishing a single national identity.
Id. at 919. Such a goal of national unity would appear to require that one’s Home State
identity not diminish the opportunities that a Pennsylvanian visiting California has vis-à-vis
Californians in all respect s. See also Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 463 (advancing
a similar argument based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a provision which,
Kreimer argues, embodies the “constitutional commitments to national union and national
citizenship”).
177
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explain why the doctrinal status quo described in Subsections 1 through 3 is
normatively desirable.
1. The Limited Activities that Constitute “Privileges” or “Immunities”
It is important to understand what is and what is not at stake under
Article IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause. The clause provides
protection only to “privileges” and “immunities” and therefore could not be
the source of an across-the-board prohibition against a Home State’s
regulation of its citizens’ out-of-state conduct.178 The Supreme Court has
defined privileges and immunities so that they encompass only “such basic
and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes
of the formation of the Union.”179 This has been held to include only a
limited number of things, including “the pursuit of common callings, the
ability to transfer property, . . . access to courts”180 and the right of
nonresidents to settle in a new state.181 For example, the Court has held that
“[e]quality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or wellbeing of the Union,” in upholding a statutory elk-hunting license scheme
that imposed substantially higher license fees on nonresidents than
residents.182
178

Professor Kreimer’s position on the question of what activities fall within the
purview of the Privileges and Immunities Clause is unclear. On the one hand, the logic of his
analysis of the clause suggests the position that visitors from sister states should be subject to
all of the Host State’s laws. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (discussing Kreimer’s
suggestion that the Privileges and Immunities Clause flatly precludes the Home State from
regulating its citizens’ conduct in sister states). Furthermore, much of his argument takes the
form of positive analysis. See, e.g., Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at
918 (citing Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948), for the proposition that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause imposes limit ations on the Home States). For my critique of Professor
Kreimer’s interpretation of Toomer, see infra notes 197-204 and accompanying text. For a
clear description of the distinctions among positive, prescriptive, and normativ e analyses, see
generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1471, 1474-75 (1998).
On the other hand, Professor Kreimer refers in a footnote to cases that have found certain
matters to be outside the scope of a protected “privilege” or “immunity.” Kreimer, Law of
Choice, supra note 5, at 499 n.167. Perhaps his argument, which gives rise to a very broad
scope of “privileges and immunities,” is intended to be a prescriptive rather than a positive
analysis. If that is so, then the crux of my response is not found in Subsections 1 through 3,
which is primarily an analysis of the contemporary do ctrine, but instead appears in Part II.A.4,
which explains why the doct rinal status quo is wise as a normative matter. Subsections 1
through 3 are still important, however, insofar as it is critical to have a clear understanding of
the current law regardless of whether one is defending or criticizing it.
179
Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978).
180
Id.
181
Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 76 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
182
Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388.
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In short, the terms “privileges” and “immunities” do not embrace a
general right of visitors to be treated as in-staters, but instead have a more
limited meaning. Many “distinctions between residents and nonresidents
merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States,”
and it is “[o]nly with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing
upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity [that the state must] treat all
citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.” 183
None of the peripatetic citizens’ activities discussed in this Article
would appear to constitute a “privilege” or “immunity” for purposes of
Article IV. This can be illustrated by considering what might be the most
controversial of the extraterritorial limitations considered in this Article;
that is, a regulation barring a state’s citizens from circumventing its Home
State’s parental notification laws by traveling to a jurisdiction that is
without such a requirement. Obtaining an abortion without parental
notification plainly does not fall into any of the aforementioned protected
activities. Furthermore, given the fact that parental notification statutes are
constitutional, it would be difficult to argue that an activity that cannot be
legally undertaken at home becomes part of the class of “such basic and
essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of
the formation of the Union”184 when the ban is extended out of state. 185
Nonetheless, because it is conceivable that a Home State might wish to
regulate a protected “privilege” or “immunity,”186 it is necessary to examine
more fully Professor Kreimer’s argument.
2. Inapplicability to the Home State
The Privileges and Immunities Clause has long been understood as
having created limitations on Host States with respect to citizens vis iting
from other states, but at no point has it been understood to limit a state’s
regulatory powers over its own citizens. This is because the clause
consistently has been understood as being directed toward eliminating
“‘discriminating legislation against [visiting citizens] by other States.’”187
The “disabilities of alienage in other States”188 that the clause proscribes
183

Id. at 383.
Id. at 387.
185
The only plausible argument to this effect would be parasitic on the right to travel,
which I discuss infra Part II.B.
186
For example, an antigambling state may wish to prevent its citizens from working in
gambling establishments located in states in which gambling is le gal.
187
Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 380 (quotin g Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180
(1869)).
188
Id.
184
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are, by their nature, regulations that emanate from Host States rather than
Home States. Thus, in the 1872 case of Bradwell v. Illinois, the Court
rejected a privileges and immunities claim asserted by an Illinois woman
who challenged an Illinois law that barred women admission to the bar189 on
the ground that the clause does not constrain Home States:
As regards the provision of the Constitution that citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, the
plaintiff in her affidavit has stated very clearly a case to which it is
inapplicable. The protection designed by that clause, as has been repeatedly
held, has no application to a citizen of the State whose laws are complained of.
If the plaintiff was a citizen of the State of Illinois, that provision of the
190
Constitution gave her no protection against its courts or its legislation.

The Court in the Slaughter-House Cases restated this understanding,
observing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV “does not
profess to control the power of the State governments over the rights of its
own citizens.”191 Fully consistent with this observation, the Court in United
States v. Wheeler noted in passing that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
provides that “one State should not deny to the citizens of other States rights
given to its own citizens.”192 And more recently, the Supreme Court
confirmed this understanding of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the
1984 case of United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden, 193 noting that although out-of-state citizens could pursue a
privileges and immunities claim against the New Jersey municipality of
Camden, “disadvantaged New Jersey residents have no claim under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause.”194 As the Court explained, “New Jersey
residents at least have a chance to remedy at the polls any discrimination
against them. Out-of-state citizens have no similar opportunity . . . .”195 In
other words, the clause limits Host States, but not Home States.
Professor Kreimer, however, asserts the converse proposition that the

189

83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138 (1872).
Id.
191
See 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75-77 (1873) (construing Article IV’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause to aid in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges and
Immunities Clause).
192
254 U.S. 281, 298 (1920); see also Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 252 (1898)
(reasserting the validity of a narrow interpretation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause).
193
465 U.S. 208 (1984).
194
Id. at 217 (citing The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 77).
195
Id. For the canonical discussion of the logic behind this approach to constitutional
interpretation, what is now often spoken of as a “representation-reinforcing” method, see
JOHN HART ELY , DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A T HEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980).
190
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Privileges and Immunities Clause applies to Home States as well. 196 To
support his claim, Kreimer quotes language from the 1948 case of Toomer
v. Witsell,197 stating that the clause “was designed to insure to a citizen of
State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens of
State B enjoy.”198 While it is true that this phrase is ambiguous, and on its
own could be read to create a limitation on the Home State as well as the
Host State, the holding in Toomer struck down a Host State’s statute, not a
Home State’s law. Moreover, other language in the opinion undermines
Professor Kreimer’s interpretation of the phrase.199 More importantly, there
are far more recent cases than Toomer where the Court has confirmed the
traditional view that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not impose
limitations on the Home State. The aforementioned case of Camden is
one. 200 Another is the 1982 case of Zobel v. Williams, 201 where the Court
also concluded that the clause was inapplicable to a claim asserted by a
citizen against her Home State. At issue in Zobel was the constitutionality
of an Alaska statute that awarded distributions from the state’s mineral
196

See Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 913, 917-21 (arguing
that the Privileges and Immunities Clause mandates “a territorial conception of state
regulatory authority over state citizens’ activities in sister states”).
197
334 U.S. 385 (1948).
198
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 918 (referencing Toomer,
334 U.S. at 395).
199
Thus, even if Professor Kreimer’s interpretation were correct, the Toomer language
would be mere dicta. In any event, a close reading of the opinion strongly suggests that the
Toomer Court’s language is best understood as applying only to Host States. The sentence
following the one that Professor Kreimer quotes makes the most sense if understood to speak
only of the State A citizen’s right not to be treated differently by Host State B because she is
not a citizen of State B. That next sentence states that “[f]or protection of such equality the
citizen of State A was not to be restricted to the uncertain remedies afforded by diplomatic
processes and official retaliation.” Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395. If the Home State were the
source of disparate treatment, the Court would have been suggesting that the citizen of State A
might attempt to get her Home State to act differently by using the “diplomatic processes” of
the Host State. This would be strange for two reasons. First, noncitizens typically are not
beneficiaries of diplomatic processes. Second, the more direct way for a citizen to effectuate
change would be to lobby the representatives of her Home State, and one would have
expected the Court to have mentioned this as a possible route to addressing her
dissatisfactions. Further support for the conclusion that the Toomer case is not making any
radical doctrinal expansions is the Court’s explanation one sentence later that the clause was
designed to “‘remov[e] from the citizens of each State the disabilities of alienage in the other
States.’” Id. at 396 (quoting Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868)).
“Disabilities of alienage” likely refers to disparate treatment at the beckoning of the Host
State, the state that typically is the source of such disparate treatment.
200
See supra notes 193-95 and accompanying text (noting that the Camden Court
recognized no cause of action under the Privileges and Immunities Clause against the Home
State and emphasizing the availability of a political remedy in the Home State which did not
exist in the Host State).
201
457 U.S. 55 (1982).
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income to its citizens but adjusted the size of compensation on the basis of
how long the citizen had been a resident of Alaska. Said the majority:
The Alaska statute does not simply make distinctions between native-born
Alaskans and those who migrate to Alaska from other states . . . . The Alaska
statute also discriminates among long-time residents and even native-born
residents. . . .
The statute does not involve the kind of discrimination which the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Art. IV was designed to prevent. That Clause “was
designed to insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same
privileges which the citizens of State B enjoy.” The Clause is thus not
202
applicable to this case.

The Privileges and Immunities Clause would have applied if Toomer
actually meant what Professor Kreimer suggests it does. Thus, in addition
to constituting a holding, 203 Zobel confirms the understanding that Toomer
did not announce an expanded doctrine of privileges and immunities that
extends to Home States.204 In short, there has been no break in the long-

202

Id. at 59-60 n.5 (quoting Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395).
Professor Kreimer is mistaken when he asserts that only in one case—the Bradwell
decision discussed above—was the clause’s inapplicability to Home States the grounds for the
Court’s decision. See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 512-13. Zobel and Camden
also held the clause inapplicable to Home States.
204
To be sure, Professor Kreimer does not overlook the Zobel case. His use of the case,
however, is dubious. He suggests on the basis of Zobel that “Justice O’Connor —joined on
occasion by both Justices Brennan and Rehnquist—has manifested skepticism” regarding the
principle announced in the Slaughter-House Cases that the Privileges and Immunities Clause
“‘does not profess to control the power of State governments over the rights of its own
citizens.’” Id. at 512-13 (quoting The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77
(1873)).
However, a close look at Justice O’Connor’s concurrence does not suggest that she
doubts the Slaughter-House principle, but instead that she holds the traditional view that the
clause only regulates states’ relationships with noncitizens. According to Justice O’Connor,
the statute at issue in Zobel had an impact on interstate migration insofar as it awarded smaller
distributions of the state’s mineral income to recent immigrants than to long-term residents.
By making it less attractive for newcomers, the statute implicated the “right to establish
residence in a new State.” Zobel, 457 U.S. at 77 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor
specifically refused to characterize the case as “discriminat[ing] among classes of residents,
rat her than between residents and nonresidents” and instead noted that the statute “classifie[d]
citizens on the basis of their former residential status.” Id. at 75. While it was true that the
Alaska statute applied to persons who technically already had become residents of Alaska,
“[t]he fact that this discrimination unfolds after the nonresident establishes residency does not
insulate Alaska’s scheme from scrutiny under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.” Id.
Justice O’Connor deployed Toomer’s doctrinal statement that the clause “was de signed to
insure to a citizen of State A who ventures into State B the same privileges which the citizens
of State B enjoy” and then explained that “the citizen of State A who ventures into [Alaska] to
establish a home labors under a continuous disability.” Zobel, 457 U.S. at 74-75 (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
In short, Justice O’Connor’s analysis—which, in any event, has never commanded a
203
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standing doctrine that the Priv ileges and Immunities Clause does not
constrain Home States.
3. Obligations Imposed on the Host State
Even if this reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not
limit the power of Home States to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state
activities, virtually identical constraints on Home States would obtain if the
clause were construed to require the Host State to apply its laws to visitors
from other states irrespective of the Home States’ policy.205 Professor
Kreimer appears to propound such an interpretation of the clause when he
cites the case of Austin v. New Hampshire 206 for the proposition that “the
status of the [H]ome [S]tate’s antiabortion policy would not dilute the
entitlement of out-of-state visitors to obtain abortions on a basis of equality
with domestic residents.”207 A closer look at Austin shows that the case

majority of the Court —does not express “skepticism” concerning the Slaughter-House
principle. Rather, it is a practical, functional analysis that refuses to allow change of
residency to ipso facto terminate the clause’s regulation of states’ relations with no ncitizens.
According to Justice O’Connor, in other words, under the circumstances of a state law that
affects interstate migration by treating long-term residents more favorably than those who not
long ago were nonresidents, the Privileges and Immunities Clause still is applicable. Justice
O’Connor’s dissent in Attorney General v. Soto-Lopez, likewise concerned a statute that
affected interstate migration. See 476 U.S. 898, 920 (1986) (O’Connor, J., dissenting)
(arguing that New York’s restriction of civil service preference to veterans who entered the
armed forces while residing in New York was constitutional under intermediate scrutiny
because New York legitimately may seek to reward those who represented the state while in
the armed forces). Professor Kreimer has suggested that this dissent stands for the same
principle he attributes to O’Connor’s Zobel concurrence. Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note
5, at 513 n.209.
205
Although the Privileges and Immunities Clause would not bar the Home State from
regulating its citizens’ out -of-state activities under this approach, the Home State likely would
not be able to prosecute or otherwise penalize its citizens for doing what the Constitution
required them to do while they were in the Host State. In short, under this understanding of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Home State would be able to legislate vis-à-vis its
traveling citizens, but would not be able to enforce its regulations. As a practical matter, such
a constraint would be quite similar to what would obtain if the Privileges and Immunities
Clause were directly applicable to Home States (the position discussed, and rejected, above in
Subsection 2). Almost, but not exactly similar, for laws on the books can have real effects
even if they are not enforced. See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Creating Criminals: The
Injuries Inflicted by “Unenforced” Sodomy Laws, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 103 (2000)
(using sodomy laws to demonstrate the harms suffered by individuals targeted by “harmless”
unenforced laws).
206
420 U.S. 656 (1975).
207
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 919 n.41. Professor
Kreimer argues that “[H]ome [S]tates cannot waive the Article IV rights of their citizens when
the states regard those rights as unnecessary to guard against interstate friction; rather, the
citizens as individuals are ‘entitled’ to local privileges and immunities when they visit
neighboring states.” Id. at 918-19. I think this is best understood as a claim that the
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stands for a significantly different principle. Moreover, the larger web of
privileges and immunities decisions definitively shows that the clause does
not create an unqualified duty for Host States to apply the same laws to
visitors that are applicable to their citizens irrespective of the Home State’s
policy.
Austin concerned a privileges and immunities challenge to New
Hampshire’s income tax. New Hampshire’s statute had the effect of taxing
the New Hampshire income of nonresidents, but not the income of
residents. However, under the terms of the statute, Host State, New
Hampshire, would not tax the nonresident’s New Hampshire income if the
nonresident’s Home State did not grant a credit for taxes paid to New
Hampshire. Like every other state, the Home State of Maine gave its
citizens a tax credit for income taxed by other states. Thus, Maine could
have wholly eliminated the taxes its citizens had to pay on income earned in
New Hampshire, thereby putting them on equal footing with New
Hampshire residents, simply by terminating Maine’s statutory credit for
taxes paid by its citizens to New Hampshire. 208
The Austin Court struck down New Hampshire’s tax law under the
Privileges and Immunities Clause because of the statute’s inequitable
“treatment for the citizens of the taxing State and nonresident taxpayers.”209
The Court concluded it was irrelevant that Maine, by repealing its tax credit,
could have eliminated the differential treatment its citizens were accorded
by New Hampshire because “the constitutionality of one State’s statutes
affecting nonresidents [cannot] depend upon the present configuration of the
statutes of another State.”210 The Austin Court supported this proposition by
approvingly quoting language from the earlier case of Travis v. Yale &
Towne Manufacturing Co.: “‘A State may not barter away the right,
conferred upon its citizens by the Constitution of the United States, to enjoy
the privileges and immunities of citizens when they go into other States.’”211
Professor Kreimer relies on Austin and Travis to support his claim that
the status of the Home State’s antiabortion policies does not affect out-ofstate visitors’ rights to obtain abortions on an equal basis with domestic
residents.212 Austin and Travis, however, involve scenarios that are
Privileges and Immunities Clause imposes an obligation on the Host State that cannot be
changed by the Home State. In any event, the analysis of Austin and Travis in text below
would be equally applicable even if Professor Kreimer’s argument were construed as another
limitation on the Home State.
208
Austin, 420 U.S. at 666.
209
Id. at 665.
210
Id. at 668.
211
Id. at 667 (quoting Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 82 (1920)).
212
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 919 n.41.
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importantly different from Professor Kreimer’s abortion example. In both
Austin and Travis, the Host State was discriminating against nonresidents to
advance its own interests.213 The states in each case did so via laws they
enacted that expressly discriminated between residents and nonresidents.
These two cases rejected the argument that self-interested discrimination
could be saved from unconstitutionality by statutory provisions permitting
the Home State to terminate the Host State’s discrimination against the
former’s citizens by in turn discriminating against the Host States’ citizens.
Austin refused to accept the New Hampshire scheme because “New
Hampshire in effect invites [the Maine appellants] to induce their
representatives, if they can, to retaliate against [differential tax treatment]”
by amending Maine’s laws “so as to deny a credit for taxes paid to New
Hampshire while retaining it for the other 48 States.”214 Travis found the
New York scheme equally objectionable because it allowed New York’s
differential treatment of nonresidents to be undone only if other states
“retaliat[ed]” with similar exemption schemes.215
Professor Kreimer’s analysis thus assumes without argument that Austin
and Travis’s teachings are fully applicable to the altogether distinct
circumstance of a Host State seeking to accommodate the Home State’s
interests in seeing that its citizens not engage in travel-evasion. Such an
assumption is unwarranted. The self-interested discriminations struck down
in Austin and Travis are examples of beggar-thy-neighbor policies that are
unquestionably at odds with a national union. Indeed, such policies are
policed by other constitutional doctrines as well, such as the Dormant
Commerce Clause’s concern with eliminating state protectionism.216

213

See Regan, supra note 27, at 1911 (providing similar analysis of Austin); cf. Lea
Brilmayer, Credit Due Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due
Process and Full Faith and Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 IOWA L. REV. 95, 101 n.31,
104 (1984) (noting the constitutional distinction between discrimination against another
state’s laws and consistent deference to the other state’s laws). In Travis the Court struck
down a New York law that granted exemptions to residents but not nonresidents. Of
relevance to Austin was that the New York law in Travis was not saved by a provision that
gave nonresidents a credit for taxes paid to their Home State on New York-derived income if
their Home State gave a reciprocal credit to New York residents subject to that state’s income
taxes. New York had argued that this provision allowed the other states to circumvent New
York’s discrimination against their citizens by adopting income taxes that provided “similar
exemptions similarly conditioned.” Travis, 252 U.S. at 82. Responded the Court: “a
discrimination by the State of New York against the citizens of adjoining states would not be
cured were those States to establish like discriminations against citizens of the State of New
York. . . . Nor can discrimination be corrected by retaliation . . . .” Travis, 252 U.S. at 82.
214
Austin, 420 U.S. at 666-67.
215
Travis, 252 U.S. at 82.
216
See infra notes 277-98 and accompanying text (summarizing Dormant Commerce
Clause jurisprudence as applying heightened scrutiny to state policies that are methods of
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Further, the Home State behavior invited by the statutory schemes in Austin
and Travis to “correct[]” the Host State discrimination was retaliation, the
avoidance of which “was one of the chief ends sought to be accomplished
by the adoption of the Constitution.”217 None of this is true in the context of
a Host State assisting a Home State to advance its policies vis-à-vis visitors
from the Home State. The Host State is not discriminating against
nonresidents generally, but is simply treating nonresidents from certain
Home States the way the Home States want them to be treated. This is not
the “evil at which” the Austin and Travis holdings are directed, namely, “the
unilateral imposition of a disadvantage upon nonresidents.”218 To the
contrary, Austin specifically did not “denigrate the value of reciprocity,”219
and Host State assistance of the Home State is more fairly characterized as a
species of reciprocity rather than unilateral impos ition of disadvantage.
A broader look at the caselaw confirms that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause does not impose a flat obligation on the Host State to
apply its laws to visitors from other states irrespective of the Home State’s
policies. If it did, there could not have been a case like Bradford Electric
Light Co. v. Clapper, 220 in which a Host State not only was permitted, but
was required under the Full Faith and Credit Clause to apply the Home
State’s law. Indeed, a flat obligation would be wholly inconsistent with the
well-established doctrine that the Privileges and Immunities Clause’s

economic protectionism). See generally Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State
Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH . L. REV. 1091,
1114 (1986) (“[P]rotectionsim is conceptually inconsistent with political union.”).
217
Travis, 252 U.S. at 82.
218
Austin, 420 U.S. at 667. For a similar analysis, see Larry Kramer, The Myth of the
“Unprovided-for” Case, 75 VA . L. RE V. 1045, 1065-69 (1989), which argues that one state’s
deference to another state’s laws in respect of the second state’s citizens may reduce interstate
friction and thus be consistent with the Privileges and Immunities Clause; and Kramer, supra
note 125, at 307 n.93 (1990), which presents “deference to the law of other States” as a
justification for treating residents and non residents differently. A recent commentator has
argued otherwise—stating that the clause “[b]y its words . . . grants rights to individuals, not
to their states” and observing correctly that “the Supreme Court has never suggested that
states may waive the rights of their citizens to the privileges and immunities of other states’
laws.” Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of Choice of Law: Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH . L.
REV. 2448, 2526 (1999). Such analysis, however, overlooks the fact that the clause does not
apply to Home States, as shown above in the text.
219
Austin, 420 U.S. at 667 n.12.
220
286 U.S. 145 (1932). Most scholars believe that the Clapper opinion has been
overturned on the basis of subsequent full faith and credit caselaw. See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL.,
supra note 124, at 146 (stating that the Court has “abandoned the attempt to strike a balance
between conflicting state interests” for which Clapper was cited). Regardless of Clapper’s
current status under full faith and credit, it could not have been decided as it was if the
Privileges and Immunities Clause imposed a flat obligation on Host States to apply their laws
to visitors.
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protections are not “‘absolute.’”221 States are permitted to draw lines
between citizens and noncitizens—if there are good reasons for doing so.
States may distinguish between residents and nonresidents if “‘there is a
substantial reason for the difference in treatment’” and “‘the discrimination
practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State’s
objective.’”222
There is a strong basis for concluding that a Host State’s desire to
further a Home State’s policy with respect to its journeying citizens would
qualify as a “substantial reason” for these purposes.223 The case of Sosna v.
Iowa224 is instructive. There, the Court upheld, despite equal protection and
right to travel challenges, an Iowa law that imposed a one-year residency
requirement for those seeking a divorce, discriminating against noncitizens
and new citizens alike. The Court held that the Iowa law justifiably
reflected the state’s desire to avoid “officious intermeddling in matters in
which another State has a paramount interest.”225 And what makes another
state’s interest paramount? The divorce petitioners’ de facto citizenship:
the petitioners for divorce in Iowa might really intend to return to their true
Home State after obtaining an Iowa divorce, in which case their Home
States have the paramount interest.226
To be sure, Sosna does not definitively answer the Privileges and
Immunities Clause question; its holding did not address that clause,227 and it
221

Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 489-502 (1999) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 396 (1998)).
222
Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998) (quoting Supreme
Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1985)). For examples of state laws discriminating
between residents and nonresidents that were upheld against Privileges and Immunities Clause
challenges, see Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371, 390-91 (1977), requiring
nonresidents to pay more than residents for hunting licenses; and Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 445 (1973), charging nonresidents higher tuition fees to attend state universities.
223
If so, it is axiomatic that applying the Home State’s law would satisfy the second test
of bearing a substantial relationship to the Host State’s objective insofar as the Host State’s
application of the Home State’s law is the only means by which the Host State can help to
counter travel-evasion.
224
419 U.S. 393 (1975).
225
Id. at 407.
226
As the Court wrote in Sosna:
A State such as Iowa may quite reasonably decide that it does not wish to become a
divorce mill for unhappy spouses who have lived there as short a time as appellant
had when she commenced her action in the state court after having long resided
elsewhere. Until such time as Iowa is convinced that appellant intends to remain in
the State, it lacks the “nexus between person and place of such permanence as to
control the creation of legal relations and responsibilities of the utmost significance.”
Sosna, 419 U.S. at 407 (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945)).
227
Sosna preceded the general restatement of Privileges and Immunities Clause
jurisprudence that the Court provided in Baldwin. One might ask why Sosna neglected to
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could be argued 228 that Sosna’s equal protection analysis demanded a lower
level of scrutiny (the legislation “may reasonably be justified”) than does
the Privileges and Immunities Clause (which requires a “substantial reason”
for differential treatment). At the very least, however, Sosna shows that
there is constitutional weight to a Host State’s desire not to interfere in the
policy of a sister state. Furthermore, even if Sosna were read as requiring
only a low-level reasonable basis scrutiny, the fact that the policy of
noninterference satisfied such review in Sosna certainly does not mean it
would not satisfy a stricter level of scrutiny under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause. The conclusion that noninterference can be a
substantial justification for differential treatment is buttressed by the
normative analysis provided immediately below.
4. Normative Considerations
The propositions established in the preceding Subsections collectively
mean that the Privileges and Immunities Clause does not prevent a citizen of
State A from being subject to State A’s regulations even when she is in State
B. To establish definitively the validity of the propositions, however, it
must be shown that a federal system where citizens may be subject to their
Home State’s laws while traveling is normatively desirable.
Most of the work establishing the normative appeal of such a system
was provided earlier in this Article, which shows the important respects in
which a state would be hamstrung if it did not enjoy the power to regulate
its citizens’ out-of-state conduct and the benefits of political heterogeneity
that result from allowing extraterritoriality. 229 Even critics do not deny this.
mention the Privileges and Immunities Clause. After all, Sosna concerned access to courts, a
right that early privileges and immunities caselaw identified as being protected under the
clause, see, e.g., Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920) (reaffirming the rights of
citizens to bring actions in other states as set forth in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 55253 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)), as Baldwin itself recognized three years after Sosna was
decided, see Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383, 387 (noting that the fundamental right of access to
courts had been identified in early caselaw). The likely answer is that the plaintiff in Sosna
did not plead a privileges and immunities claim because she was a resident of Iowa, the state
whose law she was challenging, and, as explained above, the Privileges and Immunities
Clause does not apply to Home States. Supra Part II.A.2.
228
Here I seek only to anticipate a possible objection, for in my view the Sosna opinion
is unclear on the precise level of scrutiny the Court utilized. In additio n to not precisely
stating the level of review, the Sosna Court analyzed the equal protection question by drawing
on cases that appear to have used more than merely rational basis review. See Sosna, 419
U.S. at 405 (citing to Shapiro v. Thompson , 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969), which required a
“compelling governmental interest”; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972), which
required a “substantial and compelling interest”; and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County,
415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974), which required a “compelling” state interest).
229
See supra Part I.C.3 (contending that extraterritoriality justly prevents avoidance of
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Many of their arguments instead are made from the perspective of the goals
of federal union and national unity. 230 Professor Kreimer, as usual, puts the
argument well:
[T]he citizens as individuals are “entitled” to local privileges and immunities
when they visit neighboring states. As citizens from different states travel and
interact on a basis of equality, they develop and maintain consciousness of
themselves as equals and members of a single polity.
By contrast, a system in which my opportunities upon entering California
remain subject to the moral demands of Pennsylvania undercuts this sense of
national unity. Such a system would deny to me, because of my status as a
Pennsylvanian, the privileges that the Californians I pass on the street share as
their birthright. This situation hardly advances the goal of establishing a single
231
national identity.

Although national unity long has been understood to be one of the
clause’s central goals,232 Professor Kreimer’s argument does not support the
weight of its conclusion. First, though it is true that all Americans are
“members of a single polity,”233 it is equally certain that Americans
simultaneously are members of one of fifty different subfederal polities
known as states (not to mention of a far larger number of local
such things as state gambling and abortion regulations and permits states to advance
paternalistic policies that promote the moral behavior of citizens, as well as those that protect
third-party interests).
230
An additional argument is that applying the Home State’s laws t o its visiting citizens
may interfere with legitimate Host State policies. This is a real potential cost, but I explain
below why such costs do not mean that the Host State’s legislative jurisdiction ought to trump
the Home State’s legislative jurisdiction as a per se matter. Infra Part II.D.1. Instead, a
collection of constitutional and nonconstitutional principles appropriately govern this conflict
between Home and Host States. Infra Part III. It seems to me that accounting for the
competing states’ interests is best done by const itutional provisions aside from the Privileges
and Immunities Clause, which, by its terms, is directed to citizens, not states. In short, in my
view the Supreme Court is correct in understanding the Privileges and Immunities Clause as a
provision that grants protections for individuals against discriminations by Host States, and
that has consequent effects on our nation’s federal union, but not as a clause that has as its
primary subject the states.
231
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 919.
232
For an early exposition of this, see Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 180 (1868), in
which the Court stated: “It has been justly said that no provision in the Constitution has
tended so strongly to constitute the citizens of the United States one people as this.” For a
more recent statement, see Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948), in which the Court
stated: “The primary purpose of [the Privileges and Immunities Clause] . . . was to help fuse
into one Nation a collection of independent, sovereign States.” Both the Paul and Toomer
formulations have been quoted with approbation in numerous subsequent cases. See, e.g.,
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 (1978) (citing to the formulation from Paul); Baldwin v.
Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 380 (1978) (same); New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274, 279 (1985) (citin g to the formulation from Toomer); United Building and Constr. Trades
Council v. City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 216 (1984) (same).
233
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 919.
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governments).
The dialectic between oneness (national unity) and
differentness (subfederal heterogeneity) is the essence of federalism. As a
purely methodological matter, looking at only one pole of the dialectic, as
Professor Kreimer’s national unity-focused argument does, is inadequate for
the task of critically analyzing extraterritoriality. Any serious doctrinal or
theoretical analysis must take into account both poles of the dialectic.234
Second, Professor Kreimer’s argument rests on an unexplained, yet
nonaxiomatic, assumption about the nature of our country’s national
identity. It assumes without explanation that a regime in which Home
States could regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct is inconsistent with
national unity. But this is not self-evident. Let the analysis of this matter
start with two definitions. Under a regime of “hard” legal pluralism, a state
may insist that its citizens abide by constitutional substantive policies even
when they venture out of state. Under a “soft” regime of legal pluralism, a
state’s regulations end at its borders, and national citizenship entails the
right of a non-Iowan to do in Iowa what Iowans are permitted to do under
their Iowa law.
The question is: Is our country’s national identity only consistent with
a regime of “soft” pluralism, as Professor Kreimer’s analysis assumes? At
issue is the nature and extent of the legal pluralism across the country
concerning those substantive policies for which the Federal Constitution
does not require national uniformity. It simply is untrue that “hard”
pluralism is logically inconsistent with a national political community. It is
at least plausible that the substantive limitations imposed by the
Constitution, along with the broad swaths of federal law and regulations, are
sufficient to create a national identity. Indeed, one might suggest that part
of that national identity is permitting states to differ radically about
substantive issues not foreclosed to them under the Constitution, even to the
extent of requiring that their citizens abide by their laws when traveling in

234

Ignoring the “differentness” end of the dialectic is the imperfection in Professor
Kreimer’s argument that a regime in which each state citizen is “equally bound by the law of
[her] Home State” runs afoul of the Privileges and Immunities Clause’s guarantee. Id. He
argues that it is untrue that “each citizen will be equally subject to the laws of her Home
State” because no Host States grant visitors exemptions from their local criminal law so as to
replicate the legal regime of the visitor’s Home State. Id.; see also Brilmayer, supra note 26,
at 887-89 (making virtually the identical argument in the abortion context). This is true but
immaterial insofar as there is no mandate of absolute equality; each citizen belongs to a
different subfederal polity, and this difference explains why some citizens might be subject to
their Home State’s laws while traveling and others might not. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Fish &
Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (“Some distinctions between residents and
nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and are
permitted; other distin ctions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the purpose, or
the develo pment of a single Union of those States.”).
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other states.235
Such a federal scheme of “hard” pluralism is not an oxymoron that
“hardly advances the goal of establishing a single national identity.”236 The
national identity that such a system fosters is one that permits rich pluralism
and heterogeneity in respect of those policies that are constitutionally
permissible for a state to pursue. “Soft” pluralism, by contrast, systemically
disfavors states that regulate matters that other states elect not to regulate,
thereby undermining diversity across and experimentation among states.237
Surely, one tie binding the states and preserving national identity is the right
of states to differ from each other in their policies and politics.
Furthermore, a “hard” pluralism regime may well be the logical outgrowth
of Rawlsian liberal commitments; only such a regime can accommodate
persons having both atomistic and more communal political philosophies,
and people in the “original position,” not knowing the persons they actually
represent, would think it fair to select a political structure that could
accommodate a broad array of persons that would include those who are
both atomistic and communitarian-minded.238 The national identity of a
regime of “hard” pluralism allows both liberals and communitarians to
govern themselves within subfederal communities as they deem fit within
the range of policy options that the Federal Constitution leaves open to
them. Such a conception of national identity is not a contradiction-in-terms.
Indeed, there is evidence of its plausibility in that contemporary law already
permits “hard” pluralism in at least some circumstances: Under the Model
Penal Code, for example, a Home State may impose criminal liability on
activities undertaken in another state in which the activity is permissible. 239
To be sure, “hard” pluralism is not an axiomatic form of national

235

Donald H. Regan’s article cites to an analogous proposition:
We are a single nation, but we are a nation constituted of separate states, with
separate legal systems. The Constitution expressly recognizes the reality and
significance of state citizenship, both in article IV and in the fourteenth amendment.
Why should we not think of a state as having an interest in its citizens which justifies
regulation of their conduct wherever they may be?
Regan, supra note 27, at 1908.
236
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 919.
237
See supra Part I.C.3 (arguing that allowing extraterritorial regulation of citizens to
curb travel-evasion promotes political heterogeneity).
238
See RAWLS, supra note 114, at 27 (contending that the “veil of ignorance” feature of
the “original position” concept “has no specific metaphysical implications concerning the
nature of the self”); see also supra text accompanying notes 137-50 (explaining why the just
liberal state would accommodate the broadest possible array of persons).
239
See infra notes 398-406 and accompanying text (discussing the MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 1.03 (1985), which grants the Home State legislative jurisdiction under these
circumstances).
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identity. The relevant point here, however, is that neither is the national
identity presumed by Professor Kreimer’s argument, as this brief discussion
of a plausible alternative, “hard” pluralism, shows.240 The nature of our
national identity is deeply contested, and bald appeals to “national identity”
of the sort made by Professor Kreimer cannot decide the question at issue.
The doctrinal status quo is not premised on a philosophy that is flatly at
odds with our national identity. Though incompatible with “soft” pluralism,
that status quo is perfectly consistent with a “hard” pluralist approach to our
national identity. The burden is on those who advocate the radical retooling
of our longstanding privileges and immunities doctrines, and the argument
propounded by Professor Kreimer does not suffice to counter the potent
considerations that counsel in favor of the “hard” pluralist conception of
national identity that contemporary law permits.
B. Right to Travel
The right to travel imposes a modest but important limit on Home
States’ powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities: A Home
State cannot interfere with its citizens’ rights to leave for the purpose of
visiting another State nor prevent its citizens from returning. Either would
violate “the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another
State.”241 The recent case of Saenz v. Roe noted two other components of
the right to travel, neither of which is implicated by a Home State’s

240

Several of Professor Kreimer’s other arguments fall prey to the same error of
presuming a nonaxiomatic nature of the national identit y. For example, Professor Kreimer
argues that the alternative approach of allowing citizens to be governed by their Home State’s
law “emphasizes the differences between individuals as citizens of different states rather than
their commonalties” and thereby “undercuts rather than fosters common national citizenship.”
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 920. He also baldly asserts that the
clause “imparts to individual American citizens the freedom that accompanies national
citizenship,” in particular the ability to “take advantage of opportunities legal in other states.”
Id. As a final example, Professor Kreimer argues that prohibiting its citizens from engaging
in behaviors that are permitt ed under Host State laws would constitute an unconstitutional
“abridge[ment]” of the attributes of national citizenship under the “fourteenth amendment’s
privileges and immunities clause.” See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 517-18
(discussing a woman’s right to obtain an abortion outside of her Home State). All of these
arguments assume without argument that included among the rights inherent in national
citizenship is a visitor’s unconditional right to be governed by the Host State’s regulations,
irrespective of the Home State’s laws. This unargued premise appears to be connected, once
again, to Professor Kreimer’s nonaxiomatic understanding of national identity. An additional
problem with the last argument is that the case on which it is premised, Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404, 431 (1935), has been overruled, as Professor Kreimer himself notes. See
Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 518 (noting that the decision was overruled in
Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940)).
241
Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999).

2002] EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY

911

regulation of its citizens’ out-of-state activities.
The Constitution
guarantees travelers the “right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than
an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State.”242 This
is the protection afforded by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article
IV, 243 and for the reasons discussed above this does not apply to the Home
State and hence would not preclude a Host State from applying Home State
law to a visitor for the purpose of aiding the sister Home State. 244 The third
aspect of the right to travel, “the right of the newly arrived citizen to the
same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens of the same
State,”245 plainly is not implicated by Host State regulation of its citizens’
out-of-state activities.
Professor Kreimer has proposed a more expansive understanding of the
right to travel that would severely curtail a Home State’s power to regulate
its citizens’ out-of-state conduct. He argues that the very point of the right
to travel is to “undermine[] parochial conformity” by “provid[ing] us with
the ability to experiment with modes of living other than those sanctioned at
home and to return with the potentially transformative knowledge we have
gained.”246 As a consequence, he argues, “[a] system that allows states to
truncate these experiments by allowing travel but punishing its object has
the effect of undercutting this liberty.”247
No case has suggested that the right to travel encompasses a general
right (much less an ostensibly unconditional right) to behave as the citizens
in the host jurisdiction do. 248 Professor Kreimer apparently recognizes this,
for his argument here, in contrast to his others, is bereft of relevant caselaw
citation. 249 The absence of such a doctrine is a good thing. Traveling, even
242

Id.
See id. at 501 (“The second component of the right to travel is, however, expressly
protected by the text of the Constitution, [in Article IV, Section 2, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause].”).
244
See supra Parts II.A.2-.3 (concluding that noninterference with the Home State’s
regulation of its citizens can be a substantial reason for purposes of justifying treating visitors
differently from residents).
245
Saenz, 526 U.S. at 502.
246
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 915.
247
Id.
248
The most recent restatement of the right to travel, which surveys caselaw dating back
to 1823 in its attempt to articulate the doctrine, Saenz, 526 U.S. at 498-511, certainly does not
embrace such a theory. It cannot readily be fit into any of the three components of the right to
travel identified by the Court. The most promising candidate, “the right of a citizen of one
State to enter and to leave another State,” id. at 500, refers to the right not to be actually
obstructed from “ingress and regress to and from” neighboring states, as the caselaw cited by
the Saenz Court in explaining this aspect of the right to travel makes clear, id. at 501.
249
See Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 915-17 (citing only to
T HE FEDERALIST NO . 10, at 22 (James Madison) (Roy P. Fairchild ed., 1981), to buttress his
243
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without a concomitant Kreimerian right to do as the natives do, allows the
visitor to learn all sorts of things, and she can then return to her home
jurisdiction and seek to convince others in her political community of the
wisdom of such alternative ways.250 But unilaterally taking upon herself to
do in a foreign jurisdiction those things that her home jurisdiction has
sought to proscribe is another matter. “[M]odes of living other than those
sanctioned at home” 251 frequently entail third-party effects and, in addition,
may serve to socialize the actor to modes of behavior that the Home State
paternalistically wishes to discourage. For example, gambling produces
third-party effects on both the gambler’s family and the Home State that
must absorb the bulk of the costs of the family’s becoming public charges.
Consider as well a hypothetical jurisdiction that eliminated the sanctions
that attend adultery; a philanderer’s out-of-state sexual acts may well have
third-party effects on his spouse and children. Attendant costs that flow
from such activities (such as funding the judges who will hear the divorce
case) fall primarily on the Home State. Furthermore, neighbors’ out-of-state
activities might well shape local norms in ways that the Home State wishes
to fight against; there is evidence to suggest that the behaviors of people we
know play an important role in shaping our sense of what behaviors are
acceptable. 252
For these reasons, I believe that Professor Kreimer is incorrect when he
states that “[w]hen I visit California, my actions, whatever they may be, do
not threaten the public order of Pennsylvania any more than the actions of
Californians do.”253 Such an assertion ignores third-party effects and normshaping motivations that the Constitution permits states to take account of in
formulating their laws.254 In short, it sometimes is the case that
Pennsylvania’s concerns are undermined by a visiting Pennsylvanian’s

argument).
250
The right to travel undeniably has this effect. Whether this is normatively desirable
is another question.
What Professor Kreimer praises as “undermin[ing] parochial
conformity,” Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 915, could equally be
decried as interfering with fragile distinctive local norms that readily can be disrupted by
outside influences. Nor can it be said that fragility corresponds to inferiority or that which
appropriately is displaced; virtuous behavior may be difficult to cultivate and yet be superior
to those behaviors that are more readily pursued. See sources cited in supra note 146
(discussing the Aristolelian conception of virtue).
251
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 915.
252
See Kahan, supra note 132, at 356-59 (describing “the role of social influence in
criminal decisionmaking”).
253
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 937.
254
See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 95, at 907, 910 (arguing that the government and the
law are rightfully involved in “norm management,” “expressing social values,” and “shifting
social norms”).
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actions in California, even though Pennsylvania is unaffected by the
Californian’s identical activity in California. This is true because the
welfare of other Pennsylvanians is interconnected with the visiting
Pennsylvanian’s welfare in ways that it is not interconnected with the
Californian’s. That is part of what it means to share a political community
with another person, and fellow Pennsylvanians share a political community
in a way that a Pennsylvanian and Californian do not.255
Interestingly, Professor Kreimer asserts that his conception of the right
to travel advances the values of “diversity and experimentation,” whereas a
system under which Home States retain regulatory authority over their
citizens’ out-of-state activities compromises such values.256 His argument is
that “[i]f the only way to escape from the force of a state’s laws is to move
to another state, we can expect increasing moral homogeneity in the state, as
the most passionate or mobile dissenters relocate to other jurisdictions.”257
I believe that this argument misconceives the conception of diversity
that is relevant to federalism and that, properly understood, it is in fact
Professor Kreimer’s conception of the right to travel that threatens diversity.
It seems to me that the relevant level of analysis for purposes of
understanding federalism’s diversity benefits is the nation as a whole: Does
one set of institutional arrangements permit more or fewer meaningful
political options across subfederal polities? Political diversity at the
subfederal level is particularly meaningful if the various options themselves
are important enough that some people will want to be subject to one set of
political institutions and that other people will want to be subject to others.
Thus, meaningful diversity of polit ical regimes at the subfederal level
naturally leads to “increasing moral homogeneity” at the subfederal level
insofar as those who prefer a particular set of political institutions or laws
are likely to elect to locate themselves in the subfederal polity that satisfies
those political desires.258 Perceived from the federal level, such localized
homogenization could be said to be one of the very foundations and goals of

255

That the Californian and Pennsylvanian share a national political community does not
undermine this point. The more intimate political community of common statehood entails
additional financial interconnections insofar as many citizens’ needs are financed primarily or
exclusively by state rather than federal funds. Furthermore, insofar as norm-shaping is a
function of proximity and personal knowledge of those who are engaging in the behaviors in
question, the behaviors of one’s fellow state citizens may matter more than the behaviors of
people from other states.
256
See Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 915-16.
257
Id.
258
Cf. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. P OL . ECON . 416
(1956) (outlining an economic model showing efficiencies arising from different distributions
of public goods across polities).
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federal diversity.
Conversely, dampening the “moral homogeneity” at subfederal levels in
the manner advocated by Professor Kreimer comes at a cost: increasing
political homogeneity across subfederal polities. People who feel strongly
about politics are less apt to “vote with their feet” and move to a political
community for the purpose (at least in part) of joining that community to the
extent there is little difference among polities. Professor Kreimer’s
conception of the right to travel would have such an effect of diminishing
the significance of which State’s political community a person is part of;
this is the natural result of granting all citizens of the United States a right to
opt-in to any state’s laws on an issue-by-issue basis while remaining a
citizen of a single state.
Furthermore, Professor Kreimer’s proposal would not diminish
diversity across polities in a neutral manner, but would operate as a
systematic bias toward the most lenient substantive state policies. It would
grant as a matter of federal constitutional law a personal right for citizens to
engage in travel-evasion and thereby circumvent Home State laws that seek
to protect third-party effects, advance paternalistic concerns, and shape local
norms.259 Certain political theories are more prone to seek to advance these
concerns through regulation; in particular, communitarian, republican, and
neo-Aristotelian approaches to politics would more likely advocate such
regulation.
Adherents of these political commitments would be
significantly hampered in advancing their agendas, whereas political
philosophies that are less regulation-minded (such as libertarianism) would
be little affected. Such systematic disadvantaging of one set of political
philosophies is another respect in which a Kreimerian right to travel would
undermine diversity among states and the possibilities of experimentation
across polities.260

259

Moreover, in contrast to the limitations imposed by other constitutional doctrines
explored above (Full Faith and Credit, Privileges and Immunities, and the Dormant
Commerce Clauses), such a right to travel lim itation may constrain the Congress as well as the
states; the Supreme Court has suggested that certain aspects of the right to travel limit the
federal government. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 507 (noting that Congress may not allow states to
violate the Fourteenth Amendment by creating residency requirements as part of welfare
programs). A Kreimerian right to travel thus might flatly preclude the accommodation of
Home States’ interests in a way that the aforementioned other doctrines do not, for the other
doctrines impose limitations on states that leave unfettered the congressional power to require
Host States to accommodate Home States’ interests, as Congress sought to do last year in the
Child Custody Protection Act. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting the passage
of legislation which would have made the transportation of a minor across state lines in order
to circumvent the Home State’s parental notification and/or notice laws a federal crime, other
than in the case of a parent of the minor).
260
See supra Part I.C.3.b (arguing for political heterogeneity).
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Moreover, limiting political diversity across subfederal polities may
even lead to increasing moral homogeneity of the sort that Professor
Kreimer is concerned. Insofar as law may have a socializing effect that
cannot be reproduced by other social institutions, foreclosing certain forms
of political institutions might actually preclude certain forms of social life
from developing or maintaining themselves over time. 261 Diminishing
political diversity thus may diminish the diversity of the people found in
society as a whole, thereby leading to increasing moral homogeneity of the
sort that Professor Kreimer decries.
In short, there is more than one aspect of “diversity,” and the
relationship among those aspects is complex. In some respects they may be
mutually incompatible; “diversity” of members in a political community
may come at the cost of “diversity” of polities insofar as that diversity of
members is achieved by undermining the differences across polities that
attract one or another sort of person to live there. 262 On the other hand,
these two aspects of diversity may be directly related, but in the opposite
direction Professor Kreimer suggests: diminishing the range of political
options may well lead to increasing homogeneity of persons across the
country as certain forms of social life are not given room to survive. In any
event, achieving the type of “diversity” Professor Kreimer discusses comes
at the expense of the aspects of diversity that federalism arguably is most
concerned with: diversity of political institutions and laws across states. To
date, the caselaw has not construed the right to travel in the manner
Professor Kreimer has proposed. In so large and diverse a country as ours,
the theory advanced by Professor Kreimer would be a troublesome clamp
on the experimentation and political heterogeneity that federalism allows.
Apart from the modest limitation discussed above of not precluding exit or
re-entry, the right-to-travel caselaw wisely does not bar Home States from
regulating the out-of-state conduct of their citizens.
C. Dormant Commerce Clause
Another body of constitutional doctrine that offers important limitations

261

See RAWLS, supra note 114, at 193-97 (noting that democratic regimes can lead to
the demise of certain forms of social life even when the state does not discriminate against
them). See generally Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 109, at 1063-71 (describing
communities that believe their members will be unable to fully realize themselves unless
political institutions can assist them in leading virtuous lives); Rosen, “Illiberal” Societal
Cultures, supra note 141 (manuscript at 5-6) (discussing respects in which general society’s
political institutions might impede the survival of valuable cultures).
262
I say “may come” because it surely is possible that a given polity might have a
political ethic of membership diversity.
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on Home States’ powers to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct is
the Dormant Commerce Clause. Before examining this field of law,
however, it should be recalled that Dormant Commerce Clause limitations
are not absolute, for Congress can exercise its powers under the Commerce
Clause and permit what the Supreme Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence disallows.263
Dormant Commerce Clause prohibitions
nonetheless erect significant burdens on the states as a practical matter, for
they must successfully lobby Congress to reverse a problematic Dormant
Commerce Clause decision.
1. Extraterritoriality and Inconsistent Regulations
There is a line of Dormant Commerce Clause caselaw in which the
Court has stated that it was striking down “extraterritorial legislation” that
“directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a
State.”264 The Court has said that such laws are virtually per se
unconstitutional. 265 Taken out of context, language in these cases appears to
flatly prohibit Home States from regulating their citizens’ out-of-state
conduct.266 Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
263

See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) (“It is well established that Congr ess
may authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise
forbid.”); see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (standing for the same
proposition, in holding that Congress may grant states the right to regulate interstate
transportation of radioactive waste).
264
Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989). One of the earliest principal cases is
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935), which famously stated that “New
York has no power to project its legislation into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in
that state for milk acquired there.” Baldwin struck down a provision of New York law that set
a minimum price at which milk distributors in New York could purchase milk from Vermont
that would be sold in New York, and prohibited milk purchased at prices below that minimum
from being sold in New York. Id.
265
See Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (“[A] statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the enacting State’s
authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended
by the legislature.”). For example, the Court held unconstitutional a New York law that
forced alcohol distributors to post at the beginning of the month the price of alcohol they were
selling outside New York for that month. Brown -Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 585 (1986). The law also re quired that the alcohol be sold to
New York wholesalers for no more than the posted price. As a result of the law, “[o]nce a
distiller has posted prices in New York, it is not free to change its prices elsewhere in the
United States during the relevant month. Forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in
one State before undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates interstate commerce.”
Id. at 582. The law was struck on the ground that New York could not “‘project its legislation
into [other states] by regulating the price to be paid’” for liquor in those states. Id. at 582 -83
(quoting Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521).
266
See, e.g., Healy, 491 U.S. at 336 (classifying a regulation as a violation of the
Dormant Commerce Clause if “the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct
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Circuit recently relied on the Dormant Commerce Clause to strike down a
Wisconsin regulation that sought to counter travel-evasion in the business
context.267 Analyzed more closely, however, the Dormant Commerce
Clause cases concerning extraterritoriality are best understood as standing
for a narrow principle that does not affect the extraterritorial regulations that
are the subject of this Article (and, furthermore, that should not have led to
the demise of Wisconsin’s regulation).
a.

Commerce

To begin with, the Dormant Commerce Clause’s extraterritorial
limitations are not flat prohibitions against extraterritorial regulation, but
instead only apply to such regulations that concern “commerce.”268 Recent
Commerce Clause caselaw has identified important limits on Congress’s
Commerce Clause powers,269 and these likewise limit the scope of the
Dormant Commerce Clause;270 after all, the Dormant Commerce Clause is
understood to limit State activity in respect of matters about which Congress
has not legislated, but over which Congress has the power to regulate.
Thus, the Dormant Commerce Clause concerns only those activities that
themselves constitute interstate commerce or those activities that are
“economic endeavor[s]” and have “substantial effects on interstate
commerce.”271 To fall under the Dormant Commerce Clause, the activity
would have to concern “what is truly national” rather than “what is truly
local.”272
Though the precise boundaries erected by this language are unclear, the
general implication is clear enough: not every activity is potentially subject

beyond the boundaries of the State”).
267
I critically analyze the case immediately below in Part II.C.2.
268
See, e.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87-88 (1987) (“The
principal objects of do rmant Commerce Clause scrutiny are statutes that discriminate against
interstate commerce. . . . This Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases also have invalidated
statutes that may adversely affect interstate commerce . . . .”); Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S.
624, 642 (1982) (“The Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state statute to
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s borders . . . .” (emph asis added)).
269
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617 (2000) (“We accordingly
reject the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based
solely on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.”); United States v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549, 558-60 (1995) (holding that congressional Commerce Clause power is limited
to regulating channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of commerce, and activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce).
270
See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 573
(1997) (citing Lopez for its narrowing definition of “articles of co mmerce”).
271
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611.
272
Id. at 617-18; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567-68.
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to the Dormant Commerce Clause’s limitations. The Dormant Commerce
Clause caselaw creates a two-tiered system in which a state’s extraterritorial
powers in relation to “commerce” are less than the state’s powers with
respect to the general police powers (such as criminal law). The reason for
the stricter limitations on states in the context of commerce is well
understood. Whereas the Constitution created a federal system wherein
each State can pursue its own vision of the social good, it also created a
single national market; thus although states “‘as political communities, [are]
distinct and sovereign, and consequently foreign to each other’”273 for
purposes of criminal law and most police powers, “‘the states are not
separable economic units.’”274 “‘[W]hat is ultimate’” under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, the Court has said, “‘is the principle that one state in its
dealing with another may not place itself in a position of economic
isolation.’”275 The Court has also established that “our economic unit is the
Nation, which alone has the gamut of powers necessary to control of the
economy.”276 Accordingly, any Dormant Commerce Clause bar on
extraterritoriality should not apply to matters unconcerned with the national
market, as determined by Lopez and its progeny.
b. Protectionism
Although the Court has not yet directly confronted the question,277 a
strong argument can be made that the Dormant Commerce Clause’s near per
se prohibition of extraterritorial regulation, the clause’s form of heightened
scrutiny, applies only to state statutes that are forms of economic
protectionism. This would be consistent with general Dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine, under which heightened scrutiny is applicable only if the
state regulation is a species of “economic protectionism,” and thus not
applicable to “health and safety” regulations.278 It has long been held that

273

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 93 (1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Bank of
United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 32, 53 -54 (1838)).
274
City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978) (quoting H.P. Hood &
Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538 (1949)).
275
City of Philadelphia , 437 U.S. at 623 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 527 (1935)).
276
Hood, 336 U.S. at 537.
277
It has not been directly confronted because no case before the Supreme Court has
pitted the states’ traditional police powers against a claim of problematic extraterritoriality
under the Dormant Commerce Clause. For discussion of such a case heard in the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, see infra Part II.C.2.
278
See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 956 (1982) (noting that
“[f]or Commerce Clause purposes, we have long recognized a difference between economic
protectionism, on the one hand, and health and safety regulation, on the other”).
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although the “State may not promote its own economic advantages by
curtailment or burdening of interstate commerce,” there is “broad power in
the State to protect its inhabitants against perils to health or safety,
fraudulent traders and highway hazards, even by use of measures which
bear adversely upon interstate commerce.”279 The 1949 case of H.P. Hood
& Sons v. Du Mond, for example, noted that the
distinction between the power of the State to shelter its people from menaces
to their health or safety and from fraud, even when those dangers emanate
from interstate commerce, and its lack of power to retard, burden or constrict
the flow of such commerce for their economic advantage, is one deeply rooted
280
in both our history and our law.

Modern Dormant Commerce Clause caselaw maintains this distinction
between economic protectionism, on the one hand, and “health and safety”
regulations that only incidentally affect interstate commerce, on the other.
Laws that amount to “simple economic protectionism” are virtually per se
invalid,281 while health and safety regulations are subject to a far more
deferential review 282 under which the law will be struck down only if it
imposes costs on interstate commerce that are “clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits.”283 For example, in Head v. New Mexico
Board of Examiners in Optometry, 284 the Court upheld a state law that
“unquestionably imposed some restraint upon [interstate] commerce”
279

Hood, 336 U.S. at 531-32.
Id. at 533. In terms of history, the Court noted that “[t]he sole purpose for which
Virginia initiated the movement which ultimately produced the Constitution” was to create
nationwide commercial harmony. Id. “The desire of the Forefathers to federalize regulation
of foreign and interstate commerce stands in sharp contrast to their jealous preservation of the
state’s power over its internal affairs” concerning the “social conditions” of the states. Id. at
533-34.
281
See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138, 144 (1986) (noting that state statutes
that “affirmatively discriminate against” interstate commerce “ are subject to more demanding
scrutiny” known as “the strictest scrutiny”); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
624 (1978) (noting the “virtually per se rule of invalidity” for laws reflecting “economic
isolation” and “simple economic protectionism”).
282
Some have argued that nonprotectionist state statutes should be subject to no
Dormant Commerce Clause review at all. See Camps Newfoundland/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town
of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 608 (1997) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[J]ust as a public health
justification unrelated to economic protectionism may justify an overt discrimination against
goods moving in interstate commerce, ‘so may health and safety considerations be weighed in
the process of deciding the threshold question whether the conditions entailing application of
the dormant Commerce Clause are present.’” (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S.
278, 307 (1997))); Regan, supra note 216 (arguing that the Dormant Commerce Clause
properly addresses only economic protectionism and arguing that there is no lower-level Pike
balancing in relation to nonprotectionist state legislation).
283
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
284
374 U.S. 424 (1963).
280
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because the Dormant Commerce Clause was “never intended to cut the
States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and
safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the
commerce of the country.”285 Laws “addressed to protection of the public
health,” which are part of what “is compendiously known as the police
power,” are constitutional if they “[do] not discriminate against interstate
commerce or operate to disrupt its required uniformity.”286
The Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence that speaks of a near per
se prohibition of extraterritoriality likewise should be understood as
applying only to protectionist state statutes; some lower-level balancing of
the local interests against the costs imposed on interstate commerce is
appropriate in respect of statutes emanating from the state’s historical police
powers that regulate extraterritorially. 287 The identical policy and historical
reasons enumerated in Hood and applied in Head to explain why state
statutes concerning citizens’ safety and welfare should be treated more
deferentially than protectionist regulations are equally applicable to state
statutes intended to regulate the health, life, and safety of cit izens, even
when those statutes must regulate those citizens’ extraterritorial conduct to
be effective. Indeed, as a descriptive matter it clearly is true that “[s]tate
regulations are routinely upheld despite what is obviously a significant
impact on outside actors”;288 consider, for example, products liability
actions against out-of-state manufacturers and nuisance actions against
polluters across the border.289 The types of laws that have been discussed in

285

Id. at 427-28 (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 428-29 (internal quotations omitted).
287
For an excellent recent article that also concludes that extraterritoriality does not, and
should not, per se run afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause, see Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan
O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L. J. 785, 803-06
(2001), which discusses some of the many state laws that have the effect of extraterritorially
regulating and advocates a balancing test for evaluating extraterritorial state laws under the
Dormant Commerce Clause.
It might be asked why the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine concerns itself with
extraterritoriality if such extra-state regulation only is problematic in the context of
protectionism, which itself is subject to heightened scrutiny. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska
ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982) (noting that where a statute serves as “an
explicit barrier to commerce between” two states, the restriction must be “narrowly tailored”
to a nondiscriminatory policy). The answer is that extraterritoriality is a tool that can help to
smoke out protectionism, which frequently is difficult to identify definitively, since
extraterritoriality not infrequently is also present where there is protectionism. The suggestion
of protectionist intent is particularly strong where, as is true in the Supreme Court’s Dormant
Commerce Clause extraterritoriality cases, the party to whom the regulation primarily is
extraterritorially applied is not a citizen of the regulating state.
288
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 287, at 803.
289
Id.
286
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this Article would readily qualify as nonprotectionist. They do not “shield[]
in-state industries from out-of-state competition” 290 or otherwise benefit instaters at the expense of out-of-staters.291 Even if the economic burden of a
law fell primarily or exclusively on out-of-staters, as would be the case if a
Home State prohibited gambling in its midst and also sought to disallow its
citizens from gambling out of state, that would not propel a state statute into
the category of protectionist under the Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. 292 The question is whether a state statute gives in-staters a
competitive advantage in the marketplace over out-of-staters,293 and the
statutes discussed in this Article are not of that sort. They accordingly
should not trigger the Dormant Commerce Clause’s rule of per se invalidity
of extraterritorial regulation.
Understanding the rule of per se invalidity of extraterritorial regulation
as applying only to protectionist statutes works well with the holdings of the
caselaw. Although several of the extraterritorial cases admittedly have
deployed language that is not limited to protectionist statutes,294 all but one
of the Supreme Court cases that have struck down state regulations on the
basis of extraterritoriality have concerned statutes that are readily
characterized as protectionist.295 In the singular exception, Edgar v. MITE
290

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986).
See Hunt v. Wash. Apple Adver. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351-52 (1977) (holding that
a North Carolina protectionist law favoring in -state dealers at the expense of out -of-state
dealers violated the Commerce Clause).
292
See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125 (1978) (stating that “the fact
that the burden [of a state regulation] falls solely on interstate companies . . . does not lead,
either logically or as a practical matter, to a conclusion that the State is discriminating against
interstate commerce” and accordingly runs afoul of the Dormant Commerce Clause); cf.
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 287, at 806 (coming to a similar conclusion using a normative
framework premised on economic efficiency).
293
Exxon Corp, 437 U.S. at 126 (concluding that a Maryland statute did not discriminate
against interstate commerce because the statute did not give in-state dealers a competitive
advantage over out -of-state dealers).
294
See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 (1989) (stating that extraterritoriality
is problematic due to the possibility that it would create “inconsistent obligations”).
295
See Healy, 491 U.S. at 343 (holding that a Connecticut contemporaneous affirmation
provision requiring out-of-state alcohol distillers to attest they were not selling alcohol at
lower prices outside of Connecticut was unconstitutional); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v.
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 585 (1986) (holding that a prospective affirmation
provision requiring alcohol distillers to post prices of alcohol to be sold in neighboring states
during the upcoming month and prohibiting them from selling alcohol in New York for a
price exceeding the price to be charged in other states violated the Commerce Clause);
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521 (1935) (invalidating a law prohibiting New
York milk distributors from purchasing milk in Vermont at lower than a fixed price New York
milk producers could match); see also Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 496 (“[A]ll of
the cases in which statutes have been invalidated have involved laws which in some sense
could be characterized as economic protectionism or predation.”).
291
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Corp., a plurality of the Court struck down a nonprotectionist Illinois statute
due to its extraterritorial effects.296 Nevertheless, five years later in CTS
Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 297 the Supreme Court rejected the
MITE plurality’s reasoning and upheld a nonprotectionist statute that was
virtually indistinguishable from what had been struck down in MITE, using
a legal test that deployed lower-level scrutiny than the virtual per se rule. 298
Thus, taking into account CTS’s reworking of MITE, it is fair to say that
under the current state of Dormant Commerce Clause law, the per se
invalidation rule concerning extraterritoriality is invoked only with respect
to protectionist statutes. The proposition that the per se rule is not
applicable to nonprotectionist statutes accordingly is consistent with
applicable precedent.
c. Regulating noncitizens
There is yet another possible distinction between the Dormant
Commerce Clause extraterritoriality cases that have invoked the rule of per
se invalidity and the issue of a Home State’s power to regulate its citizens’
out-of-state conduct. All the Dormant Commerce Clause cases have struck
down statutes in which the extraterritorial regulations applied primarily to
noncitizens of the regulating State. 299 By contrast, the extraterritorial
296

457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982). Indeed, a plurality of the Court appeared to hold in MITE
that a state statute having a “direct restraint on interstate commerce” by imposing “sweeping
extraterritorial effect[s]” is invalid under the Dormant Commerce Clause “regardless of the
purpose with which it was enacted.” Id. at 642 (internal quotations omitted).
297
481 U.S. 69 (1987).
298
Both MITE and CTS concerned anti-takeover st atutes in which the regulating state
sought to regulate the purchase and sale of stock that occurred outside the state. The Illinois
law struck down in MITE required that certain corporate takeover offers be registered with the
Illinois secretary of state and gave her the power to refuse registration. MITE, 457 U.S. at
626-27. The Indiana law upheld in CTS required approval by a majority of preexisting
shareholders when a potential buyer sought to acquire a substantial number of voting shares,
even if neither the proposed purchase nor sale was to occur in Indiana. CTS, 481 U.S. at 7275; id. at 99-100 (White, J., dissenting). The CTS Court concluded that it was “not bound by
[MITE’s] reasoning” because MITE was a plurality opinion. Id. at 81.
299
There is one Supreme Court case in which it is not clear whether the regulated party
was a noncitizen of the regulating state, the 1935 case of Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511 (1935). In any event, this case is not inconsistent with the above text because the
unusual statute in that case was patently protectionist. To protect New York’s milk producers,
the New York law precluded dealers from selling in New York milk they purchased out of
state at less than the minimum price fixed by the statute. Id. at 519 n.1. Indeed, a fair reading
of the opinion reveals that the Court’s concern was not with extraterritoriality per se, but with
how such a regulation could “set a ba rrier to traffic bet ween one state and another as effective
as if customs duties . . . had been laid upon the thing transported.” Id. at 521. In other words,
the Court’s concern was with economic protectionism, and extraterritoriality was problematic
only insofar as it had the protectionist “effect of establishing an economic barrier against
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regulations contemplated in this Article would be applied only to citizens.
The distinction between citizen and noncitizen has been critical in the
cases.300 This was the basis on which the CTS Court explained why there
was no inconsistency between its upholding Indiana’s anti-takeover statute
and the MITE Court’s striking down of Illinois’ similar anti-takeover law.
Under both laws, the regulating state sought to regulate purchases and sales
of corporate stock that occurred outside its borders.301 The important
distinction, according to the CTS Court, was that the Illinois law “applied as
well to out-of-state corporations as to in-state corporations,” whereas the
Indiana Act “applie[d] only to corporations incorporated in Indiana.”302
Moreover, whereas the Illinois statute could have applied even where there
were no Illinois shareholders,303 “the Indiana Act applies only to
corporations that have a substantial number of shareholders in Indiana.”304
Of partic ular significance to the issue of Home State power to regulate its
citizens’ out-of-state behavior, the Court upheld the statute in CTS because
“every application of the Indiana Act will affect a substantial number of
Indiana residents, whom Indiana indisputably has an interest in
protecting,”305 even though the out-of-state commercial activ ities of
noncitizens also were regulated by the law.306 If the Dormant Commerce
compet ition with the products of another state or the labor of its residents.” Id. at 527.
300
I will not attempt in this Article to explain why this is an important distinction for
purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause (though I suspect it is best understood as being
connected to protectionism insofar as representation reinforcement concerns may be less
pressing in respect of state statutes that regulate both citizens and noncit izens). I am content
to rest on formalistic legal argumentation here for two related reasons: (1) the Court’s
extraterritoriality strand of Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence is woefully
undertheorized and arguably not internally consistent; and (2) this Article primarily provides
positive rather than prescriptive and normative legal argumentation. Providing a theoretical
account of the significance of citizenship for the Dormant Commerce Clause would, I believe,
transform the analysis into prescriptive and normative argumentation. Goldsmith and Sykes’s
fine article, by contrast, is firmly a normative argument that is more willing to reject cases as
having been incorrectly decided than is this Article.
301
See supra note 298 (outlining statutory provisions regulating extraterritorial sale of
stock at issue in both MITE and CTS).
302
CTS, 481 U.S. at 93.
303
See MITE, 457 U.S. at 642 (noting that the Illinois statute “could be applied to
regulate [takeovers] which would not affect a single Illinois shareholder”).
304
CTS, 481 U.S. at 93.
305
Id.
306
The statute operated extraterritorially by requiring approval by a majority of preexisting shareholders when a potential buyer sought to acquire a substantial number of voting
shares even if neither the purchase nor sale was to occur in Indiana. See Id. at 99-100 (White
J., dissenting) (noting that “people from all over the country buy and sell CTS’ shares daily”
and that under the Indiana law “any prospective purchaser will be effectively precluded from
purchasing CTS’ shares if the purchaser crosses [a certain] threshold ownership level[] and a
majority of CTS’s shareholders refuse to give the purchaser voting rights”).
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Clause countenances extraterritorial regulation of noncit izens’ commercial
activities due to Indiana’s “substantial interest[s]” in its citizens’ primarily
commercial activities,307 it would follow that the clause does not pose an
insurmountable bar to a Home State regulating its citizens’ out-of-state
activities when those activities are primarily or exclusively noncommercial.
d. Impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation
This is not to suggest that the Dormant Commerce Clause poses no
limitations regarding extraterritoriality in commercial contexts under CTS.
But unlike the plurality opinion in MITE, under whose rationale
extraterritoriality would appear to be per se unconstitutional, 308 CTS
introduced a lower level of scrutiny under which the relevant question is
whether the state statute “may adversely affect interstate commerce by
subjecting activities to inconsistent regulations.”309 The Indiana statute was
not problematic, according to the CTS Court, because it is well-established
that the state of incorporation regulates its domestic corporations, including
shareholders’ voting rights.310 Consequently, “each corporation will be
subject to the law of only one State,” and accordingly there is no
“impermissible risk of inconsistent regulation by different States.”311
The types of regulations discussed in this Article would not lead to
impermissible risks of inconsistent regulation for purposes of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. The parentheticals provided by the CTS Court to gloss
the cases to which it cites speak of “subjects that ‘are in their nature
national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation.’”312
For example, the CTS Court referred to the “‘confusion and difficulty’ that

307

Id. at 93.
See MITE, 457 U.S. at 642-43 (concluding that the Dormant Commerce Clause
“precludes the application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the
State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State”).
309
CTS, 481 U.S. at 88. CTS thus substituted a more flexible test for MITE’s bright line
prohibition of extraterritoriality. The CTS Court explicitly stated that it was “not bound by
[MITE’s] reasoning” because it was only a plurality opinion. Id. at 81. To be sure, one post CTS case, see Healy v. Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324, 328 (1989) (stating that the Dormant
Commerce Clause “‘prohibit[s] the state from controlling the prices set for sales occurring
wholly outside its territory’” (quoting United States Brewers Ass’n v. Healy, 692 F.2d 275,
282 (2d Cir. 1982))), appears to have returned to MITE’s approach to extraterritoriality, but
Healy was a case that involved a state statute that was clearly protectionist, namely,
Connecticut’s contemporaneous affirmation provision that required alcohol distillers to attest
they were not selling alcohol at lower prices outside of New York, where such heightened
scrutiny is appropriate.
310
CTS, 481 U.S. at 89.
311
Id.
312
Id. at 88-89 (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1852)).
308
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would attend the ‘unsatisfied need for uniformity’ in setting maximum
limits on train lengths”313 and similarly cited to a case that struck down a
state law limiting permissible truck lengths that was “‘out of step with the
laws of all other [neighboring] States.’”314 The Court’s discussion confirms
that inconsistent regulations of a given activity are not per se
unconstitutional. Indeed, to hold otherwise would be to dramatically
circumscribe the states’ regulatory powers; this is so because
[t]here is nothing unusual about nonuniform regulations in our federal system.
States are allowed to make their own regulatory judgments about scores of
issues. The mere fact that states may promulgate different substantive
regulations of the same activity cannot possibly be the touchstone for illegality
315
under the dormant Commerce Clause.

For example, states have different libel standards, tax regimes, and tort
laws that might simultaneously be applicable to the same activity.316 The
Dormant Commerce Clause wisely has not been held to disallow these types
of inconsistent regulations. The caselaw suggests that inconsistent
regulations are problematic for purposes of the Dormant Commerce Clause
only if such inconsistencies threaten the free flow of interstate commerce; it
is readily apparent that inconsistent state laws governing train or truck
lengths might impose severe compliance costs that could make it effectively
impossible for the regulated parties to engage in interstate commerce.317
The policy differences among the states of the sort contemplated in this
Article are, however, not “subjects that ‘are in their nature national, or
admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation.’”318 Inconsistent
state regulations of this sort accordingly do not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause. Just the opposite: under the Constitution, states are
permitted to differ among themselves on such hotly contested matters as
parental notification laws, gambling, motorcycle helmets, and the like, and
extraterritorial regulation might be necessary to ensure the efficacy of these
laws. The mere fact that applic ation of the Home State’s law to its traveling
citizens affects interstate commerce does not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause; as the Supreme Court has observed, “there is a residuum
313

Id. at 88 (quoting S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 774 (1945)).
Id. at 88 (quoting Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 671 (1981)).
315
Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 287, at 806.
316
See id. at 804 (noting that multistate firms oft en encounter varying state laws
governing taxes, libel, securities, etc.).
317
See id. at 807 (observing that the Supreme Court cases invalidating transportation
safety regulations turn on the “judicial judgment that the regulatory benefits of [those
regulations] were illusory while the costs of complying . . . were severe”).
318
CTS, 481 U.S. at 88-89 (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,
319 (1852)).
314
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of power in the state to make laws governing matters of local concern which
nevertheless in some measure affect interstate commerce or even, to some
extent, regulate it.”319 Our federal system contemplates that the states can
have different political theories that animate their legislative dec isions, and
it would be a perversion of that system to treat such antic ipatable
nonuniformities as problematic, “inconsistent regulations”320 that run afoul
of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
2. The Example of Dean Foods v. Brancel
A recent federal appellate court decision mentioned above, 321 Dean
Foods Co. v. Brancel,322 provides an excellent test case for Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis of a Home State’s effort to regulate
extraterritorially. The State of Wisconsin was concerned about the future of
small dairy farmers in Wisconsin, having lost approximately 15,000 small
dairy farms over a period of fifteen years. In addition to the economies-ofscale that large dairy farmers enjoyed, the large farmers had arrangements
with milk processors (purchasers of raw milk from the farmers) under which
the large farmers were paid premiums exceeding the processors’ cost
savings in procuring milk from large farmers.323
The Wisconsin
Department of Agriculture did not seek to counteract the price differential
attributable to the economies-of-scale and transaction costs savings of the
large farms. But the Department deemed all payments by processors in
excess of costs savings to constitute “unjustified” premiums and banned
them.324 Wisconsin hoped the new regulation would put small Wisconsin
dairy farmers on equal ground with large Wisconsin farmers without
discounting the real economic benefits of large farming operations.
Dean Foods was an out-of-state milk processor that purchased milk
from dairy farms in Wisconsin. Under long-standing practice, Dean Foods
hired milk haulers to collect and transport milk from Wisconsin farmers.
After the new regulation was enacted, however, Dean Foods “announced a
new milk-purchasing program intended to circumvent” the ban on
unjustified premiums.325 Under the new plan, Dean Foods allowed
Wisconsin farmers to contract directly with haulers to transport their milk to

319
320
321
322
323
324
325

Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669 (1981).
For a similar point, see Regan, supra note 27, at 1884-85.
Supra text accompanying note 12.
187 F.3d 609 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 611.
Id.
Id. at 612.
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Dean Foods’ facilities in Illinois. Transfer of title technically occurred in
Illinois under the new plan, and Dean Foods accordingly concluded that
Wisconsin’s regulation would not apply. Under the plan, Dean Foods
continued to pay to large dairy farmers the premiums that had been deemed
“unjustified” and banned by Wisconsin. The Wisconsin Department of
Agriculture, however, attempted to apply its regulation to milk purchased
under the new plan, given Wisconsin’s many connections with the
transaction. At issue in the case was whether Wisconsin had the power to
do this.
The Seventh Circuit concluded that the transactions under the new plan
were beyond Wisconsin’s regulatory powers.
The Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the sales under the new plan “ha[d] an effect that is felt,
perhaps even predominantly, in Wisconsin” given the “reality that these
sales involve[d] Wisconsin farmers and Wisconsin milk.”326 The court
nonetheless ruled that Wisconsin could not regulate the sales because they
occurred in Illinois, citing MITE and Healy for the proposition that one
State cannot “regulate commerce which occurs outside of its
jurisdiction.”327
The Dean Foods analysis is problematic. Although the regulation at
issue in Dean Foods makes for a harder case under the Dormant Commerce
Clause than most of the other Home State extraterritorial regulations
analyzed in this Article because it was a regulation that concerned
commerce, even this type of regulation should be permitted. To begin with,
it is important to recognize that Dean Foods fits the paradigm of a Home
State seeking to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state conduct for the purpose of
ensuring that domestic policies are not circumvented by mere travel: The
Home State of Wisconsin was taking steps to ensure that its citizens—the
large dairy farmers—did not circumvent Wisconsin regulations that were
directed at securing a certain result in Wisconsin—helping to maintain small
dairy farms.328
326

Id. at 619.
Id. at 619-20.
328
The regulation varied from the paradigm on account of the fact that the party whose
actions were the subject of the regulation was a noncitizen; the regulation barred milk
processors from paying the premiums. One state’s effort to regulate the extraterritorial
conduct of noncitizens presents a greater constitutional hurdle than a Home State’s efforts to
regulate its own citizens. Nonetheless, this aspect of the Wisconsin regulation readily could
have been altered without interfering with the regulation’s functional efficacy; the regulation
could have proscribed large dairy farmers from accepting the banned premiums. Such a
modification of the regulation would not have saved the regulation under the Seventh
Circuit’s understanding of the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, for the regulated sale
still would have occurred outside of Wisconsin. See id. at 619-20 (“[T]he fact that a particular
transaction may affect or impact a state does not license that state to regulate commerce which
327
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Under the Seventh Circuit’s analysis, the Dormant Commerce Clause
prevented Wisconsin from making certain that its police power interests
were not circumvented by mere travel. The Dean Foods Court was wrong
to subject Wisconsin’s regulation to a per se rule of extraterritorial
unconstitutionality under the Dormant Commerce Clause, however, because
the regulation was not a species of economic protectionism. Indeed, if
anything, the regulation disadvantaged Wisconsin farmers vis-à-vis out-ofstate farmers by making the produce of large farmers more expensive than it
otherwise would have been.329 The appropriate test, instead, was CTS’s
lower-level risk-of-inconsistent-regulations analysis.330
Wisconsin’s regulation should have been sustained under such review
for two reasons. First, the Wisconsin regulation was not inconsistent with
any Illinois law nor was an Illinois statute imposing conflic ting duties on
milk producers “readily imagin[able].”331 Second, the subject of the
regulation—a prohibition on payments in excess of cost savings for the
purpose of putting small farmers on more equal grounding with large
farmers—is not the type of matter about which there must be national
uniformity. Nonuniformity across states about such matters of economic
and social theory wisely is permitted under our federal system.

occurs outside its jurisdiction.”).
329
Although the Seventh Circuit observed that “[a]nother apparent reason for the ban on
these premiums is that smaller in -state processors are less likely to be able to pay them,” id. at
611, this appeared to be an ancillary goal of the regulation, see id. (stating that the secretary
promulgated the regulations to stem the tide in which Wisconsin had lost “roughly 15,000
dairy farmers in the past 15 years”). More importantly, there was no suggestion that this
functioned to the sole disadvantage of out -of-staters, a necessary element of economic
protectionism. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978) (“The absence
of any of these factors fully distinguishes this case from those in which a State has been found
to have discriminated against interstate co mmerce.”).
330
Unlike the district court opinion, Dean Foods Co. v. Brancel, 22 F. Supp. 2d 931
(W.D. Wis. 1998), the Seventh Circuit did not wholly overlo ok CTS. The State of Wisconsin,
however, “ma[de] no mention of the ‘inconsistent regulations’ strand of dormant Commerce
Clause doctrine,” and the Seventh Circuit accordingly treated any arguments under CTS as
having been waived. Dean Foods, 187 F.3d at 616. This does not excuse the Seventh
Circuit’s analysis, however, because a party’s failure to raise the applicable doctrine does not
give a court license to analyze the legal questions by means of inapplicable law. Furthermore,
the Dean Foods court in dicta suggested that CTS’s rule might be limited to the context of
corporations law, see id. at 615 (“CTS may be distinguishable from most other
extraterritoriality cases because it dealt with corporations, which are uniquely creations of
state law.”), and inclined toward the view that the Dormant Commerce Clause otherwise
provides a per se prohibition against extraterritorial regulation, see id. at 616-17
(“[E]xtraterritoriality principles ban a state from regulating ‘sales that take place wholly
outside it.’” (citation omitted)).
331
Head v. N.M. Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, 374 U.S. 424, 427 -29 (1963).
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D. Structural Constitutional Considerations
Two prominent scholars, Professor Lea Brilmayer and Professor Seth
Kreimer, have argued that structural constitutional considerations place
severe limits on Home States’ powers to regulate the out-of-state conduct of
their citizens.332 With all due respect, I do not believe that their arguments
withstand careful scrutiny.
1. Exclusive Territory-Based Jurisdiction in Respect of Policies About
Which There Are Sharp Moral Disagreements Among States
Professor Lea Brilmayer has sought to ground limitations on the Home
State’s powers to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state conduct in structural
constitutional considerations.333 She has concluded that with respect to
issues about which there are sharp moral disagreements among states, such
as abortion and the right to die, “the structure of our federal system clearly
compels the priority of the territorial state, and . . . this priority typically
invalidates the residence state’s claim to regulate.”334 Her argument is
beguilingly simple. Where two states’ laws purport to govern a transaction
or occurrence and the laws directly clash, there must be a method to
prioritize the laws so as to determine which one applies. Professor
Brilmayer concludes that “territoriality trumps residence”335 in most cases
of direct clash between state policies,336 including abortion (such as when
332

Professor Donald Regan also concludes that structural considerations limit states’
extraterritorial powers, but the bulk of his discussion concerns state efforts to regulate
noncitizens. Regan, supra note 27, at 1884-1913. Though his remarks are self-consciously
preliminary, see, e.g., id. at 1887 (“I shall discuss some specific extraterrit oriality problems,
actual and hypothetical—not with an eye to presenting a general theory, but in the hopes of
encouraging someone else to try to develop one. ”), he comes to provisional conclusions that
are consistent with this Article, see id. at 1896 (noting the “possibility that states may be able
to legislate extraterritorially where their own citizens are concerned”); id. at 1909 (“[T]o say
that one can always abandon one’s state and its laws by changing one’s citizenship is not to
say that one can take a holiday from the state’s laws, while remaining a citizen by sojourning
elsewhere.”).
333
See Brilmayer, supra note 26, at 875 (making clear that her position is that a “prolife
state’s attempt to prohibit abortions extraterritorially” when its citizen is located in a state that
“desire[s] to ensure freedom of choice” would be “constitutionally invalid”); id. at 881 (noting
that her article “assess[es] the constitutionality of concurrent jurisdiction”).
334
Id. at 876.
335
Id. at 884. Professor Brilmayer uses the term territoriality in the same way that I use
the term “Host State.”
336
Professor Brilmayer helpfully notes the distinctio n between state policies of
“indifference” to an activity and “license” of that activity, and observes that “indifference”
cannot be inconsistent with another state’s affirmative desire to prohibit the activity. Id. at
888, 892. In other words, differences in respect of what activities are permitted by different
states do not necessarily give rise to “direct clashes” between the states’ laws. Id. at 876.
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the Home State, but not the Host State, has parental notification laws),
because “pro-life states are undoubtedly unwilling to give up the right to
regulate abortions within their own borders. If the residence of the woman
[determined which law applied] . . . then pro-life states would have to allow
nonresident women to have abortions in local medical facilities.”337
Because they do not, Brilmayer concludes that pro-life Home States are
likewise without power, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to regulate
the out-of-state conduct of their own citizens in respect of matters such as
abortion and the right to die.338
Professor Brilmayer’s argument is premised on two problematic
propositions. The first is that some structural and, apparently, constitutional
principle 339 compels there to be a single “connecting factor” that determines
which state’s law applies with respect to matters about which states are
deeply divided. 340 The second is that the Host State’s regulation trumps the
Home State’s when the two directly clash.
a.

The problematics of a single “connecting factor”

First let us consider Professor Brilmayer’s argument that a structural
constitutional principle compels that there be a single “connecting factor”
that determines which state’s law applies with respect to matters about
which states are deeply divided. This is the foundation of her contention
that a pro-life state that wished to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state conduct
has opted for a residence principle that accordingly requires it to permit
visitors from pro-choice states to be governed by their Home State’s laws
during their travels. Under Professor Brilmayer’s analysis, the pro-life
337

Id. at 886. Professor Brilmayer provides a second justification, that “[r]esidencebased regulation is problematic where a single rule must decide the legal rights of more than
one person, because the individuals may hail from different states.” Id. at 885. She
acknowledges that this difficulty can be readily eliminated if the Home States relinquish
claims to regulate noncitizens (such as the doctors in the out-of-state hospital). Id. at 885-86.
Accordingly, the only justification for the proposition that territoriality trumps residence that
remains for present purposes (where I consider only Home State powers to extraterritorially
regulate its own citizens) is Professor Brilmayer’s second explanation, which is analyzed
above in the text. Nonetheless, because a Home State’s ability to regulate its citizens’ out-ofstate conduct conceivably could be aided were it to have the power to regulate noncitizens
who abetted the cit izens, I hope to pursue the other justification at greater length in the future.
338
See id. at 889 (noting that her approach seeks to “prioritiz[e] the various connecting
factors” and “singl[e] one out as constitutionally sufficient” so as to identify only one state as
having legislative jurisdiction).
339
See supra notes 333, 338 (noting that concurrent jurisdiction is constitutionally
invalid in many contexts and that a constitutionally sufficient connecting factor would solve
this problem).
340
Brilmayer, supra note 26, at 886-88 (explaining the application of the “connecting
factor” in the abortion context).
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Home State that will not allow visitors from pro-choice states to have
abortions within its borders has rejected residence as the single connecting
factor and accordingly cannot invoke residence as a basis for regulating its
own citizens’ out-of-state conduct.341
Professor Brilmayer does not provide a legal source for the supposedly
constitutional principle that a single connecting factor determines which
single state has the power to regulate in circumstances of direct clash
between state regulatory regimes.342 This is because there is no legal source
for the proposition. Indeed, a close look at Professor Brilmayer’s carefully
phrased argument confirms that this all-important principle is hypothetical:
“if we are to eliminate concurrent jurisdiction by singling out a unique,
constitutionally adequate connecting factor,” then, she concludes, at least in
the abortion context, territoriality should trump residence. 343 This
formulation accurately reflects the fact that identifying a single factor for
purposes of choice of law is not a requirement of contemporary
constitutional or choice-of-law doctrine, a fact that Professor Brilmayer
herself explicitly notes elsewhere. 344 The Supreme Court has not ruled that
the Constitution requires a particular choice-of-law methodology. Indeed,
the Court recently upheld a state choice-of-law methodology that takes
account of multiple factors,345 as the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts
itself does.346
What undergirds Professor Brilmayer’s “single factor” proposition is
not precedent, but a policy argument.347 Her argument is in two steps.
First, concurrent jurisdiction is “unworkable” in contexts of “direct clash”
between two or more states.348 Second, a noncategorical “case-by-case

341

See id. at 888 (stating that a single connecting factor, such as residence or
territoriality, has to be chosen “to divide the spheres of regulation fairly and equally between
the contending states”).
342
See id. at 886 -89 (stating that a constitutionally sufficient connecting factor is
necessary to settle the conflict, but not explicating the derivation of that principle).
343
Id. at 886 (emphasis added).
344
See id. at 877 (“No single connecting factor uniquely validates the forum’s claim to
apply its law; different contacts are relevant in different sorts of cases.”).
345
See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313-20 (1981) (upholding the
application of Minnesota law on the basis of three factors: nominal residence; state-party
contacts; and state locus of the occurrence contacts).
346
See RESTATEMENT ( SECOND ) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969) (listing seven
factors for the courts to consider in choosing the applicable rule of law).
347
See Brilmayer, supra note 26, at 884-85 (exploring the implications of a residencebased, territory-based, and case-by-case assessment system of determining pro blems of
concurrent jurisdiction).
348
See id. at 883-84 (“The constitutional limits on concurrent jurisdiction . . . turn on
whether policies directly clash . . . .”).
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assessment” of which state’s law ought to be given effect is problematic
because the uncertainty it would create would allow potential defendants to
protect themselves only by conforming to the more restrictive state’s laws,
thereby “violating the principle of sovereign state equality.”349 Therefore,
concludes Professor Brilmayer, an easily applied rule that looks to only one
factor to determine which state has legislative jurisdiction is necessary.350
(She argues that the Host State’s laws should categorically prevail, a matter
which I discuss at some length in the next Subsection; this Subsection, it
should be recalled, is concerned solely with the propriety of adopting a
single factor test to determine which state has legislative jurisdiction.)
I do not believe that Professor Brilmayer’s two-step argument is
persuasive. To begin, Professor Brilmayer is not clear about when
concurrent jurisdiction is “unworkable” (such that the entire exercise of
eliminating one state’s power to regulate must be initiated). At one point in
her article she discusses the Supreme Court’s “inconsistent regulations”
jurisprudence under the Dormant Commerce Clause, 351 but she does not
explain why regulations in respect of abortion or the right to die would run
afoul of this body of law. Indeed, I suggested above why such regulations
would not qualify as problematic “inconsistent regulations.”352 Although
such state regulations do have an impact on interstate commerce, they are
primarily concerned with paradigmatic exercises of police power in pursuit
of health and welfare—not protectionism—and they are directed at the
enacting state’s own citizens. Further, the regulated subjects are not matters
about which national uniformity is necessary to preserve interstate
commerce. Just the opposite: having diverse approaches among the states
to such hotly contested matters that the Federal Constitution does not
resolve is precisely where heterogeneity across states is most important.
As suggested above, however, Professor Brilmayer’s understanding of
unworkability may not be directly tied to precedent (in this case, the precise
contours of the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). Instead, her notion of
unworkability appears to be connected to more general policy principles
relating to personal protections and constitutional structure. If this is so, her
argument would not be vulnerable to the accusation that it is inconsistent
349

Id. at 885. As will be shown below in the text, these two steps are actually
interrelated.
350
See id. (“This leaves us with a choice between allowing the residence state to regulate
and allowing the terminal state to regulate.”).
351
See id. at 881-82 (discussing various Supreme Court cases, including trucking and
state takeover cases, in which several states might impose inconsistent requirements on
interstate activities).
352
See supra notes 312-20 (arguing that inconsistent regulations only violate the
Dormant Commerce Clause if the inconsistencies threaten interstate commerce).
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with contemporary doctrine insofar as her argument would be premised on
prescriptive and normative claims rather than positive description of what
the law is.353 The force of her position would then turn not on its
consistency with precedent, but on the strength of its policy argument.
Even under this criterion, however, Professor Brilmayer’s argument that
concurrent jurisdiction is unworkable in respect of polic ies about which
states are deeply divided does not fare well. The policy arguments she
makes—based on personal protections and constitutional structure—are
interconnected. She claims that if one state “expressly licensed what the
other prohibited, potential defendants could protect themselves only by
conforming to the more restrictive rule. This outcome would consistently
subordinate the licensing policy of the first state, violating the principle of
sovereign state equality.”354 Consider first Professor Brilmayer’s personal
protections argument. Two things can be said in response to the assertion
that “potential defendants could protect themselves only by conforming to
the more restrictive rule.”355 First, this is surely an overstatement, for
potential defendants will have to conform to the more restrictive rule only
when their Home State wishes to regulate their out-of-state activities; when
the Home State is only concerned with what its citizen does in the state, the
visitor can be governed exclusively by the Host State’s law.
Second, even when the Home State does wish to regulate its citizens
extraterritorially, the fact that the visitor must conform to the more
restrictive rule is not necessarily a bad thing. In fact, it is merely the other
side of the coin of not allowing citizens to escape their Home State’s legal
obligations by merely traveling to more permissive states. Thus, observing
that visitors will have to conform their behavior to the more restrictive legal
regime 356 does not answer the normative arguments advanced above as to
why a Home State should have continuing power over its traveling citizens
if it so wishes.357 If, as argued above, it is better that Home States have the
power to ensure the efficacy of policies they are constitutionally entitled to

353

See Jolls et al., supra note 178, at 1474-75 (providing a clear explanation of the
relationship between positive, prescriptive, and normative analysis).
354
Brilmayer, supra note 26, at 884-85.
355
Id. at 884.
356
The analysis is no different in the converse case of a traveler from a more lenient
Home State visiting a restrictive Host State. There is no basis for concluding that the Host
State’s law should be overridden; for the reasons discussed below, our country’s federal
system is characterized by presumptive concurrent jurisdiction, so the Host State’s restrictive
rule presumptively would apply to the visitor. See infra Part III (supporting the argument that
the legal system functions under a concurrent regulatory jurisdiction regime).
357
See supra Part I.C.3 (arguing that the power to regulate extraterritorially ensures the
efficacy of constitutional state policies and protects political heterogeneity among states).
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pursue–-a power that supports political heterogeneity across states 358 —then
requiring visitors to conform to the Home State’s more restrictive law, when
a Home State so desires, is normatively good. The fairness of this
conclusion can be illustrated by conducting the Rawlsian thought
experiment discussed above under which people are asked to try to step
away from their current commitments by imagining what political structure
they would choose if they did not know who they actually were. Such a
thought experiment leads to the conclusion that a political system in which
Home States have the power to regulate their citizens’ out-of-state conduct,
if they so wish, is the most fair political structure.359 It would follow that it
is not unfair to require a person to conform to her Home State’s laws insofar
as she ex ante would agree that it is fair to create a political structure in
which Home States have such extraterritorial powers.
Consider next Professor Brilmayer’s structural argument that a single
connecting factor is necessary to protect the principle of “sovereign state
equality.” Her claim is that permitting the Home State’s regulations to
apply would systematically “subordinate the licensing policy of the first
state,” thereby “throw[ing] the licensing state’s policy to the wolves.”360
This argument is unconvincing. To begin with, it is hyperbolic. Far from
being thrown to the wolves, the Host State’s licensing policy still would be
applicable to its own citizens and to visitors from states that elect not to
regulate their citizens’ out-of-state activities. In fact, under Professor
Brilmayer’s solution, it is the Home State’s laws that systematically would
be “subordinated” and “thrown to the wolves,” for allowing the Host State’s
law to categorically trump the Home State’s law would render the latter’s
policy open to wholesale circumvention in respect of many types of laws.361
Furthermore, it is highly dubious whether a state’s extraterritorial regulation
of its citizens even implicates the issue of “sovereign state equality” in the
first place. Assumed without explanation in Professor Brilmayer’s
argument is that a valid aspect of state sovereignty is the power to regulate
the behavior of the Home State’s citizens against the Home State’s wishes
when the bulk of the consequences of the visitor’s activity will be felt by the
358

See supra Part I.C.3.b (positing that the possibility of extraterritorial regulation
expands political heterogeneity by allowing states to impose paternalistic and norm-driven
legal constraints that cannot be evaded by travel, which would render the regulations
ineffectual).
359
Id. (arguing from the premise that the fairest political structure is one that
accommodates a broad range of lifestyle choices, including those who require a political
structure that allows extraterritorial regulation).
360
Brilmayer, supra note 26, at 885.
361
See supra Part I.C.3.a (discussing how extraterritorial regulation is fair because it
ensures the efficacy of constitutional state policies).
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Home State. My hunch is that many would think that regulating the
behavior of noncitizens, against the wishes of the Home State, falls outside
the proper domain of the Host State’s legislative jurisdiction in the first
place. 362 If that is so, then permitting the Home State’s regulations to trump
does absolutely no violence to sovereign state equality.
Moreover, the conclusion that sovereign state equality is not at issue
can still hold even if the Host State is deemed to have some interest in
regulating visitors. If the Home State’s interest in its peripatetic citizens’
particular activity is greater than the Host State’s, then permitting the Home
State’s interest to prevail in no way threatens the principle of sovereign state
equality. The Host State and the Home State would be understood to be
differently situated vis-à-vis the visitor, and permitting the Home State’s
regulation to trump when the bulk of effects will be felt at home would not
undermine state equality.
Indeed, it is Professor Brilmayer’s solution that could be said to
threaten sovereign state equality. Disallowing Home States from regulating
their traveling citizens would undermine the principle of sovereign state
equality insofar as it would allow Host States to interfere with the
relationship between the Home State and its citizens by permitting Host
States to serve as havens from restrictive Home State laws. This would
significantly undermine the state sovereignty of certain types of states—in
particular, those that favor government regulation and those states that are
communitarian-minded—by preventing them from ensuring the efficacy of
their policies.363 By systematically disfavoring states that have a proclivity
toward regulation, Professor Brilmayer’s solution accordingly could be said
to violate state sovereign equality.
Finally, it is worth noting that the twentieth century’s experience with
the field of conflict of laws may well have something to teach about the
need to resist the impulse of attempting to make choice of law turn on a
single factor. The last doctrinal system that attempted to resolve choice-oflaw disputes by means of a single connecting factor—Professor Beale’s
“vested rights” approach, a largely territory-driven system under which the
activity was governed by the law of the place where the last aspect of the
activity occurred—has been almost universally recognized as a failure. 364
Since its rejection, virtually no courts or commentators advance choice-of362

Cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 93 (1987) (“We agree that
Indiana has no interest in protecting nonresident shareholders of nonresident corporations.”).
363
Supra Part I.C.3.a.
364
See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 124, at 20-25 (arguing that the “vested rights”
approach is too rigid and mechanical and noting that many critics have recognized these
deficiencies).
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law rules under which a single factor alone determines the applicable law.365
Indeed, most choice-of-law scholars have concluded from the experience of
the last century that any successful choice-of-law system inevitably must be
highly nuanced and case-sensitive. 366
Professor Brilmayer’s singleconnecting factor approach runs against the weight of scholarly consensus
in this respect.367
Indeed, there are solid theoretical reasons to believe that attempting to
solve the conflicts problem in the context of deeply divisive policies by
isolating a single factor of either territoriality or residence would be deeply
problematic. Gains in ease of application of such a rule would be offset by
the costs of the precarious outcomes that such a bright-line rule would
create. The fundamental trouble with such an approach is that both
residence and territoriality are crucial aspects of political community and
state sovereignty. To arbitrarily select one as per se trumping the other
would do serious violence to the political community’s and sovereign state’s
welfare, crucial considerations that any choice-of-law methodology must
take into account. Instead, a more nuanced, case-specific approach is
necessary.
To quickly conclude, there is little to support Professor Brilmayer’s
argument that, as a matter of federal constitutional law, a single connecting
factor must determine which single state’s law is applicable when two (or
more) states’ laws directly clash. The caselaw does not support such a
principle. Furthermore, a careful look at the policy arguments grounded in
personal and structural protections does not counsel in favor of such a
principle. And as will be seen below in Part III, many of Professor
Brilmayer’s “unworkability” concerns are addres sed not by a single
categorical rule under which the Host State trumps, but by the interplay of
four constitutional provisions. To be sure, obtaining the result under this
rule of interplay is more complex than Professor Brilmayer’s simple,
formulaic rule. Nonetheless, simplicity is not always the best solution.

365

See id. at 22-102 (tracing the development of conflict -of-laws approaches following
Beale’s vested rights theory and concluding that the traditional, single connecting factor
approach has been ultimately rejected in favor of methodologies that consider multiple
factors); Kramer, supra note 29, at 1992-97 (providing a useful overview of modern conflict of-law approaches, all of which eschew solutions that turn on one connecting factor).
366
See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 95, at 1233 (“One lesson of this century’s many
failures in top-down choice-of-law theorizing is that choice-of-law rules are most effective
when they are grounded in and sensitive to the concrete details of particular legal contexts.”).
367
Professor Brilmayer’s approach is properly conceptualized as a conflict -of-law rule
similar to Beale’s principle, which resolved the question of which law applies by identifying
only one state as having legislative jurisdiction. See generally Roosevelt, supra note 218, at
2455-58 (noting t his aspect of Beale’s system).
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Indeed, nuance and complexity are necessary here to accommodate fairly
the various states’ and parties’ interests.
b. The problematics of categorically subordinating the Home State’s
interests
Even if a single connecting factor did determine which state’s law
should apply under circumstances of direct clash, there are powerful
structural reasons for concluding that the social policies that states are most
acutely divided over are the very policies about which the Home States’
regulations should trump the Host States’. The political heterogeneity made
possible by federalism is most important precisely in respect of those
policies not proscribed by the Federal Constitution and about which the
states are most heatedly divided. To permit territoriality to categorically
trump residence would undermine the political heterogeneity that our
constitutional federal system allows and the experimentation across states it
makes possible. 368 By definition, it would create a political structure under
which citizens of any state could always avail themselves of the least
restrictive law of any of the states, foreclosing the possibility of having
states whose systems do not permit their citizens to effectively opt into a
different legal regime merely by crossing a border.
By making the most permissive state’s law a ready option for all United
States citizens regardless of which state they are citizens, Professor
Brilmayer’s approach of allowing the Host State’s rules to trump would
systematically bias public policies toward the most permissive laws in the
country. This would sabotage constitutionally permissible state efforts to
achieve paternalistic and norm-shaping ends. It would also be particularly
costly to the communitarian-minded, who believe that law plays a vital role
in shaping the character of the citizenry, that citizens’ values and behaviors
are shaped by the behaviors of their neighbors regardless of where the
behaviors occur,369 and that the law accordingly must be concerned with
citizens’ out-of-state activities. In short, the potential for political
heterogeneity is one of federalism’s great benefits, and averting its dilution
constitutes a structural reason for concluding, contrary to Professor
Brilmayer, that Home States ought to have the power to extraterritorially
regulate their citizens in respect of social policies over which the states are
deeply divided.370

368

Supra Part I.C.3.b.
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 132, at 356-59 (discussing the impact of social influence
on people’s values and behaviors).
370
As is made clear below, this does not mean that the Home State’s law should trump
369
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The proper solution to interstate conflict is a less categorical approach
that takes account of both the Home and Host States’ interests by
recognizing that both states ordinarily have concurrent jurisdiction, even
where their policies directly clash. To be sure, this solution is less
streamlined than Professor Brilmayer’s, but that is all right: There is no
constitutional basis for prematurely tidying the field by categorically
stripping one state (under Professor Brilmayer’s approach, the Home State)
of legislative jurisdiction over traveling citizens, and the costs of creating
such a basis would be prohibitive. Part III explores in some detail how our
country’s system of concurrent jurisdiction operates and provides a
preliminary explanation as to why it is not “unworkable.”
2. Exclusive State Sovereignty over Conduct Within a State’s Borders
Professor Kreimer also has argued that structural constitutional
considerations severely constrain the extraterritorial powers of Home States.
He asserts that “[t]he American Constitution acknowledges exclusive state
sovereignty over conduct within the territories defined by state borders.”371
The support for this claim is that “[m]any aspects of the constitutional
structure would make no sense otherwise.”372 The constitutional provisions
to which he cites, however, are fully consistent with a structure of
concurrent jurisdiction between or among interested states. Moreover,
Professor Kreimer’s analysis overlooks the many aspects of our
jurisprudence—including, most importantly, the Double Jeopardy Clause’s
dual sovereignty doctrine—that reflect the fact that ours is a system of
presumptive concurrent legislative jurisdiction, not “exclusive,” territorybased jurisdiction.
To begin, the constitutional provisions that Professor Kreimer cites do
not compel the conclusion of exclusive territory-based jurisdiction, but are
fully consistent with a regime of concurrent jurisdiction. Professor Kreimer
is correct that “[t]he understanding that a citizen of one state who ventured
into another state would be bound by the local law was the premise for the
adoption of Article IV’s Priv ileges and Immunities Clause.”373 The need
animating the clause, ensuring that the Host State does not discriminate
against out-of-staters, says nothing, however, about whether the Home State
retains legislative jurisdiction.
In other words, the Privileges and
the Host State’s regulatio n as a per se matter; there would be great costs to such a categorical
rule. The point here, though, is to showcase the profound structural costs that Professor
Brilmayer’s categorical approach would create.
371
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 922 (emphasis added).
372
Id.
373
Id.
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Immunities Clause is perfectly consistent with a regime of concurrent
jurisdiction.
Professor Kreimer next points to Article IV’s Extradition Clause, which
provides that an accused who flees from the state where a crime is
committed is to be “delivered up[] to be removed to the State having
Jurisdiction of the Crime.”374 Although Professor Kreimer believes that this
clause “acknowledges that the sole responsibility and prerogative for
punishment rests with the state within which the crime occurred,”375 the
clause does no such thing. It simply refers to the “State having Jurisdiction
of the Crime” without specifying the criteria that establish jurisdiction.
Since Michigan has criminal jurisdiction over a person who engaged in
bribery and false pretenses in Illinois as part of a scheme to fraudulently sell
used machinery to the State of Michigan,376 the State of Michigan could
successfully invoke the Extradition Clause if the accused fled back to
Illinois after having entered Michigan subsequent to the crime. In short,
because the presence of legislative jurisdiction turns on a host of due
process-type considerations and not simply the actor’s territorial
presence, 377 the Extradition Clause cannot be said to “make . . . sense” only
if there is “exclusive state sovereignty over conduct within the territories
defined by state borders.”378
Finally, Professor Kreimer points to the Article IV provision under
which the federal government agrees to protect each state against “Invasion”
and to provide assistance to states against “domestic Violence” at their
request.379 While this indeed indicates that territorial borders are of
constitutional consequence, and while several other provisions similarly
establish the constitutional significance of state borders, 380 these provisions
provide no support for the thesis that there is exclusive jurisdiction based on

374

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2.
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 922.
376
See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), discussed supra Part I.A,
explaining that states are permitted to punish behavior “done outside a jurisdiction, but
intended t o produce and producing detrimental effects within it.”
377
See supra Part I.C (arguing that legitimate state interests may, consistent with the
Due Process Clause, justify legislative jurisdiction over persons when they are outside of a
state’s border).
378
Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 922.
379
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, discussed in Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra
note 49, at 923.
380
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3 (giving Congress the power to create state
borders). See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States:
The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 315-20 (1992)
(discussing the const itutional significance of state borders in the allocation of governmental
authority).
375
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territory. The mere fact that the federal government will dispense assistance
in combating domestic violence or border incursions says nothing about the
scope of one state’s legislative jurisdiction.
Perhaps most importantly, Professor Kreimer’s thesis that “[t]he
American Constitution acknowledges exclusive state sovereignty over
conduct within the territories defined by state borders”381 ignores
entrenched practices and constitutional doctrines that testify to the existence
of concurrent jurisdiction. To begin with, “exclusive” state sovereignty
does not occur very frequently; rather, in most situations more than one
state is permitted to, in effect, regulate a given activity. For example, a
manufacturer in Michigan can be subject to both Kansas’s and New Jersey’s
products liability law.382 Similarly, the National Enquirer is subject to both
California’s and Pennsylvania’s defamation law.383 Consider as well the
dual sovereignty doctrine: “When a defendant in a single act violates the
‘peace and dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has
committed two distinct ‘offences’” and may be prosecuted by both states.384
More generally, as the earlier discussion of due process establishes, what
matters doctrinally for purposes of legislative jurisdiction is not physical
location per se, but whether the state has a legitimate interest.385 Though
the state’s interest frequently is triggered when events occur within its
borders, territorial presence is not a prerequisite. For this reason, legislative
jurisdiction is not tied to territory. Because more than one state may have a
legitimate interest in a particular matter, more than one state may regulate it.
The next Part of this Article elaborates the law that establishes and regulates
our country’s system of concurrent jurisdiction.
III. OUR SYSTEM OF CONCURRENT J URISDICTION
As shown in Parts I and II, states have the presumptive power under due
process and consistent with the Tenth Amendment to extraterritorially
381

Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom, supra note 49, at 922 (emphasis added).
See McKernan v. Gen. Motors Corp., 3 P.3d 1261 (Kan. 2000) (holding that a
products liability claim against General Motors was not barred by Kansas’s “Firefighter’s
Rule”); Poliseno v. Gen. Motors Corp., 744 A.2d 679 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000)
(clarifying General Motors’ liability under the crashworthiness products liability doctrine
developed in New Jersey courts).
383
See Gilbert v. Nat’l Enquirer, 55 Cal. App. 4th 1273, 1275 (1997) (noting a
defamation action against the National Enquirer based on California law); Dominiak v. Nat’l
Enquirer, 266 A.2d 626, 627 (Pa. 1970) (noting Pennsylvania libel action against the National
Enquirer based on Pennsylvania law).
384
Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S.
377, 382 (1922)).
385
Supra Part I.
382
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regulate their traveling citizens, and no other constitutional provisions
categorically limit this power. The Host State also typically has extensive
legislative jurisdiction over visitors from other states. The result is a system
of concurrent jurisdiction under which both the Home and Host States
typically have simultaneous power to regulate. This Part shows as a matter
of positive law that there is in fact a concurrent regulatory jurisdic tion
regime in place—a feature of our federal system that has eluded some noted
commentators. This Part also provides a prolegomenon of why concurrent
jurisdiction generally functions smoothly.386
Although primarily an
exercise in positive law, Part III also identifies select aspects of the current
doctrine that merit reconsideration, particularly in the light of this Article’s
earlier conclusions concerning the extent of Home State extraterritorial
powers.
A. The Fact of Concurrent Regulatory Jurisdiction
One might be tempted to suggest that the claim that there is concurrent
regulatory jurisdiction is belied by the constitutional provision that requires
that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”387 Professor Rollin
M. Perkins propounded such an argument when he asserted that “California
could not validly make it a crime for its citizens to ‘play the slot machines’
in Las Vegas, Nevada, where this is lawful. Such a statute would violate the
full faith and credit clause.”388 He is not alone in this view.389
This analysis is incorrect, however, because it conflates two aspects of
choice of law: (1) determining whether two (or more) states have legislative
jurisdiction; and, if they do, (2) determining which state’s law applies in a
particular litigation.390 As of the time Perkins was writing, full faith and
386

A full exposition must await another day. Rosen, supra note 9, at 8-40.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
388
Rollin Perkins, The Territorial Principle in Criminal Law, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 1155,
1164 (1971). It should be noted that Perkins’ analysis does not run afoul of the principle that
full faith and credit does not apply to criminal laws insofar as that principle simply means one
state is not required to apply the penal statutes of another. See, e.g., Nelson v. George, 399
U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (“[T]he Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require that sister States
enforce a foreign penal judgment.”). Perkins is arguing the wholly different proposition that
the Home State does not have the power to regulate in the first instance.
389
See P ERKINS & BOYCE , supra note 25, at 42 (concluding that full faith and credit
would preclude such a regulation); Larry Kramer, Note, Jurisdiction over Interstate Felony
Murder, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1431, 1451 n.111 (1983) (“The availability to the states of a
nationality principle to justify punishing citizens for acts committed in other states may be
limited by the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution . . . .”).
390
Cf. Kramer, supra note 125, at 280 (making clear the two -step nature of choice-oflaw problems); Roosevelt, supra note 218, at 2467-68 (distinguishing between “rules of
387
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credit, unlike due process, did not govern the scope of a state’s legislative
jurisdiction. Instead, full faith and credit determined which state’s law was
to be applied by a particular court in the course of a given litigation. Thus,
the Court explicitly observed in several of its seminal Full Faith and Credit
Clause cases that, although the clause permitted the forum state to apply its
law to the controversy, the nonforum state would have been free to apply its
laws to the self-same parties and occurrences had the lawsuit been filed
there;391 this of course presumes that both states had regulatory powers over
the parties and occurrence, and that the only question under full faith and
credit was which state’s laws were to be applied by the particular court that
was hearing the matter.392 Consider as well the case of Thomas v.
scope” and “conflict rules”).
391
See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 502
(1939) (“[T]he full faith and credit clause does not require one state to substitute for its own
statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the conflicting statute of another state, even
though that statute is of controlling force in the courts of the state of its enactment with
respect to the same persons and events.” (emphasis added)); Ala. Packers Ass’n v. Indus.
Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532, 540 (1935) (concluding that California law could apply by
virtue of the Full Faith and Credit Clause even though “the employee, had he chosen to do so,
could have claimed the benefits of the Alaska statute” by suing in Alaska).
392
In the few cases where the Court held that full faith and credit required the forum to
apply nonforum law, the rationale was not that full faith and credit limited the forum’s
legislative jurisdiction. Rather, under the Court’s analysis, only one state’s law (the
nonforum’s) was conceivably applicable and full faith and credit disallowed the forum state
from refusing to apply that law. See John Hancock Mut. Life Insur. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S.
178 (1936) (requiring the forum state to apply a nonforum state’s contract law to an insurance
policy bought in the nonforum state by an insured who spent the remainder of his life in the
nonforum state); Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932) (applying the
nonforum state’s worker compensation laws to resolve claims arising from the employee’s
death while working in the forum state, in which he neither resided nor regularly worked).
T hese opinions reveal that the Court’s conclusion that the forum was without legislative
jurisdiction did not rest on the Full Faith and Credit Clause, but derived from the Court’s
territory-based conception of state sovereignty, under which a state’s legislative jurisdiction
was deemed to be coterminous with its physical borders. See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714, 722 (1877) (“And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of
one State have no operation outside its territory . . . .”). That is why the opinions in Clapper
and Yates localize the regulated entities in the nonforum state, see Clapper, 286 U.S. at 158
(“The relation between Leon Clapper and the company was created by the law of [the
nonforum]; and as long as that relation persisted its incidents were properly subject to
regulation there.”); Yates, 299 U.S. at 182 (“[T]he contract of insurance was made, and the
death of the insured occurred in [the nonforum state]. In respect to the accrual of the right
asserted under the contract, or liability denied, there was no occurrence, nothing done, to
which the law of [the forum] could apply.” (citation omitted)), and undertake to explain why
the application of nonforum law is not extraterritorial, see Clapper, 286 U.S. at 158 (“The
mere recognition by the courts of one state that parties by their conduct have subjected
themselves to certain obligations arising under the law of another State is not to be deemed an
extraterritorial application of the law of the State creating the obligation.”); Yates, 299 U.S. at
182 (“Such recognition does not give to the [nonforum state’s] statute extraterritorial effect.”).
Even under this territory-based system, there were discrete doctrines that gave states
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Washington Gas Light Co., where the Court ruled that full faith and credit
required that the District of Columbia be allowed to apply its workmen’s
compensation laws to one of its residents who had sustained a work-related
injury in Virginia—even though Virginia already had applied its laws in
respect of the identical person and occurrence.393 Thomas thus definitively
establishes that full faith and credit doctrine coexisted with concurrent
regulatory jurisdiction, for it upheld the application of both states’ laws to
the identical occurrence. Thus, to return to Professor Perkins’ example, full
faith and credit at the time of Perkins’ article said nothing about whether
California had the power to regulate its citizens when they were in Nevada;
full faith and credit only had something to say about which state’s laws
would be applied in a litigation in Nevada.
To be sure, since Professor Perkins’ article was published, the Supreme
Court has held that full faith and credit does limit legislative jurisdiction.
The Court has, however, held that full faith and credit and due process
requirements impose precisely the same choice-of-law limitations.394 In
other words, the Court has folded full faith and credit into the due process
inquiry that this Article explored at length above. 395 As shown above, under
today’s combined due process/full faith and credit analysis, California could
regulate its citizens’ conduct in Nevada because such conduct affects
California’s legitimate paternalistic policy and interests in guarding the
legislative powers vis-à-vis acts undertaken outside their physical borders. See, for examples,
Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911), discussed supra notes 34-36 and
accompanying text; and Clapper, 286 U.S. at 156. In Clapper the Court states: “But,
obviously, the power of [the nonforum state] to effect legal consequences by legislation is not
limited strictly to occurrences within its boundaries.” Id. (emphasis added). Over time, the
Court’s territorialist conception of sovereignty has been modified. No longer talismanic,
territorial location now is one among many factors deemed relevant in determining whether a
state has a significant contact such that application of its law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819 (1985)
(acknowledging the visibility of a forum state’s “own interests in furthering its public policy”
when deciding whether to apply the laws of nonforum states). The bottom line is that as of
the time of Professor Perkins’ article, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was not used to
determine the scope of a state’s legislative jurisdiction but instead was a provision that
disallowed the forum from refusing to apply nonforum law where only nonforum law
conceivably was applicable.
393
448 U.S. 261, 284-85 (1980).
394
See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 735 n.2 (1988) ( stating that full faith and
credit imposes no additional constitutional limitations beyond due process in the choice of law
context); W EINTRAUB, supra note 32, at 624-25 (“[T]he full faith and credit clause imposes
no further limitation on a state’s choice of law than is imposed by the basic requirements of
due process.”).
395
See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 818 (holding that a state can apply its law, consistent with the
requirements of due process and full faith and credit, only if there are “significant
contact[s] . . . creating state interests, such that choice of law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair”). See generally supra Part I.C (discussing what this case requires).
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welfare of third parties (such as the gambler’s family). Such conduct
accordingly qualifies as significant contacts that create state interests, such
that the applic ation of California law would be neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair.396 In short, the conclusion is the same irrespective of
the time frame consulted: under no circumstances would full faith and
credit bar California from regulating its citizens’ gambling activities in
Nevada. If Nevada also wished to regulate the Californian when she is in
Nevada, we accordingly would be presented with a circumstance of
concurrent jurisdiction.
There is another important point to note about our country’s regime of
concurrent regulatory jurisdiction. Each state’s regulations may materially
conflict. It is the conflict between their laws, after all, that typically
provides the incentive for litigating parties to engage in choice-of-law
battles; one state’s law is more favorable to one of the parties.397 Our law of
full faith and credit thus contemplates a regime of concurrent regulatory
jurisdic tion under which the parties’ legal rights may vary depending on
which state’s law is deemed to apply. In short, regulatory authority is
concurrent even when the states’ regulations substantively conflict.
There is concurrent jurisdiction in respect of certain criminal matters, as
well. Consider the Model Penal Code. The Code provides that a Home
State has legislative jurisdiction if “either the conduct that is an element of
the offense or the result that is such an element occurs within” the Home
State. 398 Many states have adopted these provisions,399 and as long ago as
1966, one commentator observed that courts have found no difficulty in
finding an act or result occurring in their state even where the conduct “for
all important purposes took place beyond the state’s boundaries.”400 For
example, the Court of Appeals of Alaska upheld the prosecution of a
divorced father for custodial interference under an Alaskan statute despite
the fact that “all the acts constituting the offense were committed outside of
396

Supra Part I.C.
See, e.g., Pac. Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 498-99
(1939) (considering whether Massachusetts law, under which an employee was deemed to
have waived his common law right of action to recover for personal injuries suffered during
the course of employment unless he has given appropriate notice to his employer in writing, or
California law, which did not have such a notice requirement, applied).
398
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(1)(a) (1985).
399
E.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN . § 13-108(A)(2) (West 2001) (conferring jurisdiction
over out-of-state conspiracies to commit a crime in Arizona if the offenders have also done
something within the state to further that conspiracy); 18 P A . CONS. STAT. ANN . § 102(a)(2)
(West 1998) (giving Pennsylvania jurisdiction if events occurring outside the state constitute,
under Pennsylvania law, a conspiracy to commit a crime in Pennsylv ania).
400
B.J. George, Jr., Extraterritorial Application of Penal Legislation, 64 MICH . L. REV.
609, 622 (1966).
397
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the state;”401 the child had traveled to Arizona to spend the summer with her
father, in accordance with the divorce decree’s visitation schedule, but the
father prevented the child from returning to her mother in Alaska at
summer’s end.402 This is an example of concurrent jurisdiction because the
father’s actions were also governed by Arizona law.403
Further, there is concurrent regulatory jurisdiction in criminal matters
even where there is a policy conflict between the Home and Host States.
Consider once again the Model Penal Code. 404 One section states that the
Home State can exercise legislative jurisdiction if the “actor purposely or
knowingly caused the result within the [Home] State,” even though
“causing a particular result is an element of an offense and the result is
caused by conduct occurring outside the State that would not constitute an
offense if the result had occurred there.”405 Another provision addresses the
converse situation. It states that as long as a “legislative purpose plainly
appears to declare the conduct criminal regardless of the place of the result,”
the Home State may treat an act committed in the Home State as criminal
even if “causing a specified result or a purpose to cause or danger of causing
such a result is an element of an offense and the result occurs or is designed
or likely to occur only in another jurisdiction where the conduct charged
would not constitute an offense.”406
Finally, it is important to note that there is more extensive concurrent
regulatory jurisdiction in criminal than civil matters in one important
respect. A civil judgment rendered in a Host State’s courts must be granted
full faith and credit by a Home State’s courts and accordingly will have res
judicata effects, barring application of the Home State’s laws if the parties
or their privies were to file a subsequent lawsuit in the Home State in

401

Wheat v. Alaska, 734 P.2d 1007, 1007 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 1007-08.
403
In Arizona, the law is as follows:
A. A person commits custodial interference if, knowing or having reason to know
that the person has no legal right to do so, the person does one of the follo wing:
....
3. If the person is one of two persons who have joint legal custody of a child takes,
entices or withholds from physical custody the child from the other custodian.
4. At the expiration of access rights outside this state, intentionally fails or refuses to
return or impedes the return of a child to the lawful custodian.
ARIZ. RE V. STAT. ANN . § 13-1302(A) (West 2001).
404
Additional evidence can be found under double jeopardy jurisprude nce. See infra
Part III.B (discussing the implications of concurrent regulatory jurisdiction when the state
laws involved materially differ from one another).
405
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.03(3) (1985).
406
Id. § 1.03(2).
402

946

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 150: 855

relation to the same transaction or occurrence. 407 In this sense, it could be
said that concurrent legislative jurisdiction in the civil context largely ends
at the moment a court renders a civil judgment.408 This is not so, however,
in the context of criminal law. Full faith and credit is not applicable to
criminal judgments,409 and the Double Jeopardy Clause permits the Home
State to prosecute on the basis of a transaction or occurrence that already
has been the subject of the Host State’s prosecution.410
Tellingly, the Court has justified this outcome under the Double
Jeopardy Clause on the basis that concurrent jurisdiction is a natural and
acceptable byproduct of a federal system of meaningfully empowered states.
The key case on this issue is Heath v. Alabama.411 The defendant there had
been convicted in Georgia for “malice murder” and was subsequently
prosecuted in Alabama for “murder during a kidnapping.”412 The Supreme
Court ruled that the two crimes were greater and lesser offenses and hence
the “same” offense for purposes of Double Jeopardy if applied within a
single state. 413 The Court nonetheless upheld the two convictions, ruling
that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar successive prosecutions by
two states for the same conduct.414
Heath’s holding turned on the fact that a single act may implicate the
regulatory interests of two states, and the Court held that under the “dual
sovereignty doctrine,” each sovereign state is entitled to vindicate its own
interests: “The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on the common-law
conception of crime as an offense against the sovereignty of the
government. When a defendant in a single act violates the ‘peace and
dignity’ of two sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he has committed
407

See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (“For claims and issue
preclusion (res judicata) purposes . . . . [t]he judgment of the rendering State gains nationwide
force.”).
408
There are two important caveats here. First, this might have no effect on the prelitigation regulatory effect of the laws because parties would not know in which forum a
lawsuit first would be filed and so would have the incentive to abide by both states’ laws.
Second, very frequently only one state has regulated the relevant field, and so only it is likely
to be the forum ; under a circumstance where the Home State has regulated and the Host State
has not, the only way there first could be a judgment in the Host State would be by means of
declaratory judgment.
409
See, e.g., Nelson v. George, 399 U.S. 224, 229 (1970) (noting that states do not have
to enforce other states’ penal judgments); cf. The Antelope, 23 U.S. 66 (10 Wheat), 122 -23
(1825) (“The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another.”).
410
See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 88 (1985) (holding that “successive prosecutions
by two States for the same conduct are not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause”).
411
474 U.S. 82 (1985).
412
Id. at 84-85.
413
Id. at 87.
414
Id. at 88-89.
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two distinct ‘offences.’”415 “[T]he crucial determination” for purposes of
the dual sovereignty doctrine, said the Court, “is whether the two entities
that seek successively to prosecute a defendant for the same course of
conduct can be termed separate sovereigns. This determination turns on
whether the two entities draw their authority to punish the offender from
distinct sources of power.”416 The Court then held that states qualify as
“separate sovereigns.” Their “powers to undertake criminal prosecutions
derive from separate and independent sources of power and authority
originally belonging to them before admission to the Union and preserved to
them by the Tenth Amendment.”417
One might suggest that Heath’s acceptance of concurrent jurisdiction is
limited to circumstances where there is no conflict between state policies;
after all, both Alabama and Georgia proscribed the defendant’s behavior. 418
This, however, would be a dubious limitation, for the rationale deployed by
the Heath Court in no way turns on the absence of conflict. Instead, the
opinion focuses on the fact that a single act can implicate the legitimate
interests of two states, and it is not infrequently the case that different
jurisdictions treat identical acts differently.
Additional powerful support for the conclusion that Heath’s holding
does not depend on the absence of conflict between the relevant
jurisdictions is in the Heath Court’s treatment of Nielsen v. Oregon, 419 a
concurrent jurisdiction case whose holding pointed in an opposite direction
than that taken by the Court in Heath. Heath accordingly had to distinguish
Nielsen. Importantly, even though Nielsen involved conflict between two
states, the Heath Court’s analysis did not draw a distinction on the basis of
that conflict. Nielsen concerned a circumstance in which Congress granted
Oregon and Washington concurrent jurisdiction over the Columbia River.

415

Id. at 88 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1992)).
Id.
417
Id.
418
For such a suggestion, see Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 481, stating:
“[T]here is a difference between seeking to deter acts that both states agree are evil and
seeking to punish an action . . . protected by . . . the state in which it occurs.” On a separate
point, one might think that the Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated only when two states
prohibit a particular activity and then prosecute, and that Double Jeopardy is not even of
threshold relevance unless there is no conflict between the two sovereigns. But this is not so.
Consider the Heath case: Imagine that the defendant had been acquitted in Georgia for malice
murder because his actions did not satisfy the statutory elements but that the defendant’s
actions would have constituted murder during kidnapping under Alabama law. In such a case
there is “conflict” between the two states’ laws, yet one would expect that the defendant
would invoke the Double Jeopardy Clause to preclude prosecution in Alabama were it not for
the dual sovereignty doctrine.
419
212 U.S. 315 (1909).
416
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The Court in Nielsen set aside the conviction of a Washington resident in an
Oregon court for operating a particular type of fishing net pursuant to a
valid license from Washington. The Nielsen Court’s rationale had been
explicitly tied to the presence of an interstate conflict of policies: where
“the opinion of the legislatures of the two States is different . . . the one
State cannot enforce its opinion against that of the other, at least as to an act
done within the limits of that other State.”420
This would have been a simple basis on which the Heath Court could
have distinguished Nielsen. But this Heath did not do. Instead, it held that
“Nielsen is limited to its unusual facts and has continuing relevance, if at all,
only to questions of jurisdiction between two entities deriving their
concurrent jurisdiction from a single source of authority [i.e., Congress].”421
In short, Heath did not limit Nielsen on the basis of interstate conflict,
which had figured prominently in the Nielsen opinion itself, but instead
distinguished the case on the ground that the concurrent jurisdiction had not
emerged from inherent powers of the two states but instead had been
granted by the Congress. The approach taken toward Nielsen in Heath
accordingly supports strongly the view that Heath’s rationale extends to
circumstances of policy conflict between or among states as long as the two
or more jurisdictions’ powers are derived from independent sources. And,
as Heath itself makes clear, state criminal law satisfies this condition: “The
Constitution leaves in the possession of each State ‘certain exclusive and
very important portions of sovereign power.’ Foremost among the
prerogatives of sovereignty is the power to create and enforce a criminal
code.”422 This suggests that a Home State’s criminal jurisdiction emerging
from the police power is concurrent with the Host State’s criminal
jurisdiction over a visitor from the Home State, even where there is
substantive conflict between the two states’ criminal laws.
Understanding the constitutional law governing concurrent jurisdiction
helps to shed light on an intriguing hypothetical mentioned above423 that
was originally put forward by Professor Kreimer. Suppose that New Jersey
recognizes a “battered wife” defense, that Pennsylvania does not, and that a
Pennsylvanian battered wife kills her Pennsylvanian husband while both are

420

Id. at 321.
Heath, 474 U.S. at 91.
422
Id. at 93 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO . 9, at 55 (Alexander Hamilton) (J.E. Cooke
ed., 1961)); see also id. at 93 (“States, ‘as political communities, [are] distinct and sovereign,
and consequently foreign to each other.’” (quoting Bank of United States v. Daniel, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 32, 54 (1838))); id. (suggesting that “States are no less sovereign with respect to each
other than they are with respect to the federal government”).
423
Supra note 5 and accompanying text.
421
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on vacation in New Jersey. Professor Kreimer argues that New Jersey could
not deny the noncitizen wife a battered wife defense in a New Jersey
prosecution.424 That would appear to be correct insofar as full faith and
credit does not require one state (here, New Jersey) to apply the penal laws
of another (here, Pennsylvania’s rejection of the battered wife defense).425
This is of only limited practical import, however, because the Double
Jeopardy Clause would not preclude the Pennsylvanian wife from
accomplishing what her home jurisdiction does not want to permit.
Pennsylvania also could prosecute the wife, its own citizen, and apply its
law of homicide, which does not recognize the defense. 426 Once again, the
two states have concurrent, conflicting regulatory jurisdiction under current
law.
*

*

*

To quickly conclude, concurrent legislative jurisdiction among states is
an entrenched part of federal constitutional law. It permits all interested
states to regulate so as to protect their interests. Moreover, states’ criminal
jurisdiction is in one important respect more extensive than their civil
legislative jurisdiction: whereas full faith and credit’s constitutional rules of
res judicata preclude a second trial where there has been a civil judgment in
another state, neither the Full Faith and Credit nor the Double Jeopardy

424

See Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 499 n.169 (“It would plainly violate the
privileges and immunities clause to make [the battered woman] defense only available [to
New Jersey citizens].”).
425
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 123 (1825). Professor Kreimer analyzes the
question under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, but for reasons discussed above I do not
believe that Clause to be applicable to the issue at hand: the defense would not appear to fall
under a protected privilege or immunity and, in any event, New Jersey could justify
application of Pennsylvania’s law on the basis of not wanting to interfere with Pennsylvania
law. Supra Parts II.A.1-.3.
426
Pennsylvania has enacted the Model Penal Code provision that permits a Home State
to prosecute for acts performed out of state that were legal in the Host State but prohibited by
the Home State. See 18 P A. CONS. STAT. ANN . § 102(a)(6) (West 1998) (prohibiting
extraterritorial conduct that violates a Pennsylvania statute where the statute is express and
reasonably related to the Commonwealth’s in terest). If the Sixth Amendment’s vicinage
requirement were incorporated against the states—as of now, “the Supreme Court has never
directly addressed the issue,” Kreimer, Law of Choice, supra note 5, at 484-85—then
Pennsylvania would be permitted to prosecute its citizen only if at least some of the conduct
constituting the offense occurred in the Home State. See United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno,
526 U.S. 275, 278-79 (1999) (describing the federal constitutional vicinage requirement in
criminal cases). Were the vicinage requirement applied to the states, states wanting the power
to prosecute particular crimes for extraterritorial activities would be well advised to draft
those criminal statutes in a manner that expressly constituted as elements of the offense
aspects of the activity likely to be performed in the Home State or the activities’ effects.
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Clause preclude the second state from prosecuting, even after there has been
a criminal determination in the first state.
B. Concurrent Jurisdiction and Interstate Conflict—A Prologue
One consequence of concurrent legislative jurisdiction is that more than
one state’s laws may apply to a particular activity. This can present a
difficulty if the two (or more) states’ laws materially differ from one
another. In fact, it was this very possibility of interstate conflict that led
Professor Brilmayer to argue against the existence of concurrent legislative
jurisdiction vis-à-vis issues on which states are deeply divided; by
eliminating one state’s legislative jurisdiction (the Home State’s), Professor
Brilmayer sought to eliminate the very possibility of interstate conflict.427
As explained above, however, there is no constitutional principle that so
readily eliminates difficult conflicts. Moreover, the absence of a simple rule
like “the Home State trumps” is a good thing, for simplicity’s costs in these
circumstances would be too grave in respect of the interests of the Home
State and the federal system more generally.428 Of course, a full exposition
of how our system of concurrent jurisdiction manages interstate conflict is
beyond the scope of this Article; it is a core part of the field of conflict of
laws,429 about which I shall not say much here. In what remains, I hope
only to sketch the contours of the problems of interstate conflict that arise
from Home State extraterritorial regulation, as well as to identify the several
approaches to accommodating such conflicts that are already present in the
caselaw. Although a fuller exposition must await another day, this
discussion will provide the basic concepts necessary for understanding how
a system of concurrent, conflicting jurisdiction can be workable.
1. A Simple Taxonomy of Conflicts
Before discussing how our federal system handles interstate conflict, it
is necessary to understand the metes and bounds of the problem. To begin,
it is important to recognize that the exercise of Home State extraterritorial
powers does not always give rise to conflicts with the Host State. Consider
427

See supra Part II.D.1 (noting Professor Brilmayer’s view that “t erritoriality trumps
residence”).
428
See supra Part II.D (noting that an univariable dictate like “Home State trumps”
could undermine sovereign equality and the Host State’s ability to pursue paternalistic and
norm-shaping ends).
429
See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS, at v (6th ed. 2001) (“The
power of different [governmental] bodies to make or administer law is often unclear and, even
when clear, frequently overlaps. Conflicts arise, and a way is needed to resolve them. This,
broadly speaking, is the subject matter of ‘conflict of laws.’”).
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the circumstance where only the Home State has regulated the activity in
question and the absence of Host State regulation signifies the absence of
Host State regulatory interest in the matter. (To be sure, the absence of
regulation does not always mean an absence of interest—as is discussed
immediately below—but it sometimes may). For example, think about
Wisconsin’s milk regulations in the Dean Foods case.430 Whereas
Wisconsin felt strongly about discouraging the payment of premiums to
large Wisconsin dairy farms, it is likely that Illinois was indifferent to the
matter.431 Under these circumstances, concurrent jurisdiction permits the
interested state to ensure that its laws are followed, irrespective of where its
citizen happens to be located. The Host State should not care much, if at all,
and the Home State that wishes to regulate its citizens extraterritorially will
be quite content. Under this situation, which might be called a “No
Conflict” circumstance,432 concurrent jurisdiction presents no difficulties in
respect of interstate conflict; the Home State’s law can be unproblematically
applied to its peripatetic citizens. A Home State with a motorcycle helmet
law that sought to apply its regulation to one of its citizens while she was in
a Host State that had no such laws might be another No Conflict
circumstance. 433
Frequently, however, there is a direct conflict between the policies of
the Host and Home States. Two dimensions of the conflict are particularly
important to note for present purposes. The first is the relative importance
of each state’s policy. Of course, it is frequently very difficult in practice to
make such a comparison: there are uncertainties as to what the policy

430

Supra Part II.C.2.
To be sure, it is impossible to know for certain the legislative intent lurking behind
the Wisconsin statute, which on its face was silent as to extraterritoriality, and much less the
intent behind the absence of regulation in Illinois. Professor Brilmayer has put forward a
powerful critique of the concept of “governmental interests” in the conflict-of-laws context,
arguing that it amounts to little more than a fictitious constructive intent. See Lea Brilmayer,
Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MICH . L. REV. 392, 402 -07 (1980).
Brilmayer’s argument ultimately is “not an objection to a choice of law method alone” but “is
an objection to a conventional method of statutory con struction.” Kramer, supra note 125, at
300. “The objection thus really amounts to a claim that courts are unable to do something that
they do all the time.” Id. at 300-01. For this reason, I assume for present purposes that courts
are capable of assessing legislative intent, even if it only amounts to “‘imaginative
reconstruction,’” for that is a deep part of contemporary legal practice. Id. at 300 (quoting
RICHARD A. P OSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 287 (198 5)).
432
This is analogous to “false conflicts” under the conflict-of-laws approach known as
interest analysis. LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 51 (2d ed. 1995).
433
It is possible, however, that behind the absence of a mandatory helmet law is a state
policy of supporting personal choice in respect of wearing helmets, in which case there would
be a conflict between the Home and Host State policies.
431
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behind a particular law is in the first place, 434 and there are often
incommensurability problems when “weighing” one state’s interest against
another’s.435 Nevertheless, it is surely possible that one state’s interest in a
given matter may uncontroversially outweigh another state’s interest. For
example, it long has been the case under the law of full faith and credit that
the Home State’s interest in its citizens on the issues of marriage and
divorce has been held to exceed the Host State’s.436 Let us call this the
“Relative Interests Dimension” of interstate conflict.
The second dimension concerns whether and to what extent the two (or
more) states’ rules give rise to inconsistent demands over a particular person
or transaction. Let this be known as the “Compatibility Dimension” of
interstate conflict. Most problematically, a visitor could be subject to the
laws of two states that require mutually inconsistent behaviors such that
both cannot be complied with simultaneously. Consider, for example, a
“safe” State A that set fifty-five miles per hour as the maximum traveling
speed on its highways and that sought to impose that limit on its citizens’
out-of-state highway travels, and consider further what would happen if one
of its citizens visited a neighboring “macho” State B that set sixty-five miles
per hour as the highway minimum. I will call this a “Hard Conflict”
circumstance in respect of the Compatibility Dimension.
Most often, however, it is possible for a person to abide by both states’
rules, even if they are at odds with one another. Consider antigambling
State A that wished to prevent its citizens from gambling out of state and a
pro-gambling state, such as Nevada. A citizen of State A can comply with
both states’ laws by not gambling—after all, Nevada law does not mandate
that its visitors gamble. Nevertheless, there typically is a conflict between
the two states’ laws along the Relative Interests dimension of conflicts;
Nevada, for example, wants people to gamble in Nevada. Another example
is the relationship between New Jersey and Pennsylvania law concerning
the battered wife defense: though New Jersey recognizes the defense,
434

See supra note 431 (illustrating the difficulty in determining legislative intent).
See generally Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: Introduction, 146 U.
P A . L. REV. 1169, 1170 (1998) (noting that “‘incommensurability’ means the absence of a
scale or metric” and that this might be understood as referring to a situation where “no
numerical ranking of the options in the order of their comparative worth is possible”).
436
See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229-30 (1945) (ruling that only the
place of “permanence” should have the power to alter “legal relations and responsibilities” of
such “utmost significance” as marriage). Similarly, in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 396
(1975), the Court upheld against challenges grounded in equal protection and the right to
t ravel an Iowa statute that imposed a one-year residency requirement for divorce on the
ground that Iowa may reasonably be justified in, inter alia, not wanting to “become a divorce
mill for unhappy spouses” who likely will return to their Home States soon afterward. Id. at
407.
435
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merely having this law in place does not, of course, dictate that battered
wives kill their husbands—-that is, a battered Pennsylvanian visiting New
Jersey abides by both states’ laws by not taking the life of her abusive
spouse. On the other hand, New Jersey may well not want any battered
spouse, whether hailing from New Jersey or elsewhere, to go to jail for
killing her batterer in New Jersey. I will call these cases of “Soft
Conflict”437 along the Compatibility Dimension.
As will be discussed below, Hard Conflicts are particularly problematic.
They only infrequently occur, however. None of the examples of
extraterritorial regulation discussed in this Article, for example, would
create Hard Conflicts. Hard Conflicts are rare because the Host State’s law
typically is permissive rather than mandatory. For example, pro-gambling
states do not require that visitors gamble, and states without parental
notification laws do not require that pregnant minors undergo abortions
without parental consent. For this reason, Home State extraterritoriality
ordinarily results in situations of No Conflict or Soft Conflict, not Hard
Conflict.
2. Why Interstate Conflicts Are Not “Unworkable”
There are three plausible strategies for coping with potential interstate
conflict. First, the conflict can be eliminated by determining that only one
state in fact has legislative jurisdiction; Professor Brilmayer, as discussed
above, 438 takes this approach. While her principle of “Host State trumps” is
problematically coarse, there is merit to her general method. As I will show
below, there are several constitutional provisions that dispel conflicts by
identifying only one state as having legislative jurisdiction, though they do
not eliminate as many conflicts as Professor Brilmayer’s principle does.
Second, a nonconstitutional conflict-of-laws regime could be deployed
under which one state’s law is identified as applicable in the circumstance at
hand. Third, both states’ laws could be deemed to be applicable, and the
individual then could be held responsible to conform her behavior to both
regimes. Each of these approaches is applicable in certain circumstances.
By appropriately utilizing these three approaches, the interstate conflict that
naturally arises under a regime of concurrent jurisdiction can be

437

Professor Brilmayer makes a similar distinction. See Brilmayer, supra note 26, at
874-75 (“Most states that choose not to pro hibit abortion to the extent constitutionally
permissible are not merely expressing a simple lack of interest in the abortion issue. They are,
instead, affirmatively granting to those within their borders the freedom to make the
choice . . . .”).
438
Supra Part II.D.1.
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successfully managed.439
a.

Eliminating conflict by identifying a single source of law

Four federal constitutional principles eliminate a significant number of
potential conflicts by determining that only one state has legislative
jurisdiction over particular persons or transactions. Due process is the first:
it precludes states without reasonable connections to the matter at hand from
regulating.440 The second is the Dormant Commerce Clause’s inconsistent
regulations test. As discussed above, this does not impose a general ban on
inconsistent regulations, but instead forecloses those inconsistencies that
unduly interfere with the national economy.441 This is an important, albeit
limited, constraint on state legislative power. The third limitation emerges
from the right to travel. Professor Kreimer has suggested that the right to
travel serves a role analogous to Professor Brilmayer’s “Host State trumps”
principle: The Kreimerian right to travel effectively eliminates Home State
legislative jurisdiction over its traveling citizens by creating a right on
behalf of the traveler to be governed by the Host State’s laws.442 While
neither precedent nor policy considerations support such a view of the right
to travel, 443 the right to travel likely eliminates the Home State regulatory
jurisdiction that creates Hard Conflicts. Hard Conflicts, it could be said, run
afoul of the right to travel by interfering with a citizen’s right to leave her
Home State for the purpose of visiting another state. This is so insofar as
the specter of inevitably breaking one state’s laws might well be such a
disincentive to interstate travel that it affirmatively interferes with the right
to travel, which is part and parcel of American federalism.444
The fourth constitutional provision that properly plays a role in sorting
out interstate conflicts is the Full Faith and Credit Clause. I mention it last
only because the role it appropriately plays likely would require a reworking

439

As stated above, I intend here to provide only a cursory overview of these
methodologies. A fuller exposition of their appropriate scope must await another day.
440
See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 819-20 (1985) (holding that
the forum state of Kansas could not apply its law because Kansas was only “casually or
slightly related to the litigation”).
441
It is quite possible that the Dormant Commerce Clause on its own would bar State A
from extraterritorially regulating in respect of highway speed; the Court in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), conceptualized cases striking down states’
efforts to set maximum train and truck lengths as having been decided under the risk -ofinconsistent -regulations principle. Supra Part II.C.1.d.
442
Supra Part II.B.
443
Id.
444
See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999) (holding that the right to travel includes
“the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave another State”).
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of contemporary full faith and credit doctrine; that is, the analysis that
follows is normative and prescriptive, rather than positive in nature.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause is both textually and conceptually
suited to playing a role in sorting out interstate conflicts. By its terms, the
clause determines when “[f]ull faith and credit shall be given in” one state
to the statute445 of another state; it thus addresses directly the issue
presented by interstate conflict of determining which state’s law is
applicable. The Full Faith and Credit Clause is conceptually suited to this
task because, unlike the Dormant Commerce Clause and the right to travel,
its scope of inquiry naturally includes an assessment of whether the Home
State or the Host State has overreached. The Dormant Commerce Clause’s
risk-of-inconsistent-regulations test, developed to explain under what
circumstances extraterritoriality is problematic,446 most naturally would be
construed as limiting only the Home State. The same likely applies to the
right to travel: it too is most readily construed as a limit on only the Home
State, for it is the Home State’s regulation that is most naturally viewed as
the obstacle to its citizens’ ability to travel.
As constitutional limits on interstate conflict in circumstances where
due process does not eliminate one state’s legislative jurisdiction, the
Dormant Commerce Clause and the right to travel are incomplete because
they erect virtually irrebuttable presumptions that the state that has
overreached is the Home State. This is problematic because it surely is
plausible that the Host State has sought to inappropriately interfere with the
visitor’s relationship to her Home State and, accordingly, that it is the Host
State that has precipitated the problematic interstate conflict. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause, in contrast to the right to travel and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, invites an inquiry as to whether the Home or Host State
appropriately has the regulatory power. In fact, an old line of full faith and
credit decisions employed this very analytic, balancing the Host and Home
State’s interests in applying their laws and holding in various circumstances
that the forum/Host State had to apply the Home State’s law.447 In short,

445

The term “public acts” that is found in the Full Faith and Credit Clause has been
construed to mean statutes and common law. See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,
232 (1998) (“Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative measures and
common law) and to judgments.”).
446
See supra note 309 (discussing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S.
69 (1987), and the inconsistent -regulations standard for judging extraterritoriality).
447
See, e.g., Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am. v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 62425 (1947) (holding that a South Dakota court must give effect to an Ohio Law). This case’s
holding was later limited by the Supreme Court’s opinion in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd., 377 U.S. 179, 183 (1964), which characterized Wolfe as “a highly specialized decision
dealing with unique facts.” See also Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145, 163
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under this caselaw, full faith and credit took into account the Relative
Interests Dimension of interstate conflict and determined when the Home
State’s interests overrode the Host State’s interests such that the Home
State’s law trumped the Host State’s—even in the Host State’s courts.448 To
be sure, most courts and commentators believe this approach to full faith
and credit to be long dead.449
Though I believe this to be an
overstatement,450 it is true that today’s doctrine of full faith and credit would
have to be reworked were the clause to play the role described here. 451 In a
future work, I hope to explain why and how contemporary full faith and
credit doctrine should be modified.452
b. Eliminating conflict by recourse to ordinary conflict-of-laws principles
Many, perhaps most, interstate conflicts will not be resolved by means
of the above-mentioned constitutional principles. The next set of tools for
resolving such conflicts is ordinary conflict-of-laws doctrine. Like the
constitutional principles, this approach operates by effectively eliminating
the legislative jurisdiction of one of the regulating states. The elimination
is, however, by means of state common law rather than federal
constitutional law.
Taking up Professor Brilmayer’s concern, a skeptic might respond that
this effectively requires citizens to conform their behavior to the more
restrictive state’s legal regime due to uncertainty as to which state’s law
would be applied. There are two responses to such a critique. First,
uncertainty is not inherent, but instead is the result of shortcomings in
(1932) (holding that the Host State of New Hampshire must apply Home State Vermont law).
But again, this case’s holding was later denied broad applicability by Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 421-22 (1979), in which the Court stated that the opposite result of Clapper would be
permissible as a general principle.
448
See cases cited supra note 447.
449
See, e.g., SCOLES ET AL., supra note 124, at 146-47 (noting that the Supreme Court
has abandoned the Clapper line of cases).
450
For other suggestions that Clapper still has vitality, see Lea Brilmayer, Credit Due
Judgments and Credit Due Laws: The Respective Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit in the Interstate Context, 70 I OWA L. REV. 95, 107 n.74 (1984), discussing the Court’s
resurrection of Clapper, albeit in a limited way and with a new gloss; and Frederic L. Kirgis,
Jr., The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L.
REV. 94, 120, 122 -24 (1976), arguing that when another state has an interest in applying its
law that is overwhelming in comparison to the interest of the forum state, then Clapper is still
authority for the proposition that the Full Faith and Credit Clause requires the nonforum
state’s law be applied.
451
For the most important recent statements of the law of full faith and credit relevant to
sorting out interstate conflicts of legislative jurisdiction, see Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302, 307, 308 n.10 (1981).
452
Rosen, supra note 9.
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contemporary conflict-of-laws doctrine.
If the doctrine were more
determinate—and if full faith and credit were deemed to require that the
same choice-of-law doctrine be applied irrespective of the forum in which
an action was brought453 —then this uncertainty would be eliminated and
parties could know what law governed their activities. The appropriate
response is to improve our choice-of-law doctrine, not to manufacture
constitutional principles that purport to solve the problem through crude
elimination of the Home State’s legislative jurisdiction over its traveling
citizens. The second response, discussed immediately below, is that having
to conform one’s behavior to more than one state’s laws is not per se
problematic.
c. Embracing conflict
The final approach is to embrace the interstate conflict. Apart from
circumstances of Hard Conflict (which, in any event, probably are
eliminated by the right to travel) and inconsistent regulations that unduly
interfere with the national economy, having to conform one’s behavior to
the requirements of all interested states is not problematic. If one’s
activities implicate the legitimate interests of two or more states, then it
makes sense to permit the interested states to regulate the activity so as to
protect their legitimate interests. This is the lesson that emerges from the
Court’s Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence. And it is sensible: if more
than one state’s interests are affected by a particular activity, each state
ought to be able to protect its interests, unless doing so problematically
interferes with the constitutional federalism-based commitments of
protecting interstate commerce and not interfering with interstate travel. 454
453

See Laycock, supra note 380, at 310-11 (arguing that “[u]nder the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, the identity of the forum is irrelevant to choice of law”).
454
Professor Kreimer argues that permitting the Home State to regulate its citizens’ outof-state activities would be a “disincentive” to interstate travel and that “[i]n a nation whose
citizenship entails a right to travel among the states . . . such disincentives to interstate travel
should be minimized.” Kreimer, Whoever Treasures Freedom , supra note 49, at 916.
Professor Kreimer is correct that extraterritorial regulations may serve as a “disincentive” to
interstate travel, but that fact alone does not answer the question of whether extraterritoriality
is constitutional. As a general matter, our constitutional order is characterized by the
commitment to multiple constitutional principles; const itutional doctrine virtually never
reflects a decision to maximize one principle, but accommodates the numerous competing
principles that are applicable in any given circumstance. So while our constitutional order
undoubtedly includes a right to travel, constitutional law does not require that this right be
given its maximum conceivable scope, but instead harmonizes that right with other
constitutional commitments, such as the states’ powers as subfederal sovereigns (which, as I
have argued, includes the power to pursue efficacious regulations in respect of subject matters
that themselves are not unconstitutional). The “disincentive” Professor Kreimer speaks of
thus does not bespeak a constitutional deficiency, but instead is a manifestation of the fact that
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CONCLUSION
Many constitutional state policies can be skirted when citizens travel to
jurisdictions that permit activities that are banned in their Home State. The
United States’ federal system gives states significant powers to counter such
“travel-evasion.” Several constitutional doctrines govern Home State
extraterritorial powers. States have presumptive powers to regulate their
citizens’ out-of-state conduct, and extraterritorial regulation designed to
protect legitimate state interests from being thwarted by citizens’ out-ofstate activities satisfies due process. Such extraterritorial powers are not
precluded by the Dormant Commerce Clause, so long as the regulations are
not species of economic protectionism and are directed primarily to the
state’s own citizens. Nor is the Dormant Commerce Clause’s doctrine of
inconsistent regulations a significant barrier, insofar as it applies only to
those subjects that by their nature must be uniform across the country to
prevent undue interference with interstate commerce. Due to the right to
travel, Home States may not prevent their citizens from traveling to other
states. Neither the right to travel nor the Privileges and Immunities Clause,
however, grant a visitor the categorical right to be subject only to the Host
State’s laws once she leaves her Home State. The right to travel is mute on
the subject, and Host States have a substantial interest for purposes of
privileges and immunities in ensuring that they do not interfere with
visitors’ relationships with their Home States. Finally, neither the Full Faith
and Credit nor the Double Jeopardy Clauses limits Home States’ powers to
regulate their citizens’ extraterritorial behavior, though full faith and credit
doctrine as presently constituted undercuts Home States’ powers to apply
their laws over a particular transaction or occurrence that has been the
subject of a civil lawsuit in another state.
A state’s power to regulate its citizens’ out-of-state activities is
important to secure political heterogeneity across states. A federal system
in which states did not have extraterritorial powers over their traveling
citizens would systematically favor more permissive laws, undermine the
states’ ability to pursue paternalistic and norm-shaping goals, undercut the
states’ powers to protect third-party interests, and limit the extent of
experimentation across subfederal polities that otherwise could occur. It is
thus desirable that the Constitution is not interpreted as flatly foreclosing on
extraterritorial regulation, contrary to the views of many courts and noted
commentators. Subject to only a few limitations, the decision whether or
not to regulate extraterritorially so as to ensure the efficacy of important

constitutional law accommodates not only a right to travel but other constitutional
commitments, as well.

2002] EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND POLITICAL HETEROGENEITY

959

state laws is a matter that states may decide for themselves on the merits.
Even if no states elect to extraterritorially regulate their citizens, it is
important that they each have the opportunity to make the choice. The very
possibility of extraterritorial regulation of citizens secures rich political
heterogeneity across states, and a federal regime that allows such diversity
is normatively desirable under commonly held liberal premises.455
455

I would like to express my deep appreciation for Professor Kreimer’s response,
which appears immediately following this Article, for Professor Kreimer’s scholarship has
played a crucial role in shaping my views concerning extraterritoriality. Seth F. Kreimer,
Lines in the Sand, supra note 10. The editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review
have kindly allowed me a footnote to respond to his comments. These severe, though
understandable, space limitations allow me to provide only a partial analysis. I hope to reply
to many of Professor Kreimer’s other important points at a future date.
It might be useful to start by pinpointing our precise disagreement, for Professor Kreimer
is correct that there is much about which we concur. Most relevant, we agree that federalism
allows room for each state to pursue different political agendas. Co nsider substantive policy
choices that do not implicate the Constitution—such as whether or not a state should ban
gambling. Because constitutional rights are not directly implicated, different states can pursue
different policies in accordance with their views of what is best. For example, State A can ban
gambling in an effort to (let us say) paternalistically protect the would- be gambler from
himself and to guard the third-party interests of his family members, whom his gambling
might drive into poverty. Professor Kreimer and I part ways with respect to the extent of a
state’s regulatory power. Professor Kreimer believes that the Constitution imposes a
secondary restriction on states in relation to policies that themselves are constitutional. For
instance, even though State A’s constitutional paternalistic and third-party protection goals can
be readily circumvented if its citizens can travel to a state where gambling is legal and roll the
dice there, Professor Kreimer believes that the Constitution flatly prevents State A from taking
steps to counter this side -stepping of its legitimate law. In contrast, I do not believe that there
is any such general secondary restriction; though there are discrete limitations on a state’s
power to regulate its citizens’ out -of-state activities, these constraints largely leave intact
extraterritorial powers to impede the circumvention of state laws through travel. My
argument is primarily positive: I claim to be describing the current state of the law. Insofar as
crucial parts of the contemporary do ctrine turn on normative considerations, however, my
Article also examines normative factors.
Now to my brief comments. First, Professor Kreimer notes that few states have sought to
extraterritorially regulate, Kreimer, Lines in the Sand, supra note 10, at 975, and that many
states have vicinage requirements, id. at 976 n.9, app. These interesting observations do not
affect my Article’s analysis. The Article’s express focus is on federal constitutional
limitations on extraterritorial state regulation. Supra note 33 and accompanying text. Indeed,
extraterritoriality’s rarity reinforces the Article’s importance insofar as it seems to be
attributable to most states’ (mis)perceptions that the Constit ution flatly precludes such
regulation. Supra note 32. Similarly, vicinage requirements, which require that crimes be
tried in the place (variously defined) where they are committed, are a product of an era during
which it was believed that state legislative power did not extend beyond the state’s borders.
See, e.g., Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722 (1877) (“And so it is laid down by jurists, as an
elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its
territory . . . .”). In any event, states can eliminate vicinage requirements, if they wish, insofar
as they are state law requirements. But the extraterritorial regulations discussed in this Article
likely would not require a change of vicinage requirements. Most of the regulations discussed
are civil rather than criminal. Moreover, even criminal forms of the extraterritorial
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regulations discussed in this Article could satisfy state vicinage requirements. While vicinage
requirements typically are met if any element of a crime occurs in the vicinage, see, e.g.,
United States v. Rodriguez-Moreno, 526 U.S. 275, 281 (1999) (providing the federal rule), not
all states’ vicinage requirements demand that “some element of the crime or preparation must
occur in the county of trial,” see, e.g., Price v. Superior Court, 25 P.3d 618, 634 (Cal. 2001)
(noting that California’s constitution does not), and vicinage re quirements typically are not
absolute, in any event, but may be overridden for good reasons. See, e.g., State v. Hereford,
592 N.W. 2d 247, 252 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (noting that “maintaining venue in the county
where the crime was committed” is not “a fundamental right”). Furthermore, although no
state courts apparently have confronted the question, the place wh ere an activity’s effects are
felt may satisfy venue requirements if the effects are an element of the crime. Finally, even
under well-established doctrine, vicinage requirements presumably could be satisfied if
included as an element of the crime were so me in-state activity (like the planning that their
citizen’s undertook) that typically accompanies the out-of-state activity that the legislature
wished to regulate.
Next, although Professor Kreimer interprets many cases in importantly different ways
than I do—the details of which I unfortunately cannot address here and will discuss in future
scholarship—when all is said and done he appears to agree with the following conclusions to
which I come in my Article. As a matter of positive law, (1) the extent of a Home State’s
baseline extraterritorial powers is determined by the Shutts test, which asks whether
application of a state’s law would be “‘arbitrary’” or “‘fundamentally unfair,’” see Kreimer,
Lines in the Sand, supra note 10, at 993 (citations omitted); (2) the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of Article IV imposes limits on one state’s ability to regulate noncitizens, but has been
held to not impose limitations on a Home State’s power to regulate its own citizens, id. at
1003 & n.121; and (3) the Privileges and Immunities Clause allows a state to distinguish
between citizens and noncitizens where there is a “substantial” reason for so doing, id. at
1006-07. Furthermore, Professor Kreimer does not dispute that (4) the right to travel has not
been held to include a right for visitors to be subject to the same regulations as citizens if the
visitor’s Home State wants its peripatetic citizens to be subject to its laws while traveling, id.
at 1007 -08; (5) nor does he dispute that the Supreme Court upheld an extraterritorial
regulation over a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge in the CTS case and that, more
generally, many state laws (such as product liability laws) have significant regulatory effects
on out-of-state actors. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
Taken together, these propositions establish two things. First, as a matter of positive law,
states are not flatly prohibited from regulating their citizens’ out-of-state activities. Second, to
what extent they have such regulatory powers turns on largely normative considerations:
whether extraterritorial application would be “arbitrary” or “fundamentally unfair,” and
whether there is a “substantial reason” for a Host State to apply the Home State’s law to a
visitor in accordance with the Home State’s wishes. (Indeed, several other crucial parts of
Professor Kreimer’s analysis also are normatively impelled rather than “legally compelled,”
Kreimer, Lines in the Sand, supra note 10, at 975. Consider, for example, his argument that
the right to travel “becomes a hollow shell” unless it includes a visitor’s right to do what
residents can do, id. at 1007, and that privileges and immunities doctrine be reworked so that
it limits Home States, id. at 1003.)
For these reasons, my Article contains an extensive analysis of the normative
considerations that attend the question of whether states enjoy the power to extraterritor ially
regulate their citizens. Though I will not reproduce that analysis here, I would like to make a
few comments about Professor Kreimer’s treatment of the Article’s normative analysis. First,
a reader of Professor Kreimer’s Article could easily conclude that the only rationale for
extraterritoriality is the “projection of perfectionist morality”—a goal that most readers
presumably would not be particularly sympathetic to (more on this shortly). Kreimer, Lines in
the Sand, supra note 10, at 1008; see also id. at 981 (“perfectionist morality”); id. at 986
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(referring to “Professor Rosen’s regime of extraterrit orial moralism”); id. at 991-92
(“extraterritorial moralism”); id. at 1006 (same); id. at 1017 (“extraterritorial assertion of
moralism”). In fact, this Article explains that the power to regulate extraterritorially is
important for states to achieve far less controversial goals. Such powers are critical whenever
a law seeks to protect third-party interests or to serve paternalistic goals. Moreover,
extraterritorial powers help to advance structural federalism interests by allowing political
diversity and experimentation across states in respect of constitutional substantive policies.
Supra Parts I.C.3, II.A.4, II.B.
Although Professor Kreimer gives virtually no attention to these latter justifications for
extraterritoriality, he does critique the Rawlsian argument I provide for why, contrary to what
one is likely to believe at first, extraterritorial powers that allow the advancement of
“perfectionist” political agendas are normatively desirable from the perspective of liberalism.
I developed the core of this argument in an earlier article, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note
109, at 1053-1144, and in this Article I apply it to the issue of extraterritoriality, supra at Part
I.C.3.b. At the outset, it is important to note that my argument does not claim to be a
straightforward application of Rawls’s framework, but a self-conscious reworking of it. See
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 109, at 1108-10, 1110-24, 1124-25 (arguing that Rawls’s
analysis overlooks the subfederal polities; that their existence requires the adjustment of
several aspects of Rawls’s frame work; and that liberalism as a result can achieve a greater
degree of “neutrality in effect” and accommodate more types of persons than even Rawls
thinks is possible). As such, I think it is misleading to describe an explicit reformulation as a
“misappl[ication]” of Rawls’s analytical framework, Kreimer, Lines in the Sand , supra note
10, at 1009, particularly insofar as my analysis anticipates Professor Kreimer’s astute
objections, see Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 109, at 1106-26.
Professor Kreimer’s core rejoinder to my Rawlsian argument is that a person in the
original position would not select a political structure in which states had extraterritorial
powers, because it would be too burdensome. After all, he argues, if a state enacted a law that
advanced the behavior norm of Z, and a person were a Z-opponent, that person would be
forced either to abide by the norm of Z or to “leave[ her] home,
. . . job and . . . friends entirely” in the event that the state in which she lived had
extraterritorial powers. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand, supra note 10, at 1013. Faced with this
prospect, Professor Kreimer argues, a person in the original position would choose a political
structure in which states did not have extraterritorial powers. Id.
I think that Professor Kreimer’s criticism is mistaken. This can be seen best by
considering what he assumes the person in the original position would be willing to sacrifice.
Professor Kreimer acknowledges that there are persons who hold a go od faith belief that their
ability to self-actualize (in particular, their capacity to formulate a conception of the good)
depends on the active involvement of some subfederal level of government. Id. at 1010;
Rosen, Outer Limits, supra note 109, at 1064-71, 1090-93. Professor Kreimer also concedes
that such persons (whom I have dubbed “localist political perfectionists,” Rosen, Outer
Limits, supra note 109, at 1069), might believe that among the powers their subfederal polity
must have is the power to extraterritorially regulate its citizens. Kreimer, Lines in the Sand,
supra note 10, at 1010. Professor Kreimer’s argument thus assumes that a person in the
original position, not knowing whether she represented a non-perfectionist or a “localist
political perfectionist,” would choose a national political structure in which she could
actualize herself if she were a nonperfectionist, but not if she happened to be a political
perfectionist, even though she could have chosen a political structure in which she could have
been assured a place in which she could have been accommodated whether she were a
perfectionist or a nonperfectionist. I submit that if one takes seriously the original position’s
thought experiment of attempting to construct a fair society by asking what political structure
would be chosen by a person who really did not know whether she represented a perfectionist
or a nonperfectionist, a person would not come to Professor Kreimer’s conclusion. This is

962

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 150: 855

because the downside she would face if she in fact represented a perfectionist (absolute
inability to self-actualize anywhere in this country) would be far steeper than the relocation
costs she would bear if she represented a nonperfectionist who were born into a perfectionist
polity that extraterritorially regulated its members. Stated differently, basic liberties (i.e., the
liberty to develop a conception of the good) trump even significant costs of inconvenience
(i.e., relocation costs). More generally still, a host of differences among states (e.g., jobs,
marital prospects, climate, and geography) makes one state more attractive in one person’s
eyes than another, thereby enticing her to move. Why should the list of differences among
states not include full-bodied differences in states’ political communities with respect to
regulations that themselves are not unconstitutional? As Tieboutian analysis suggests, diverse
offerings of public goods across polities can increase utility, for people can choose to live in
the polity that affords them the public goods they value. See Tiebout, supra note 258, at 416.
(In any event, even if one were unconvinced by this Rawlsian argument, there remain the
above-mentioned, less controversial justifications for extraterritoriality.)
Finally, I would like to say that I, like Professor Kreimer, believe that states’ physical
boundaries are very important. I believe, however, that careful consideration shows that they
are only imperfect surrogates for demarcating where a polity’s legitimate interests end. This
mismatch between physical boundaries and legitimate interests has grown over time due to
various technological revolutions that increase the frequency of cross-border activities and, in
the process, provide citizens ever greater opportun ities to structure their activities so as to free
themselves of their Home State’s regulations. This is true even when those activities
primarily impact their Home State’s interests for all practical purposes. Though many
people—state governmental officials included—think that state legislative jurisdiction is
coterminous with state borders, this is a bygone, mistaken conception that erroneously
deprives states of extraterritorial regulatory powers that rightfully are theirs to exercise, if they
so choose. Describing the true scope of states’ extraterritorial powers, and explaining the
normative considerations that attend the exercise of such powers, were the tasks of this
Article.

